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ABSTRACT 
FAN RESPONSE TO LEAGUE PLAYOFF STRUCTURE AND CONSECUTIVE 
SEASON COMPETITIVE BALANCE IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 
MAY 2014 
RYAN SPALDING, B.S. PURDUE UNIVERSITY 
M.S. STANFORD UNIVERSITY 
M.B.A./M.S. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Ph.D. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
 
Directed by: Professor Neil Longley 
 
Competitive balance (the level of equality of playing talent across teams) is 
presumed to be a necessary element for league success due to the unique inter-dependent 
economic nature of professional sports which requires teams to have financially healthy 
rivals in order to field games (Rottenberg 1956).  Underlying this notion is the 
uncertainty of outcome hypothesis, which suggests that a fan’s interest in professional 
sports is dependent on various levels of uncertainty of outcome: individual game 
uncertainty (who will win the game), individual season uncertainty (who will win the 
championship), and consecutive season uncertainty (does the same team win the 
championship every year) (Cairns 1987).  Although there is an expanding body of 
literature that empirically tests the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis, most of it focuses 
on attendance responses to within-game or within-season measures of competitive 
balance.  In addition, nearly all previous studies focus on regular season outcomes only 
and completely ignore the playoffs (Longley and Lacey 2012).  Filling in a notable gap in 
the literature, this dissertation thus uses a new metric of competitive balance that relies on 
inter-seasonal measures of qualification for and advancement in the playoffs. 
vii 
 
 In addition to measuring fan response to this new measure of competitive balance 
that incorporates both playoff outcomes and consecutive season effects in a novel way, 
this dissertation also investigates the effects of league playoff rules on competitive 
balance.  No previous study has analyzed how the number of teams that qualify for the 
playoffs affects fan interest in a league through competitive balance concerns.  On the 
one hand, increasing the number of teams that qualify for the playoffs should increase fan 
interest by increasing the overall pool of teams that are competitive for a playoff spot.  
On the other hand, increasing the number of teams that qualify for the playoffs shifts the 
importance from the regular season to the playoffs, reducing fan interest in the regular 
season.  This dissertation empirically investigates the issue of fan response (as measured 
by league-wide regular season attendance figures) to varying levels of inter-seasonal 
competitive balance as measured by the churn of playoff qualifying/advancing teams and 
as affected by league playoff structures that dictate the number of teams making the 
playoffs.   
The results show that small changes in league playoff structure can significantly 
affect attendance.  It is predicted that if Major League Baseball were to further increase 
the number of teams that make the playoffs from 10 to 12, the average attendance per 
game would increase by over 4,300 (about 14% of the current average).  In the National 
Hockey League, a reduction in the number of teams that make the playoffs from 16 to 14 
is expected to increase the average attendance per game by over 700 (about 4% of the 
current average).  These results highlight the importance of including playoff 
considerations when investigating the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis as well as the 
value of competitive balance to sport league success. 
viii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS………………………………...………………………….....iv 
ABSTRACT…………………………...………………………………………………....vi 
LIST OF TABLES…………………………..………………………………………….....x 
CHAPTER 
1. INTRODUCTION…………………………..................................................…..……...1 
2. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPETITIVE BALANCE…….....….……6 
2.1 Theoretical Modeling of Professional Sports Leagues…..………………………11 
2.2 Analysis of Competitive Balance (ACB) Research……….……………………..20 
2.2.1 Seasonal Competitive Balance Measures………………………………..21 
2.2.2 Consecutive Season Competitive Balance Measures………………...….37 
2.2.3 Match Competitive Balance Measures…………………………………..43 
2.3 Uncertainty of Outcome Hypothesis (UOH) Research...………………………...44 
2.3.1 Tests Using Match Competitive Balance.………………………………..46 
2.3.2 Tests Using Seasonal Competitive Balance ………………………...…...55 
2.3.3 Tests Using Consecutive Season Competitive Balance ……………..…..60 
2.3.4 Tests Using Multiple Forms of Competitive Balance …………………...61 
2.4 Summary of Literature and Future Directions…………………………………...68 
3. CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT…….......73 
3.1 Playoff Structure UOH Hypothesis……………….………………..……………75 
3.2 Consecutive Season UOH Hypothesis……….….……………………………….83 
4. DATA AND ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY……..….…………………..…………91 
ix 
 
4.1 H1 Model Specification...……………..………………..…………………..........92 
4.2 H1 Research Variables…..……………………..……………………..………….98 
4.2.1 Independent Variables ……………………………………..……………98 
4.2.2 Dependent Variable.…...…………………………………………..…….99 
4.2.3 Control Variables……………………………………..………………...101 
4.3 H2 Model Specification……………………….………………………..………106 
4.4 H2 Research Variables……………………………………………………….....111 
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION....………...……………………..…………………114 
5.1 Playoff Structure UOH Hypothesis………………...……………………..……114 
5.2 Consecutive Season UOH Hypothesis………….………………………………125 
5.3 Control Variables……………………………………………………………….133 
5.4 Alternate Models…………………………….…………..……………………...137 
5.5 Concluding Discussion………………………………………………………....144 
6. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS.…..………...…………………..…………152 
6.1 Conclusion...……....................…………………………………………………152 
6.2 Implications……………..………………………………………………………153 
6.3 Limitations and Areas of Future Research………...……………………………156 
APPENDIX 
A. HISTORY OF PLAYOFF QUALIFYING TEAMS…………..…………..………...159 
B. REGRESSION RESULTS AND VARIABLE DEFINITIONS……………...……..162 
BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………...…………………………………………….....…182 
 
 
x 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table                          Page 
1. MLB H1 Descriptive Statistics……………………...…...……………………………96 
2. NHL H1 Descriptive Statistics…………………………..…………………..………..96 
3. NBA H1 Descriptive Statistics………………………………………………………..97 
4. MLB H2 Descriptive Statistics………………………………………………………109 
5. NHL H2 Descriptive Statistics………………………………………………………110 
6. NBA H2 Descriptive Statistics………………………………………………………110 
7. H1 Final Regression Models: Dependent Variable First Difference of Average 
Attendance per Game………………………………………………………………..116 
 
8. MLB Playoff Structure Results for Select Years……………………………………117 
 
9. NHL Playoff Structure Results for Select Years………………………………….…121 
 
10. MLB H2 Final Regression Models: Dependent Variable First Difference of Average 
Attendance per Game……………………..…………………..…………….…127-128 
 
11. NHL H2 Final Regression Models: Dependent Variable First Difference of Average 
Attendance per Game……………..……………………………………….…..129-130 
 
12. NBA H2 Final Regression Models: Dependent Variable First Difference of Average 
Attendance per Game……..……………………………………………….…..131-132 
 
13. MLB Regression Models: Dependent Variable Average Attendance per Game..…167 
 
14. MLB Regression Models: Dependent Variable Average Attendance per Game as a 
Percent of Capacity…………………………………………………………………168 
 
15. MLB Regression Models: Dependent Variable Average Attendance per Game 
Weighted by Ticket Price…………………………...………………………………169 
 
16. MLB Regression Models: Dependent Variable First Difference of Average 
Attendance per Game…………...…………………………………………………..170 
 
17. MLB Regression Models: Dependent Variable First Difference of Average 
Attendance per Game as a Percent of Capacity……………………………….……171 
 
xi 
 
18. MLB Regression Models: Dependent Variable First Difference of Average 
Attendance per Game Weighted by Ticket Price………………..…………….……172 
 
19. NHL Regression Models: Dependent Variable Average Attendance per Game...…173 
 
20. NHL Regression Models: Dependent Variable Average Attendance per Game as a 
Percent of Capacity………………………...……………………………………….174 
 
21. NHL Regression Models: Dependent Variable First Difference of Average 
Attendance per Game…………………………...…………………………………..175 
 
22. NHL Regression Models: Dependent Variable First Difference of Average 
Attendance per Game as a Percent of Capacity……………………………….……176 
 
23. NBA Regression Models: Dependent Variable Average Attendance per Game…...177 
 
24. NBA Regression Models: Dependent Variable Average Attendance per Game as a 
Percent of Capacity…………...…………………………………………………….178 
 
25. NBA Regression Models: Dependent Variable First Difference of Average 
Attendance per Game………………………...……………………………………..179 
 
26. NBA Regression Models: Dependent Variable First Difference of Average 
Attendance per Game as a Percent of Capacity ………….……………………...…180 
 
27. H1 Final Regression Models, Subset: Dependent Variable First Difference of 
Average Attendance per Game……………………………………………………..181 
  
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Competitive balance in sport has become a major research topic of interest in 
recent years.  The early work (Rottenberg 1956; Neale 1964; El-Hodiri & Quirk 1971) 
effectively defined the unique inter-dependent economic nature of sport and how 
competitive balance, in theory, is essential for long-run profit maximization of a league 
and its member teams.  More recent work has empirically investigated the levels of 
competitive balance in leagues over the years as well as any effects such balance (or lack 
thereof) has had on consumer behavior.  Fort and Maxcy (2003) summarized these two 
distinct lines of recent competitive balance research as analysis of competitive balance 
(ACB) and uncertainty of outcome hypothesis (UOH) literature.   
ACB research focuses on measuring the level of competitive balance in leagues 
and the effect on balance of league wide rule changes such as free agency.  Cairns (1987) 
categorized competitive balance into three areas: individual game uncertainty (who will 
win the game), individual season uncertainty (who will win the championship), and 
consecutive season uncertainty (does the same team win the championship every year).  
Most research uses within-season uncertainty as the metric for competitive balance, but 
the precise measure of the level of balance takes many forms.  Various measures of 
competitive balance include: standard deviation of win percentage (Quirk & Fort 1992), 
excess tail frequency of win percentage (Fort & Quirk 1995), Gini coefficients (Schmidt 
& Berri 2001), and the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (Depken 1999).   
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In addition to the within-season research on competitive balance, several studies 
have looked to investigate long-term competitive balance under the premise that 
uncertainty of outcome across seasons is more important than within a given season.  The 
reasoning is that fans are willing to continue to support and follow a team even if its 
prospects during the current season are dim as long as its potential for the next few 
seasons is sufficiently good.  This represents a significant departure from the previous 
literature as within-season competitive balance only considers how evenly matched the 
teams are as a whole and not which specific teams are actually winning.  Therefore, to 
assess the level of inter-seasonal competitive balance within leagues, new metrics are 
needed that measure effects across seasons such as the concentration of championships 
(Quirk and Fort 1992; Eckard 2001), cross-season correlation coefficients (Butler 1995; 
Lee and Fort 2008; Lee 2010) and Markov transitional probabilities (Hadley et. al. 2005; 
Krautmann and Hadly 2006). 
Although ACB research has provided various measures of competitive balance in 
professional sports leagues over the years, as well as examples of policy changes that 
have affected competitive balance one way or the other, the research is fraught with 
uncertainties and contradictory findings.  Overall, the field could benefit from the 
determination of a standard measure of competitive balance that is the most useful or 
important.  However, determining usefulness or importance is a tricky situation.  
Zimbalist (2002) argues that “the best measure of competitive balance is the one to which 
the consumers show greatest sensitivity.”  In Zimbalist’s view, competitive balance 
research should focus on investigating how the consumer responds to changes in the level 
of competitive balance (UOH research).  He goes on to argue that many of the traditional 
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means of measuring competitive balance by academics are inadequate because the fans 
do not experience game or season outcomes in that manner.  As a result, this dissertation 
is rooted in UOH and seeks to define an appropriate competitive balance measure to 
which consumers show significant sensitivity. 
Although there is an expanding body of uncertainty of outcome hypothesis 
(UOH) literature, most of it focuses on attendance responses to within-game measures of 
competitive balance (e.g. Peel and Thomas 1988, 1992; Knowles et. al. 1992) or within-
season measures (e.g. Schmidt and Berri 2001; Meehan et. al. 2007).  Filling in a notable 
gap in this literature, this dissertation thus proposes a new measure of competitive 
balance that relies on inter-season measures of qualification for and advancement in the 
playoffs.  As pointed out in a recent paper by Longley and Lacey (2012), most previous 
competitive balance studies focus on regular season outcomes only and completely 
ignore the playoffs, which runs contrary to fundamental notions of how fans evaluate 
team success.  For example, if a team finishes the regular season with the best record but 
then languishes in the playoffs, it will likely be considered an unsuccessful season.  A 
recent example of this could be the 2001 Seattle Mariners which set the all-time regular 
season record for wins in Major League Baseball with 116 but lost in the 2
nd
 round of the 
playoffs.  Conversely, if a team just manages to make the playoffs but then ends up 
winning the championship, it will likely be considered a hugely successful season.  In 
2012 the New York Giants (National Football League) and Los Angeles Kings (National 
Hockey League) won their respective championships despite qualifying for the playoffs 
in their final game of the regular season.  These examples highlight the importance of the 
playoffs and that such considerations, which are not found in most previous research, 
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should form the basis of appropriate competitive balance measures.  Therefore, this study 
proposes a playoff qualification/advancement churn variable that measures how 
frequently the same teams qualify for the playoffs each year and whether the same teams 
advance to each later round of the playoffs (including winning the championship). 
In addition to measuring fan response to this new measure of competitive balance 
that incorporates both playoff outcomes and inter-season effects in a novel way, this 
study will also investigate the effects of league playoff rules on competitive balance for 
the first time.  Longley and Lacey (2012) evaluated the effect of league playoff pooling 
structures on competitive balance, but no study has thus far investigated how the number 
of teams that qualify for the playoffs affects fan interest in a league through competitive 
balance concerns.  Adding this effect of playoff structure to the study could be especially 
illuminating as within and across leagues, the number of teams that qualify for the 
playoffs each year has varied wildly. 
Although there is a significant existing literature on competitive balance, much of 
it completely ignores the issue of the playoffs (both structure and outcomes) and how it 
affects the notion of the optimal level of competitive balance in sport leagues.  Of the few 
studies that explicitly include competitive balance measures that relate to the playoffs, 
none consider inter-seasonal competitive balance or the effects of the number of playoff 
teams on this balance.  The proposal for this paper is therefore to investigate the issue of 
fan response (as measured by league-wide attendance figures) to varying levels of inter-
seasonal competitive balance as measured by the churn of playoff qualifying/advancing 
teams and as affected by league playoff structures that dictate the number of teams 
making the playoffs. 
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The remainder of the dissertation is structured as described below.  Chapter 2 
provides a review of the literature related to competitive balance in professional sports.  
Chapter 3 describes the conceptual theory forming the basis of this study and develops 
testable hypotheses.  Chapter 4 describes the methodology for completing the 
investigation previously detailed.  Chapter 5 summarizes the results of the empirical 
analysis used to test the hypotheses and offers a discussion of the important findings.  
Chapter 6 concludes with limitations, implications, and areas of future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPETITIVE BALANCE 
 
The notion of competitive balance and its importance to the health and viability of 
a professional sports league can be traced to Rottenberg’s (1956) seminal article that 
essentially created the field of sport economics.  Although Rottenberg specifically 
discusses Major League Baseball (MLB), his two principle arguments concerning 
competitive balance are applicable for all of the Big Four major professional sport 
leagues in the United States: MLB, the National Football League (NFL), the National 
Basketball Association (NBA), and the National Hockey League (NHL).  First, 
Rottenberg asserts that some general level of competitive equality (i.e. all teams within a 
given league are composed of players with similar levels of talent) is necessary for a 
league to be financially successful.  This argument is predicated on the unique economic 
inter-dependence of teams within a given professional league.  Unlike every other 
industry where companies strive to out-perform their rivals and drive them out of 
business, sport teams rely on some level of success of their competitors in order to stay 
viable.  A league that saw its weakest teams continually struggle to compete and go out 
of business would soon fail entirely due to a lack of available teams to play games.  
Therefore, “competitors must be of approximately equal ‘size’ if any are to be 
successful” (Rottenberg 1956, pg. 242).  This unique nature of professional sports forms 
the basis of the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis, which asserts that fans are most 
interested in games where there is uncertainty as to which team will be the victor and in 
leagues where there is uncertainty as to which team will win the championship.  A league 
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with a focus not only in remaining viable but also in maximizing league-wide revenues 
would therefore seek to ensure a level of competitive balance amongst teams that 
maximized the uncertainty of outcome. 
Neale (1964) furthers this theoretical discussion of the importance of competitive 
balance by extending the analysis to individual sports.  In what he deems the Louis-
Schmeling Paradox, Neale describes how the heavy-weight boxing champion (in this case 
Joe Louis) wants to face an opponent that has a legitimate chance to win (in this case 
Max Schmeling) in order to increase fan interest and the corresponding profits from 
fighting him.  Although a lesser opponent would mean an easier victory, decreased fan 
interest in this more certain outcome would lead to lower prize money and prestige.  And 
in the worst case scenario, Joe Louis doesn’t have anyone to fight and therefore earns no 
income.  In addition, the author discusses the importance of season-long competitive 
balance for a team sport league, described as the “league standing effect.”  This form of 
competitive balance finds fans interested in the daily changes in the standings or merely 
in the possibility of those daily changes.  As the season goes on, closer standings will 
increase fan interest and drive larger gate receipts. 
Quirk and Fort (1992) continue this foundational discussion of the need for 
competitive balance in the four major professional sport leagues.  Following Rottenberg 
(1956) and Neale (1964), Quirk and Fort assert that a key determinant for fan interest in a 
league is the excitement generated from close games and the uncertainty surrounding 
which team will win.  Furthermore, sport leagues must act to ensure that the level of 
playing talent across teams is approximately equal so that the uncertainty of outcome is 
preserved.  If leagues are competitively unbalanced, with playing talent concentrated in 
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just a few good teams, the authors argue that fan interest in the weaker teams will 
diminish, followed thereafter by a decrease in fan interest for the strong teams as well.  
To support these assertions, the authors give several examples where dominance by an 
individual team eroded league-wide attendance.  For example, the Cleveland Browns of 
the All American Football Conference (AAFC) won all four AAFC championships 
during the league’s existence from 1946-1949 before a partial merger with the NFL.  
During that reign of Browns dominance, the team saw its per game attendance drop from 
57,000 in 1946 to under 30,000 in 1949.  Similarly, the dominating runs of the 1927 New 
York Yankees and 1931 Philadelphia Athletics (who won the American League by 19 
games and 13 games, respectively) contributed to overall league-wide attendance drops 
of 300,000 and 800,000 respectively.  In the latter case, the Athletics themselves 
witnessed a drop in attendance of 100,000 during their dominant season.  Although 
merely anecdotal, these examples provide support for the idea that maintaining 
competitive balance amongst teams (ensuring that there is uncertainty of outcome) is an 
important determinant of fan interest and therefore the financial livelihood of a 
professional sports league. 
To further define what is meant by competitive balance and the corresponding 
uncertainty of outcome, Cairns (1987) segments the concept into three distinct branches.  
First, there is the uncertainty with respect to individual games (match uncertainty; game 
uncertainty) where competitive balance can be measured as some level of the difference 
in talent between the two competing teams.  Second, there is the uncertainty with respect 
to individual championships (seasonal uncertainty; within season uncertainty; intra-
seasonal uncertainty) where competitive balance can be measured as some level of the 
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difference in the final season-long standings of all teams within a league.  And third, 
there is uncertainty with respect to multiple championships across seasons (consecutive 
season uncertainty; across-season uncertainty; inter-seasonal uncertainty) where 
competitive balance can be measured as some level of the concentration of 
championships among the teams within a league.  In addition to these three broad forms 
of competitive balance/uncertainty of outcome, Fort and Maxcy (2003) suggest that there 
are two main streams of competitive balance research.  The first is deemed “analysis of 
competitive balance” (ACB) research, which empirically measures what has happened to 
competitive balance over time or as a result of institutional changes (such as free agency 
or revenue sharing) in professional sports leagues.  The second is deemed “uncertainty of 
outcome hypothesis” (UOH) research, which measures the fan response to differences in 
competitive balance within a league over time.   
Although not mentioned by Fort and Maxcy, a third stream of competitive 
balance research can be identified which involves theoretical modeling of professional 
sports leagues in order to determine the hypothetical effects of institutional rule changes 
on competitive balance.  This theoretical modeling is rooted in the second main 
contribution from Rottenberg (1956) concerning competitive balance, which is known as 
the invariance principle.  This principle states that under a certain set of reasonable 
assumptions, the initial allocation of resources has no effect on the final distribution of 
those resources.  The primary applicability of the invariance principle to professional 
sports and competitive balance involves the concept of the reserve system, which existed 
in all of the Big Four leagues into the 1970s and which essentially bound individual 
players to specific teams for their entire playing career.  The opposite of the reserve 
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system is complete free agency, where players are allowed to sell their services to the 
highest bidder among all of the teams in the league.  The team owners argued that the 
reserve system was necessary to preserve competitive balance, as without it, nothing 
would prevent large-market, rich teams from buying up all of the playing talent and 
creating competitive imbalance.  However, Rottenberg argues that the reserve rule does 
not change owners’ behavior, as trades and cash sales facilitate the transfer of players 
such that they end up on the team with which their value is highest, just as in a free labor 
market.  A simple example can illustrate this point, where a star player initially plays for 
a small market team where he generates $5 million in revenue per year for the team.  If 
he were to play for a large market team, he would generate $10 million in revenue per 
year for the team due to the additional revenue potential of the larger market.  In this 
case, any trade or cash offer from the large-market team to the small-market team for the 
player that was valued at between $5 million and $10 million per year would be 
financially beneficial for both teams and the trade should occur.  Thus, players should 
end up on the team for which their marginal revenue product is the highest, just as in free 
agency.  As a result, instead of preserving competitive balance as the owners proclaim, 
Rottenberg states that the true purpose of the reserve rule is simply to depress player 
salaries due to the unequal bargaining power in the reserve system’s monopsony market, 
where every player can only sell his services to one team. 
Building on this theoretical foundation, El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) introduce a 
mathematical model to formally prove some of the assertions concerning the importance 
of competitive balance for a league.  Using an n-team decision making model, the authors 
show that as long as different markets have different revenue potential based on local 
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team success, perfect competitive balance is inconsistent with league-wide profit 
maximization.  This conclusion suggests that the owners’ arguments in favor of certain 
restrictions such as the reserve clause as necessary means to promote competitive balance 
are largely unfounded as perfect balance is not a desired outcome for the league as it was 
currently constructed.  However, the authors also use their model to show that perfect 
competitive balance can be achieved if, among other things, cash sales of players are 
prohibited under the reserve clause.  El-Hodiri and Quirk’s analysis, the first formal 
mathematical modeling of a professional sports league, laid the groundwork for future 
theoretical studies that have investigated the effect on competitive balance of institutional 
rule changes such as the implementation of free agency, revenue sharing, luxury taxes, 
and salary caps.  Section 2.1 reviews the literature in this area.  Section 2.2 reviews the 
ACB literature for each of the three forms of competitive balance, highlighting how the 
ACB line of research is often an empirical extension of the previous theoretical analysis.  
Section 2.3 reviews the UOH literature for each of the three forms of competitive 
balance, and concludes by showing that while ACB and UOH remain largely separate 
lines of inquiry, they are natural complements with the results from UOH analysis 
informing appropriate ACB study. 
 
2.1 Theoretical Modeling of Professional Sports Leagues 
Building off of El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971), Fort and Quirk (1995) create a 
theoretical framework of a professional sports league that assumes that team owners are 
profit-maximizers and that they choose a level of playing talent to maximize their profits 
in an n-team non-cooperative game where revenues are only a function of win percentage 
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and the drawing potential of a team’s location.  Since fans prefer to see their team win, it 
is natural to assume that a team’s revenues are an increasing function of team win 
percentage.  As far as team location, all of the Big Four professional leagues in the 
United States have exclusive monopoly territorial rights that create differences in their 
revenue potential based on the markets in which they reside (e.g. the New York market 
has far greater revenue generating potential than the Pittsburgh market due to its greater 
population and per capita income).  In order to lessen the effect of these market 
differences and promote competitive balance, leagues have instituted various rules such 
as revenue sharing that serve to subsidize the weaker-drawing teams.  However, the 
authors show that with the exception of salary caps, none of the devices meant to promote 
competitive balance actually achieve such a result. 
With no market restrictions in the theoretical model, the equilibrium profit-
maximizing situation is for large market teams to purchase more playing talent and have 
higher win percentages than the small market teams.  Two significant market restrictions 
meant to reduce this large market advantage are the reserve clause and the reverse order 
draft, both of which are shown in this model to have no effect on competitive balance in 
keeping with the invariance principle put forth by Rottenberg (1956).  In both cases, it is 
expected that small market teams will simply sell their best players to the large market 
teams where their revenue generating potential is the highest, thus restoring the 
competitive dis-equilibrium found in the case with no market restrictions (free agency). 
 Instead of having the effect of promoting competitive balance, as often claimed 
by owners as justification for needing these market restrictions, Fort and Quirk show that 
the reserve clause and the rookie draft largely have the effect of depressing player 
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salaries.  The same is true of revenue sharing agreements, both gate/local TV revenue 
sharing as well as national TV revenue sharing.  In either case, the transfer of revenue 
from the strong-drawing teams to the weak-drawing teams increases their financial 
livelihood, but it does nothing to change the underlying differences in revenue generating 
potential between the teams, and the corresponding equilibrium points of win percentage 
that maximize profits.  However, because each win is now worth less to an individual 
teams due to revenue sharing, the value of additional talent is reduced and player salaries 
are lowered correspondingly. 
 The one institutional control that Fort and Quirk (1995) suggest can lead to 
greater competitive balance is the salary cap, where all teams are forced to spend within 
an upper (cap) and lower bound (floor) on total player payroll.  Although such a result is 
shown to reduce overall league profitability and create the incentive to cheat (e.g. large 
market teams will want to spend more than the cap on playing talent and earn more wins, 
while small market teams will want to spend less than the floor), a properly enforced 
salary cap should have beneficial effects on competitive balance.  This result is replicated 
by Kesenne (2000a), where it is shown that even in the case of just a salary cap (with no 
salary floor and no revenue sharing), the cap promotes competitive balance. 
 Vrooman (1995) builds on the analysis from Fort and Quirk (1995) by utilizing 
less limiting assumptions that allow the revenue and cost elasticities of winning to vary 
across teams.  Under this specification, the relationship between the competitive 
equilibrium and market size is more complicated and requires knowledge about the 
specifics of the revenue and cost functions for different teams.   Nevertheless, this more 
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expansive model replicates the finding that revenue sharing should have no effect on 
competitive balance. 
Kesenne (2000b) adds to the theoretical modeling by considering team revenues 
as a function of not only market size and winning percentage but also away team winning 
percentage, under the premise that fans prefer to see games with quality competition.  
Under this specification, Kesenne shows that revenue sharing can impact competitive 
balance as long as the downward shift in the demand curve for playing talent is not the 
same for all teams.  If visiting team winning percentage is excluded from the model, or if 
the impact of home and away team quality on revenue is assumed to be the same for all 
teams, then revenue sharing will not affect competitive balance as was found in previous 
studies.  Although these results were for the standard economic assumption of profit-
maximizing owners, the same model was further expanded to include win maximizing 
owners with the finding that revenue sharing in this case impacts competitive balance 
regardless of whether the visiting team winning percentages is an important determinant 
of team revenues. 
Vrooman (2009) furthers the analysis of the effect of revenue sharing and salary 
caps on competitive balance by considering closed and open leagues, as well as win-
maximizing and profit-maximizing owners.  As was shown in previous studies using 
profit-maximizing owners, the asymmetry of market size leads to competitive imbalance.  
This imbalance is worse for closed leagues (leagues with monopoly territorial rights such 
as in the Big Four leagues) as compared to open leagues (leagues with freedom of entry 
to create new teams in any market such as in European football).  Adding revenue sharing 
to the closed league does not change the level of competitive balance, but revenue 
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sharing in an open league is shown to reduce competitive balance.  The effect of a salary 
cap is to increase competitive balance, but this effect is negated by the addition of 
revenue sharing which causes the league to revert to its original level of imbalance.  In 
order for a payroll cap plus revenue sharing to increase competitive balance, a payroll 
minimum is necessary.  For win-maximizing leagues, the model shows that although the 
original level of competitive balance is worse than for profit-maximizing leagues, the 
implementation of revenue sharing, payroll caps, or both can increase the level of 
competitive balance.  This result is in contrast to Fort and Quirk (2004), who show that in 
consideration of win-maximizing and profit-maximizing leagues, it is indeterminate as to 
which league would show greater competitive balance.  Instead, these two types of 
leagues can be identified by the fact that win-maximizing leagues have higher talent costs 
and greater demand for talent. 
Szymanski and Kesenne (2004) add to the theoretical model by eliminating the 
assumption that the total supply of talent is fixed and therefore their model does not 
require that the acquisition of a given unit of talent by one team necessarily reduces the 
level of talent of the other team by the same level.  Without this limiting assumption it is 
shown that increasing the level of revenue sharing actually causes a reduction in the level 
of competitive balance.  This result is replicated by Kesenne (2005) for profit-
maximizing owners, but in a league of win-maximizing owners, revenue sharing is 
expected to increase the level of competitive balance.  For the standard profit-maximizing 
case, the implementation of revenue sharing decreases the demand for talent for all teams 
(thus lowering player salaries), but the reduction is lower for the teams with higher levels 
of playing talent and thus competitive balance is diminished. 
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 Miller (2007) shows that the pool revenue sharing system currently employed by 
the MLB and NFL (where each team pays the same percentage of its local revenues into a 
central fund) proportionally lowers the free agent reservation price of all teams such that 
the level of competitive balance is unchanged.  However, changing the revenue sharing 
system such that higher revenue teams pay a larger percentage of their revenues into the 
sharing fund than lower revenue teams can affect competitive balance by lowering the 
reservation prices of the higher revenue teams by a greater amount than that for the lower 
revenue teams.  Furthermore, if the percentage of shared revenue received by each small 
market team is an increasing function of win percent, than the reservation prices of small 
market teams can actually be raised, and competitive balance can be increased as a result. 
Chang and Sanders (2009) replicate this result concerning pool revenue sharing 
and competitive balance, but additionally show that this type of revenue sharing could 
actually worsen balance.  The reason for this is that low revenue teams face a moral 
hazard problem where spending the revenue sharing money on upgrading their playing 
talent is less profitable than just keeping the money.  As a result, overall spending on 
player talent decreases in a pool revenue sharing system while at the same time the 
difference in win percentage between the high revenue and low revenue teams is 
increased.  Chang and Sanders propose and theoretically show that a pool revenue 
sharing system combined with minimum payroll levels that all teams must reach has the 
potential of increasing competitive balance by forcing low revenue teams to invest their 
revenue sharing funds in team improvement. 
 Crooker and Fenn (2007) show that, given a casual relationship from competitive 
balance to fan interest, leagues will under-provide competitive balance based on 
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individual team owners acting to maximize their own (and not league-wide) profits.  This 
result is conceptually similar to the free market economic outcome of public goods being 
under-provided, where in this case the public good is competitive balance.  Crooker and 
Fenn show that competitive balance can be restored, and league-wide profits maximized, 
if a tax and lump-sum payments are enforced.  Dietl et. al. (2010) further this discussion 
of the effect of luxury taxes on competitive balance, showing that a luxury tax that taxes 
payroll above the league average and redistributes the revenue proportionally to below 
average payroll teams will increase the level of competitive balance in the league.  This is 
because small market teams end up spending more on player salaries in the luxury cap 
system while large market teams either spend less, or increase their spending to a degree 
that is smaller than that seen for the small market teams.  The observed increase in 
competitive balance also rises as the luxury tax rate rises. 
 Grossman et. al. (2010) further the analysis of the effect of revenue sharing on 
competitive balance by using a dynamic contest model with an infinite time horizon.  
Unlike all of the previous studies using just a single period, Grossman et. al. emphasize 
that team investments in playing talent are often multi-year commitments that are 
expected to yield returns over time.  As a result, analysis of just a single period is 
insufficient to properly model team investment behavior.  Using this dynamic model, it is 
shown that the impact of revenue sharing on competitive balance depends on three 
factors: the cost function of talents investments, the clubs’ market sizes, and the initial 
endowments of talent stock.  Based on differing combinations of these three parameters, 
the invariance principle holds only in the case where all teams have the same market size.  
Under this situation, the long term equilibrium of the league will always be complete 
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balance regardless of the degree of revenue sharing.  For teams with different market 
sizes, revenue sharing is shown to decrease the long-run level of competitive balance by 
creating a disincentive for the small market teams to invest in playing talent.  In this case, 
there is a greater marginal impact to a decreased investment in a small market team’s 
talent (due to the revenue share from the large market teams, which are now more 
successful) than to an increase in its own talent.  Revenue sharing is also shown to 
decrease the rate of convergence to a more balanced long-term state when there is an 
initial unequal endowment of playing talent.  Grossman et. al. conclude that league 
managers intent on increasing competitive balance should lower the degree of revenue 
sharing. 
 Dietl, Grossman, and Lang (2011) add to the theoretical model by considering 
sport leagues composed of utility maximizing owners.  Previous research has assumed 
that leagues are either composed of profit-maximizing owners or win-maximizing 
owners.  In contrast, this study assumes that owners maximize utility, some weighted 
combination of wins and profits.  In this situation, the equilibrium win percentages 
between a large and small market team may be closer to competitive balance if the small 
market team has a greater preference for wins than the large market team.  In fact, if its 
preference for wins is large enough relative to profits, the small market team could be the 
dominant team in equilibrium.  In regards to revenue sharing, it is shown that revenue 
sharing can lead to greater competitive balance if it has a positive effect on marginal 
revenue, an outcome that is impossible in a purely profit-maximizing league.  However, 
if revenue sharing has a negative effect on marginal effect, competitive balance will 
worsen. 
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 Dietl, Lang, and Rathke (2011) more thoroughly analyze the joint effect of pool 
revenue sharing and salary caps/floors.  It is shown that if neither the cap nor floor is 
binding, revenue sharing has no effect on competitive balance, but merely lowers player 
salaries.  If the cap is binding for the large market team but the floor is not binding for the 
small market team, revenue sharing decreases competitive balance and the imposition of 
a stricter salary cap would increase balance.  If the cap is not binding for the large market 
team, but the floor is binding for the small market team, revenue sharing increases 
competitive balance as does the imposition of a stricter salary floor.  Lastly, if the cap (or 
floor) is binding for both teams, then the league is perfectly balanced and revenue sharing 
will not have any effect on this balance. 
 In total, this stream of literature that theoretically models the economics of a 
professional sports league showcases the complexities involved in competitive balance 
research.  Although there is some general agreement across studies concerning the 
validity of the invariance principle as it relates to the reserve clause and the reverse order 
draft, the impact of revenue sharing on competitive balance depends heavily on the 
specifics of the underlying model, with results ranging from increasing balance, to having 
no effect on balance, to decreasing balance.  In addition, the effects of salary caps/floors, 
luxury taxes, and all of the various potential forms of revenue sharing are all inter-related 
and impact competitive balance in complex ways.  As a result, the second major stream 
of competitive balance research, analysis of competitive balance, seeks to empirically test 
the ideas put forth by these theoretical models.  However, empirically measuring 
competitive balance raises further complications, as all of these theoretical models simply 
use the distribution of playing talent among teams as the metric for the level of 
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competitive balance in a league.  Directly observing the level of talent on each team as a 
practical exercise is impossible, so new measures are needed (such as win percentages) 
which proxy for talent.  There are a large number of different measures for each of the 
three forms of competitive balance (match, seasonal, consecutive season), and no general 
consensus as to which is preferable for each form.  These different measures, and well as 
the ACB findings from using them, are reviewed in the next section. 
 
2.2 Analysis of Competitive Balance (ACB) Research 
 Analysis of competitive balance (ACB) research involves empirically measuring 
the level of competitive balance in professional sports leagues.  The purpose and 
contribution of such research is threefold.  First, the relative level of competitive balance 
for a given league can be determined over time, such that conclusions can be drawn 
concerning the observed improvement or worsening of competitive balance.  Second, the 
relative level of competitive balance can be compared across leagues.  And lastly, 
competitive balance can be measured before and after institutional changes such as free 
agency in order to provide an empirical test for the invariance principle and other 
conclusions put forth by the theoretical modeling in the previous section.  The vast 
majority of ACB studies to date have looked at seasonal measures of competitive balance 
and as a result the review of the ACB literature will start there.  Later sections will review 
consecutive season studies and then match level studies. 
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2.2.1 Seasonal Competitive Balance Measures 
The first seasonal competitive balance measure used by early scholars is the 
standard deviation of final season win percentages (or league points).  The idea is that the 
more spread-out are the final standings, the less competitive balance exists between the 
teams in that season.  In this regard, high values for the standard deviation of win 
percentages are associated with low levels of competitive balance, and perfect balance 
occurs when the standard deviation is zero.  Cairns (1987) uses this measure to assess the 
impact of the re-organization of the Scottish Football League in 1975 on seasonal 
competitive balance.  Using data from 1971-1980, the author shows that the re-
organization of the top division from 18 teams to 10 teams in 1975 did not affect the 
seasonal uncertainty of outcome.   
Scully (1989) uses the standard deviation of win percentages to investigate the 
level of competitive balance in MLB throughout its history (1876 through 1987).  Over 
this time frame, the level of seasonal balance shows a small but constant increase over the 
entire history of MLB, suggesting that playing strengths have become more equal over 
time.  Scully also uses this measure to assess the effect of free agency on competitive 
balance by comparing the period of 1961-1976 with the period of 1977-1987, finding no 
change in competitive balance for the American League (AL) and an increase in 
competitive balance in the National League (NL) after free agency was implemented in 
1976.  Balfour and Porter (1991) show similar results using the same seasonal balance 
measure and MLB data from 1961-1989.  Comparing the pre- and post-free agency 
periods, a statistically significant decrease in the standard deviation of win percentages 
from 56.6 to 48.3 (increased balance) was found.  Fort and Quirk (1995) use standard 
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deviation data from 1966-1975 as the reserve period and from 1976-1985 as the free 
agent period, finding that competitive balance stayed the same in the NL but went down 
slightly in the AL, although the result was not significant.  The results from these studies 
show that over the periods measured, the final standings are equally or more tightly 
bunched under free agency than under the reserve clause, suggesting that free agency 
might actually promote competitive balance.  This is in stark contrast to the owners’ 
arguments that the reserve clause was necessary to maintain the financial viability of the 
league otherwise large market teams would dominate. 
Quirk and Fort (1992) introduce three additional measures of seasonal uncertainty 
of outcome that are based on the standard deviation of win percentages.  First, they 
calculate the range of win percentages of each league by subtracting the lowest win 
percentage from the highest, giving a measure of the overall spread of team talent in a 
league.  However, this method does not account for what is happening with the remainder 
of teams that are not the very best or worst, and therefore this method is not as 
informative as the standard deviation of win percentages.  However, the standard 
deviation of win percentages suffers from the fact that it cannot be used to accurately 
compare competitive balance across leagues, since even in a perfectly balanced league 
the standard deviation will be larger in a league with fewer games due to chance (just like 
flipping a coin will likely deviate significantly from 50% heads and 50% tails for a low 
number of flips).  As a result, Quirk and Fort calculate the ratio of the actual (observed) 
standard deviation of win percentage to the idealized standard deviation of win 
percentage, where the idealized standard deviation is determined from a normal 
distribution of the outcomes for a league where every team has a 50% chance of winning 
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each of its games.  Sticking with this general framework, the last new seasonal measure is 
the calculation of excess tail frequencies by subtracting the ideal percentage of teams that 
should fall outside some level of win percentages (say, +/- 2 or 3 idealized standard 
deviations) under perfect competitive balance from the actual percentage of teams that do 
so in a given year.  Using all of these measures, Quirk and Fort calculate the level of 
competitive balance in each of the four major professional sport leagues throughout their 
history, finding that in general, the NFL has shown the greatest level of competitive 
balance and the NBA the least, with the NHL and MLB in the middle.  Additionally, by 
looking at these measures of competitive balance for MLB and the NBA before and after 
free agency was implemented in each league, it is found that there were no statistically 
significant changes in the level of competitive balance pre/post free agency, a result in 
line with the invariance principle. 
Other studies that have investigated the effect of free agency in MLB on seasonal 
competitive balance include Depken (1999), Schmidt and Berri (2001) and Schmidt and 
Berri (2003).  Depken used data from 1920-1996 and the Hefindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) as a measure of the concentration of wins among all teams in a season, finding that 
free agency had no effect on competitive balance in the NL, but a significant negative 
effect in the AL.  Schmidt and Berri (2001) used data from 1901-1999 and the Gini 
coefficient, a measure of inequality that ranges from 0 (perfect equality; each team has a 
0.500 win percentage) to 1 (perfect inequality), finding that competitive balance has 
increased for both leagues following free agency.  Schimdt and Berri (2003) used data 
from 1901-2000 and the ratio of actual to idealized standard deviation of win percentage, 
finding that free agency did not have a statistically significant effect on balance.  These 
24 
 
three studies show an inconclusive effect of free agency on competitive balance (see 
Maxcy and Mondello 2006 for a more thorough review of such findings), a result that 
may be attributed to the different methodology used in each study and/or the different 
seasonal measures of competitive balance.  However, all three measures confirm the 
results from previous studies that the level of seasonal competitive balance in MLB has 
increased over its history.   
Schimdt and Berri (2003) propose that this increase in balance over time can be 
attributed to the increase in the underlying population of baseball talent.  As MLB draws 
from larger and larger pools of potential players, it can be expected that there will be a 
greater number of especially talented players from which teams can choose, and the 
overall level of competitiveness will increase.  To test for this, a time-series co-
integration analysis is performed to determine whether the level of competitive balance 
responds endogenously over time with two variables that approximate the underlying 
population of talent: the percent of black players in the league and the percent of foreign 
players in the league.  The results show that competitive balance is co-integrated with the 
measures of the population pool, suggesting that the increasing openness of the baseball 
players’ market to blacks and foreigners over the years has been primarily responsible for 
the observed increase in competitive balance in MLB.   
Other explanations for this increase in MLB’s seasonal competitive balance over 
time were put forth and tested by Holowitz (1997) and Butler (1995).  Horowitz used a 
relative-entropy measure of information theory to show that the start of the live-ball era, 
the racial integration of baseball, franchise expansion, and the implementation of free 
agency all had statistically significant effects on the broad trend of increasing competitive 
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balance for one or both leagues in MLB.  Butler used the standard deviation of win 
percentage to test whether free agency, the narrowing of MLB market sizes, and/or the 
compression of baseball talent could explain the increase in balance.  The results provide 
no statistically significant support for any of those three theories.  However, a control 
variable for the reverse-order amateur draft was shown to contribute positively to 
competitive balance.  This result runs contrary to the invariance principle proposed by 
Rottenberg (1956). 
 Other ACB studies investigating the effect of the reverse-order draft on seasonal 
competitive balance include Fort and Quirk (1995), Croix and Kawaura (1999), and 
Schmidt and Berri (2003).  The foundation of the reverse order draft (where the last place 
team in a given year gets the first choice amongst the available amateur talent the next 
year) is to promote competitive balance in a sports league by giving additional 
opportunities for better future players to the currently worse performing teams.  However, 
the theoretical modeling described previously suggests that the reverse order draft, like 
the reserve clause, does not change the final allocation of playing talent and thus has no 
effect on competitive balance.  Fort and Quirk define the pre- and post-draft periods in 
the NFL from 1930-1935 and 1936-1941, respectively, and in MLB from 1952-1963 and 
1964-1975, respectively.  Using the standard deviation of win percentages, competitive 
balance decreased slightly in the NFL following implementation of the draft, although the 
result is not significant.  However, for MLB, competitive balance increases significantly 
following implementation of the draft for both leagues.  Croix and Kawaura, in their 
study of the Japanese Professional Baseball League (JPBL), break down the data into 
three periods: pre-draft (1958-65), adjustment (1966-73), and post-draft (1974-93).  
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Using three different measures of seasonal competitive balance (excess tail frequencies of 
win percentage, range of win percentage, and standard deviation of win percentage) it is 
found that the draft has no statistically significant effect on competitive balance.  Schmidt 
and Berri also find no significant effect of the draft on competitive balance in their study 
of MLB using the ratio of actual to idealized standard deviation of win percentages.  
These results for the draft are slightly more consistent than those for free agency, but 
there are still important differences that may be partly explained by the differences in the 
seasonal competitive balance measures. 
Although a lot of the competitive balance research (especially the early studies) 
focuses on MLB, there are several studies that investigate other team sports such as the 
NHL (Richardson 2000; Fenn et. al. 2005; Maxcy and Mondello 2006), the NFL (Larsen 
et. al. 2006; Maxcy and Mondello 2006), the NBA (Fort and Quirk 1995; Maxcy and 
Mondello 2006), English football (Szymanksi 2001; Haugen 2008; Lee and Fort 2012); 
European football (Pawlowski et. al. 2010; Peters 2011), the Australian Football League 
(Booth 2004; Lenten 2009a), and the National Rugby League (Lenten 2009a).  For the 
NHL, Richardson (2000) examines the level of competitive balance in the NHL over the 
time period of 1979-1999 using two different seasonal measures: the ratio of the actual to 
idealized standard deviation of win percentages and the number of playoff games played.  
Since the NHL has a 16-team, best of seven playoff system the number of playoff games 
played ranges from a minimum of 60 games (all series are four game sweeps) to a 
maximum of 105 games (all series last the full seven games). More playoff games would 
suggest greater competitive balance, with the average number of playoff games expected 
for a perfectly balanced league at 87.2 with a standard deviation of 3.9.  The results from 
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this competitive balance analysis show no statistically significant change in balance over 
time, and in fact the observed number of playoff games fall well within the 2-standard 
deviation expectations of perfect balance for every year in the data set.  This study 
therefore cannot rule out the hypothesis that there is an equality of playing strength 
among the teams that make the playoffs.  This result is in contrast to that using the ratio 
of actual to idealized standard deviation of win percentages, which showed a slight 
positive trend in seasonal balance over time. 
Fenn et. al. (2005) plot the ratio of actual to idealized standard deviation of win 
percentages for the NHL from 1950-2000, showing that the NHL has exhibited a 
relatively constant level of competitive imbalance over its history but with a spike in 
imbalance during the 1970s.  To determine the underlying factors that might contribute to 
the level of competitive balance in the NHL, a regression model is created that shows that 
the fight for talent with the rival World Hockey Association (WHA) and the 1968 
expansion which doubled the number of teams from 6 to 12 both had a negative effect on 
competitive balance due to the dilution of talent.  However, the arrival of a large number 
of European players had a positive effect on the level of observed balance, which Fenn et. 
al. find curious but which is consistent with the effect of the expansion of the labor pool 
for players put forth by Schmidt and Berri (2003).  The results also support the invariance 
principle in that neither free agency nor the amateur draft had a significant effect on 
competitive balance. 
For the NFL, Larsen et. al. (2006) examine the level of seasonal competitive 
balance in the NFL from 1970-2002 using the Gini coefficient and HHI of wins, showing 
that competitive balance in the NFL has largely hovered around a constant level.  To 
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more fully understand the components that affect competitive balance, a regression model 
is created that finds that the implementation of free agency and the salary cap in 1993 had 
a positive effect on the level of competitive balance in the NFL. 
Maxcy and Mondello (2006) investigate the effect of free agency on seasonal 
competitive balance in the NBA, NHL, and NFL using the ratio of actual to idealized 
standard deviation of win percentages.  For each league, each competitive balance metric 
is regressed on various dummy variables reflecting the different states of the league 
during the data set from 1951-2004.  For example, in the NBA, the dummy variables are 
for the periods of unrestricted free agency (1978-1982), team salary cap (1983-99), team 
salary cap plus individual salary cap (2000-04), rival league (1967-76), strike (1999) and 
expansion (various years).  The results are mixed, only providing statistically significant 
evidence that seasonal competitive balance has improved in the NHL since 1994.  Maxcy 
and Mondello contend that the ambiguous results highlight the interactions between the 
granting of free agency rights and other labor market and league rules. 
Fort and Quirk (1995) evaluate the effect of the salary cap in the NBA on 
seasonal competitive balance using the standard deviation of win percentage.  Using pre-
cap data from 1975-1984 and post-cap data from 1984-1993 it is shown that competitive 
balance actually worsened in the post-cap era.  Fort and Quirk suggest that the empirical 
findings are inconsistent with theory due to the failure of the salary cap to actually 
equalize spending on player talent.  As instituted in 1984 (and still continuing today), the 
salary cap in the NBA has many loopholes and exemptions that allow teams to regularly 
spend far more on payroll than the salary cap technically allows.  Thus the NBA salary 
29 
 
cap is not a great test of the underlying theory of the effect of strict salary caps on 
competitive balance. 
Szymanksi (2001) analyzes the level of historical competitive balance in English 
football using the standard deviation of win percentages.  Using data from 1976 to 1998, 
Szymanski shows that competitive balance has largely stayed the same in the English 
football leagues over time, despite the increasing level of income inequality.  Lee and 
Fort (2012) use time series analysis on the level of competitive balance in the English 
Premier League over its entire history (1888-2007) to identify structural break points in 
the data.  The five competitive balance measures used in this study are the ratio of actual 
to idealized standard deviation of win percentage, the concentration ratio of season points 
of the top three and top four teams, and the concentration ratio of season points of the 
bottom three and bottom four teams.  An increase in the first three measures suggests less 
competitive balance while an increase in the last two measures suggests greater 
competitive balance.  Time series analysis of these five metrics gives several structural 
break points that segment the data into four general periods: Early Period (1888 to the 
early 1900s), Pre-War Period (mid 1900s to late 1930s), Post-War Period (mid 1940s to 
mid 1990s), and Modern Period (after the mid 1990s).  The results show that the level of 
seasonal competitive balance was largely increasing in the Early and Pre-War Periods, 
with a decreasing trend in the years after and a particularly sharp decrease in the Modern 
Period such that competitive balance is at a historic low in the current decade.  The 
authors hypothesize that changes in the Champions League format, growing revenue 
inequality, and/or the Bosman ruling in 1995 may have contributed to the observed rapid 
decline in competitive balance in the 1990s and onward. 
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Haugen (2008) assesses the impact of the change from the 2-1-0 to the 3-1-0 
points system in European football, which was implemented under the idea of 
encouraging more offensive play.  However, a potentially unintended side effect of this 
change is that by inducing more offensive play, and thus more wins as opposed to draws, 
the level of competitive balance is predicted to decline.  To test this empirically, three 
leagues of different quality are chosen (English Premier League, Norwegian Tippeligaen, 
and Romanian Divizia A) and the level of seasonal competitive balance is calculated for 
the period prior to and following the rule change.  In each case, there is a statistically 
significant decrease in the level of competitive balance in the years following the rule 
change.  Haugen suggests that the intended effect of increased interest and attendance due 
to greater offensive play from the rule change may be offset by a reduction in interest and 
attendance due to diminished competitive balance following the UOH. 
Pawlowski et. al. (2010) use various seasonal competitive balance measures to 
determine the effect of the 1999-2000 increase in Champions League payouts on the level 
of balance in five top European football leagues (England, Spain, Italy, Germany, and 
France).  The hypothesis is that the large increase in Champions League payouts for 
participating teams that was put in place in the 1999-2000 season created a positive 
feedback loop where the best teams would continue to get better, and competitive balance 
would worsen as a result.  Depending on the league, the top three or four teams directly 
qualify for the Champions League and receive the large payout for participating.  These 
teams then have substantially more money to spend on players and are likely to become 
better and qualify for the Champions League in the following years as well.  To test this 
hypothesis, three different seasonal competitive balance measures were calculated for the 
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pre (1992-2000) and post (2000-2008) payout change periods: HHI of league points, 
concentration ratio of points of the top five teams in each league, and standard deviation 
of league points per season.  The results for each of these metrics generally suggest that 
the level of competitive balance has declined for each league following the changes in the 
Champions League payouts.  However, none of the results are tested for statistical 
significance, so the observed reduction in competitive balance across the various metrics 
may not be meaningful.   
 Peeters (2011) empirically estimates the effect of various factors on seasonal 
competitive balance in European football using data from 32 leagues from 2000-2009.  
Two different competitive balance measures are used: the ratio of actual to idealized 
standard deviation of win percentage, and the ratio of actual to most unbalanced standard 
deviation of win percentage.  The results for each measure identify two variables that are 
consistently statistically significant.  First, the variation of team market sizes within a 
league has a negative effect on competitive balance: as the drawing potential of clubs 
becomes more equal, competitive balance improves.  Second, the number of qualifying 
Champions League teams/the amount of Champions League prize money earned by a 
league has a negative effect on competitive balance: as the number of qualifying 
teams/prize money is reduced, competitive balance improves. 
Booth (2004) analyzes the level of seasonal competitive balance in the Australian 
Football League (AFL) during its entire history (1897-2004) using the ratio of actual to 
idealized standard deviation of win percentage.  The results show that the competitive 
balance in the AFL has fluctuated quite largely from year to year, but has mostly hovered 
around the historical average.  Breaking the data up into six periods representing different 
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structural eras in the AFL shows that the most recent period of 1985-2004 (which saw the 
league adopt a salary cap and player draft, in addition to previously implemented forms 
of local and national revenue sharing) has the greatest level of competitive balance. 
Lenten (2009a) investigates the level of seasonal competitive balance in 
Australia’s two major professional sport leagues: the AFL and the National Rugby 
League (NRL).  Using the actual to idealized ratio of the standard deviation of win 
percentages it is shown that the NRL has consistently had a greater level of seasonal 
competitive balance across its history compared with the AFL. 
Berri et. al. (2005) use the ratio of actual to idealized standard deviation of win 
percentages to determine the average level of competitive balance for 17 sport leagues 
across five sports (soccer, football, hockey, baseball, basketball).  The results show that 
the level of competitive balance is very similar across leagues for each sport.  For 
example, the seven soccer leagues studied have ratios from 1.281-1.581 while the two 
basketball leagues have ratios of 2.542 and 2.601 (higher ratios mean less balance).  The 
authors conclude that the level of competitive balance is primarily a function of the sport 
being played, and that the fundamental driver of balance (or the lack thereof) is the size 
of the available population of playing talent.  It is noted that the level of competitive 
balance for each of the major U.S. professional sport leagues except for the NBA has 
increased in the 1990s compared to their historical averages and this is attributed to the 
expansion of the labor pool due to the use of racial minorities and foreigners.  As the pool 
of potential playing talent is widened, the variability of skill among those making the 
major leagues is expected to decrease, leading to greater balance.  It is hypothesized that 
the reason why the NBA has the worst level of competitive balance and why it has not 
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improved over time is that there is a very limited supply of extremely tall people in the 
world.  This restricted supply of tall players ensures a high level of variability in their 
talent level and a correspondingly low level of competitive balance.  Berri et. al. (2005) 
conclude that competitive balance (or lack thereof) is largely a function of the sport being 
played and therefore is unaffected by structural changes within leagues.  
 In addition to professional leagues, a small sub-stream of ACB literature has 
focused on major college football in order to investigate the effect of NCAA rule changes 
on competitive balance.  Bennett and Fizel (1995) look at the landmark 1984 Supreme 
Court decision that gave each individual school property rights for their television 
broadcasts of their games.  Prior to 1984, the NCAA controlled all of the broadcast rights 
and sold national packages to television networks under the argument that such a system 
was necessary to maintain competitive balance by ensuring smaller market teams would 
have relatively equal access to national exposure.  However, others argued that weaker 
teams would have a greater ability to use television to attract good recruits if they 
controlled their own TV rights.  Using the ratio of actual to idealized standard deviation 
of intra-conference win percentage for the top nine conferences in college football, the 
periods of 1980-83 (NCAA controlled rights), 1985-1988 (short term school controlled 
rights), and 1988-1991 (long term school controlled rights) are compared.  For the short 
run period, two conferences showed a statistically significant increase in competitive 
balance but two others showed a statistically significant decrease.  For the long run 
period, no conferences showed a statistically significant difference with the 1980-83 pre-
period.  These results suggest that the ownership of the TV rights has no lasting effect on 
competitive balance. 
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Sutter and Winkler (2003) look at the implementation of scholarship limits for 
Division 1 football by the NCAA in 1977.  On the surface, scholarship limits have the 
appearance of reducing the ability of the top teams to sign an excessive amount of talent 
and therefore this should increase competitive balance.  However, there are reasons to 
suggest that the true motivation of the NCAA is to preserve the success and monopoly 
rents of the top football programs.  To test this, the ratio of actual to idealized standard 
deviation of win percentages is used to look at the pre- (1957-1976) and post-scholarship 
limit (1982-2001, allowing a five year transition) periods.  The results show that 
competitive balance decreased after the scholarship limits were introduced. 
Depken and Wilson (2006) look at NCAA investigations in Division 1A college 
football.  The competitive balance measure used is the HHI of conference wins for each 
team in each of the 11 conferences studied during 1953-2003.  The results show that both 
measures of the level of NCAA enforcement are statistically significant and contribute to 
greater levels of competitive balance.  Conversely, the severity of probation contributes 
significantly to a lower level of competitive balance.  The net effect of the average levels 
of both enforcement and probation is to promote greater competitive balance, thus giving 
support to the stated mission of the NCAA of ensuring a level playing field. 
Dittmore and Crow (2010) look at the implementation of the Bowl Championship 
Series (BCS) in 1998.  Competitive balance is measured using the ratio of actual to 
idealized standard deviation of win percentages and between-seasons using the HHI of 
league championships.  Using data from 1993-2007 for the six BCS conferences (Big 
Ten, Big 12, ACC, SEC, Pac 10, and Big East) it is shown that seasonal competitive 
balance has improved for each of these six conferences following implementation of the 
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BCS.  Nevertheless, the findings suggest that the implementation of the BCS did not 
decrease the level of competitive balance in major college football, and perhaps may have 
led to a slight improvement. 
 ACB research has also been undertaken for individual sports such as the 
Olympics (Baimbridge 1998), tennis (DuBois and Heyndels 2007; Corral 2009), and 
Formula One racing (Mastromarco and Runkel 2009).  Baimbridge uses the ratio of 
medal winning countries to total participating countries and shows that this measure has a 
large negative trend, with a peak of 90.9% of competing nations winning a medal at the 
1908 London Games and a low point of 32.7% in the 1988 Seoul Games.  DuBois and 
Heyndels (2007) investigate the differences in seasonal competitive balance in men’s 
(Association of Tennis Professionals, ATP) and women’s (Women Tennis Association, 
WTA) tennis.  The competitive balance metric is the coefficient of variation (standard 
deviation over the mean) of rankings points for the top 10 players on each tour, where a 
higher coefficient of variation means that the rankings points of the top 10 are more 
spread out and thus there is less competitive balance.  Using data from 1995-2005, it is 
shown that there is no statistically significant difference in the coefficient of variation 
between the ATP and WTA and therefore the level of competitive balance is equal 
between both tours. 
Corral (2009) investigates the level of competitive balance in Grand Slam tennis 
events following the change from 16 to 32 seeded players in 2001.  Because seeded 
players cannot face each other until later rounds, it is hypothesized that increasing the 
number of seeded players will likely have the outcome of lessening the chances of early 
round upsets and thus decreasing the level of competitive balance in a given tournament.  
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To test this, the number of seeded players that reach each round of the tournament as a 
percentage of the total number expected to reach that round (based on their seeds) is 
calculated.  This percentage ranges from 0 to 100% for each round, with increasing levels 
representing a greater amount of competitive imbalance.  Using data from Grand Slam 
tournaments from 1994 to 2008, it is graphically shown that the level of competitive 
balance has decreased following the 2001 seeding change.  Regression analysis confirms 
this result, with a statistically significant decrease in the level of competitive balance in 
the 2001-2008 period as compared with 1994-2000.  Moreover, splitting the data into 
men and women shows that there was no statistically significant change in the women’s 
tour while the magnitude of the decrease was larger for the men than originally estimated.  
However, the men’s tour still showed a statistically significant greater level of 
competitive balance than the women’s tour, even after the seeding rule change.  These 
results stand in contrast to those of DuBois and Heyndels (2007), emphasizing the 
importance of the choice of competitive balance measure. 
Mastromarco and Runkel (2009) look at the impact of Formula One rule changes 
on seasonal competitive balance using as the standard deviation of final championship 
points.  The results show that the number of rules changes significantly increases the 
resulting level of competitive balance, with each 10% increase in the number of new 
regulations reducing the standard deviation of final championship points by between 
7.3% and 7.8% (greater competitive balance).  This provides support for the notion that 
Formula 1 is actively adjusting its rules in order to increase the level of within-season 
competitive balance. 
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2.2.2 Consecutive Season Competitive Balance Measures 
 Although the vast majority of ACB studies focus on seasonal measures of 
competitive balance, many of those studies also include measurements of consecutive 
season competitive balance which allows for differences between these two forms of 
balance to be easily observed.  For example, Cairns (1987), in his study of the re-
organization of the Scottish football league found that consecutive season uncertainty 
increased as measured by the concentration of championships for the ten year period 
following the re-organization as compared with the ten years prior.  This result is in 
contrast to the seasonal uncertainty which stayed the same following the re-organization.  
Other studies showing different results for across-season competitive balance measures as 
compared to the previously discussed within-season measures as are follows.  Scully 
(1989), using the distribution of league championships in the AL and NL, found that 
consecutive season balance decreased over time, in contrast to the increasing seasonal 
balance.  DuBois and Heyndels (2007), using the root mean square of Spearman’s rank 
correlation coefficient for the top 10 players year-to-year and the percent of new players 
making the top 10, found that the ATP has a statistically significant greater level of inter-
seasonal competitive balance than the WTA, in contrast to equivalent levels of seasonal 
balance.  Butler (1995), using season-to-season win correlations in MLB, found that free 
agency, the narrowing of market sizes, and the compression of baseball talent were all 
statistically significant explanatory variables for the observed increase in consecutive 
season competitive balance over time, in contrast to none of them significantly explaining 
the increase in seasonal balance. 
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Lenten (2009a), using the frequency of premiership victories for every team in the 
AFL and NRL, found that the AFL generally has a greater level of multi-season 
competitive balance, in contrast to the NRL having greater within-season balance.  
Dittmore and Crow (2010), using the HHI of league championships, found that 
consecutive season balance decreased for three of the six BCS conferences following the 
implementation of the BCS, in contrast to the increase in seasonal balance for all six 
conferences.  Bennett and Fizel (1995), using the turnover of individual team win 
percentages each year, found that inter-seasonal balance increased following the 1984 
Supreme Court decision, in contrast to no change in the intra-seasonal balance.  Maxcy 
and Mondello (2006), using Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, found that inter-
seasonal competitive balance has improved in the NFL since free agency was introduced 
in 1993 and declined in the NBA after free agency, in contrast to no change in intra-
seasonal balance for both of those leagues.  Sutter and Winkler (2003), using nine 
different measures (number of new entrants, total teams, and the HHI of AP Top-20, AP-
Top 10, and conference champions), found a statistically significant increase in the 
consecutive season competitive balance of Division 1 football following the introduction 
of scholarship limits, in contrast to the decrease in seasonal balance.   
 The conflicting results of all of these studies when comparing seasonal and 
consecutive season competitive balance highlights the importance of the choice of not 
only the specific competitive balance measure, but also the form of competitive balance 
that is most appropriate for a given study.  These findings also emphasize that 
competitive balance is not one uniform topic but rather several distinct topics under one 
common umbrella.  As a result, simply using the term competitive balance is insufficient, 
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as what is true for seasonal competitive balance may not be true for consecutive season 
balance, as shown in the previous studies.  
However, not all results are different when comparing seasonal and consecutive 
season competitive balance measures.  For example, Quirk and Fort (1992) find the same 
relative levels of competitive balance across the Big Four leagues when looking at the 
Gini coefficient of the concentration of championships as an inter-seasonal measure.  
Similarly, Fort and Quirk (1995) find the same results concerning free agency and the 
draft in MLB (more balance), and for the salary cap in NBA (less balance) using the Gini 
coefficient of the concentration of championships as an inter-seasonal measure.  
Pawlowski et. al. (2010), also find similar results concerning the increase in Champions 
League payouts (although more striking in magnitude) when using Markov transitional 
probabilities as the measure of consecutive season competitive balance.  Balfour and 
Porter (1991) find the same results concerning the effect of free agency (increased 
balance) in MLB when using one-, two-, and three- year lag correlations of winning 
percentage for each team as measures of inter-seasonal balance.  Lastly, Croix and 
Kawaura (1999) find similar results concerning the draft in the JPBL (no effect on 
balance) when using three different consecutive season measures of competitive balance: 
the HHI of pennant winners and last place finishers as well as the change in performance 
of individual teams post-draft. 
In addition to the ACB research that investigated both within- and across-season 
measures of competitive balance, several studies have focused specifically on 
consecutive season measures.  Eckard (1998) looks at NCAA regulation of player 
recruiting, eligibility, and compensation.  NCAA regulation of the college football 
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players’ market began in 1952 and mirrors the situation of the reserve clause in baseball.  
In both cases, those in charge argued that the market restrictions were necessary to 
maintain competitive balance, while in reality the motivation was likely to reduce costs 
and maximize profitability.  The difference is that MLB players were able to earn free 
agency in 1976, while collegiate football players are still subject to strict NCAA 
regulations.  To test for the effect of NCAA regulation on inter-seasonal competitive 
balance in college, two sets of consecutive season competitive balance measures are used.  
The first set considers national rankings and the number of different schools to make the 
rankings, the concentration of schools in the rankings over time, and the frequency with 
which new schools or long-removed schools break into the rankings, either the top 10 or 
the top 20.  The second set considers conference standings and the level of churn in the 
final standings as well as the concentration of championships.  Using all of these 
measures, the pre-regulation period (depending on the specific test, data starts from as 
early as 1924 and goes through 1951) is compared to the post-regulation period (1957-
1981) with five years allowed for a transitional period.  The results show, across all 
measures, a reduction in the level of consecutive season competitive balance after NCAA 
regulation in 1952. 
 Grier and Tollison (1994) address the issue of whether the reverse order draft 
affects inter-seasonal competitive balance.  Using NFL data from 1983-1990 to perform a 
regression analysis of win percentage on average lagged draft order, it is found that teams 
drafting earlier win more games, with a five-year draft lag showing the greatest effect. 
Fizel (1997) investigates the effect of free agency in MLB on consecutive season 
competitive balance.  The competitive balance measures are the number of teams that 
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finished within 10 games of the league leader, the number of different division winners, 
and the number of different pennant winners during eight years of the reserve clause 
(1969-1976) and then during two eight year periods of free agency (1977-1985 with the 
strike shortened 1981 season excluded, and 1986-1993).  The results show that the 
number of competitive teams, division winners, and pennant winners was the same or 
increased during the free agency periods as compared to the reserve clause era (e.g. for 
the NL the number of different pennant winners went from 4 to 6 to 7 over the three 
periods studied).  
Eckard (2001) also investigates the effect of free agency on inter-seasonal 
competitive balance by using the HHI of team championships as well as the 
decomposition of winning percentage variance into cumulative and time variances.  A 
standard within-season competitive balance metric used in numerous previous studies is 
the standard deviation of winning percentages during individual seasons.  However, this 
metric does not account for possible churn in league standings from year to year, and 
therefore does not differentiate between two league years that have completely identical 
standings and two league years with an identical standard deviation of wins among all of 
the teams but with every team occupying a different final position.  Eckard’s variance 
decomposition breaks this value up into two components: the variance of cumulative win 
percents across league members during the period, and the mean of individual teams’ 
annual win percent variances about their own period mean.  Using this decomposition, it 
is possible to differentiate between the two examples given above where the total 
variance is the same, but in the second case the time variance will be greater and the 
cumulative variance will be lower, which indicates a greater level of inter-seasonal 
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competitive balance.  Using this metric for an MLB data set from 1961-1992, it is shown 
that while the total variance (standard deviation) of win percentage does not change 
significantly from the reserve clause era to the free agency period, the individual 
components of the variation significantly change in support of greater inter-seasonal 
competitive balance for both the AL and NL during free agency.  The results using the 
HHI of championships also show increased inter-seasonal competitive balance following 
free agency. 
 Hadley et. al. (2005) study the level of inter-seasonal competitive balance in MLB 
before and after the 1994 strike using Markov transitional probabilities.  The Markov 
transitional probabilities consist of four probabilities: that a playoff team from the 
previous season makes the playoffs in the current season, that a playoff team misses the 
playoffs, that a non-playoff team makes the playoffs, and that a non-playoff team misses 
the playoffs again.  Assuming complete balance, the previous state should have no impact 
on the future state, and thus the probability of making the playoffs in the current season 
should be the same for all teams, both previous playoff and non-playoff teams.  The 
results from the pre-strike period (1982-1993) are not statistically different from the 
perfect parity probabilities, but the post-strike period (1995-2003) shows a statistically 
significant decreased level of inter-seasonal competitive balance, as previous playoff 
teams are over three times more likely to make the playoffs in the current season than 
non-playoff teams. 
 Mizak et. al. (2007) investigate the level of consecutive season competitive 
balance in MLB over time using the adjusted churn.  This metric is calculated by taking 
the sum of the absolute value of the change in league standing for each team and then 
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dividing by the maximum possible churn.  This yields a number between zero and one, 
where a value of zero represents league standings that are completely unchanged from 
one year to the next and a value of one represents league standings that are completely 
reversed (previous first place team finishes last, previous second place team finishes 
second to last, etc.).  Computing the adjusted churn for the AL and NL from 1910 to 2007 
shows a sharp decrease in the level of inter-seasonal competitive balance for the AL 
during the 2000s.  Furthermore, it is shown that the adjusted churn was especially low for 
the AL East from 1997-2007, including six straight years of absolutely no change in the 
standings (adjusted churn equals zero) from 1998-2003. 
Lee (2010) measures the level of between-season competitive balance in the NFL 
before and after the implementation of a salary cap and free agency in 1993.  The 
between-season competitive balance measure is the correlation in win percentages for 
each team from one year to the next.  Using data from 1978-2008, the results show a 
statistically significant increase in inter-seasonal competitive balance (a reduction in the 
correlation of win percentages from 0.563 to 0.444) following the implementation of free 
agency and a salary cap in the NFL. 
 
2.2.3 Match Competitive Balance Measures 
Although almost all of the ACB literature focuses solely on seasonal and 
consecutive season competitive balance measures, two of the previous articles included 
match-level measures.  Sutter and Winkler (2003) used the average margin of victory of 
all division 1 collegiate football games as the measure of match uncertainty, finding that 
NCAA scholarship limits did not significantly affect game-level competitive balance.  
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DuBois and Heyndels (2007) used the percent of Grand Slam finals sets that went to a 
tiebreaker, and the percent of Grand Slam finals that lasted more than the minimum 
number of sets (more than two for women, more than three for men) as measures of 
game-level uncertainty of outcome.  The results showed no statistically significant 
difference in match competitive balance between the ATP and WTA. 
Two other recent articles focus exclusively on match-level competitive balance.  
Bowman et. al. (2012) use six different point spread based metrics (e.g. the mean 
absolute value of all points spreads with and without home field advantage included) to 
quantify the level of game competitive balance in the NBA and NFL.  Calculating these 
competitive balance measures for the NBA from 1990-2009 and the NFL from 1985-
2009 show that while they fluctuate year-to-year for both leagues, there has been a slight 
statistically significant increase in match competitive balance over time in the NBA and 
no significant change in the NFL. 
 Bowman et. al. (2013) extend this analysis to use pre-game money lines instead of 
point spreads to calculate the six match-level competitive balance metrics for MLB, as 
MLB uses money lines instead of the point spreads used in the NBA and NFL.  Using 
data from 1999-2011 these competitive balance measures are calculated for MLB, and 
the result is a statistically significant increase in the level of match competitive balance 
over this time period. 
 
2.3 Uncertainty of Outcome Hypothesis (UOH) Research 
 Although ACB research provides interesting information concerning what has 
happened to competitive balance over time and/or as a result of institutional changes in 
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professional sports leagues, the findings may not have practical significance.  In keeping 
with the original underlying notion that competitive balance is necessary for league 
health and profitability, the ACB studies assume that regardless of the competitive 
balance measured employed, more balance is always good and less balance is bad.  But 
none of those studies actually test whether this is true by looking at the fan response to 
differing levels of competitive balance using attendance and/or television viewership.  In 
light of this, Zimbalist (2002; 2003) questions the usefulness of previous competitive 
balance measures and argues for the use of one best measure to which consumers show 
the greatest sensitivity.  In the absence of such a measure, it can be difficult to properly 
assess whether the presumed lack of competitive balance in MLB, the NBA, and English 
football is actually bad for the respective sport.  Similarly, is the greater level of 
competitive balance in the NFL and NHL good for those sports?  In addition, competitive 
imbalance that favors large market teams might be viewed differently by fans than 
competitive imbalance that favors small market teams (Kesenne 2004). 
In consideration of the previous ACB findings, it is clear that the results are very 
sensitive not only to the form of competitive balance that is studied (match, seasonal, or 
consecutive season) but also to the specific competitive balance measure that is used.  
Testing whether fans respond to given forms and measures of competitive balance thus 
becomes important.  If, for instance, fans show no response to varying levels of the ratio 
of actual to idealized standard deviation of win percentages then studies showing an 
increase or decrease in this metric for a given league over time are not particularly 
informative.  In addition, testing the response of attendance and television viewership to 
competitive balance allows for Rottenberg’s (1956) original theories concerning fan 
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preference for competitive balance (the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis, UOH) to be 
empirically tested.  Do fans actually prefer outcomes (at the game, season, and multiple 
season levels) to be uncertain/competitively balanced?  Because the UOH literature 
focuses primarily on the match-level, the literature review starts there, followed by 
seasonal, consecutive season, and then combination studies. 
 
2.3.1 Tests Using Match Competitive Balance 
Peel and Thomas (1988) provide an empirical test for the individual game 
uncertainty of outcome hypothesis by using pre-game betting odds to analyze the effect 
of the probability of the home team winning on attendance for the English Football 
League.  The attendance regression results show highly statistically significant results for 
both team position in the standings as well as the home team win probability for all four 
divisions of the English Football League.  These results suggest that better quality teams 
will drive attendance as well as an increased probability of home team success, with a 
10% increase in the chance of the home team winning (evaluated at the sample mean) 
increasing the attendance by 1,650 in Division One, 768 in Division Two, 580 in 
Division Three, and 465 in Division Four.  Although Peel and Thomas assert that these 
findings provide support for the UOH, in fact they suggest that fans prefer more certain 
outcomes in favor of the home team winning. 
Peel and Thomas (1992) update the previous study by including a quadratic form 
for the home team probability of winning (still based on pre-game betting odds) as well 
as including lagged attendance to account for a team’s core supporters that regularly 
attend games regardless of other factors such as competitive balance.  This study also 
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attempted to include measures for within-season uncertainty of outcome by using dummy 
variables for late-season data to segregate teams into categories such as “ in contention 
for the playoffs,” “guaranteed a place in the playoffs,” “promotion candidate,” 
“relegation candidate,” etc.  However, the parameter estimates for these dummy variables 
were not significant so they were excluded from the model.  In regards to the home 
team’s probability of winning, Peel and Thomas found a result contrary to the UOH of a 
U-shaped relationship where attendance is maximized by lop-sided results with limited 
uncertainty.  Czarnitzki and Stadtmann (2002) find nearly identical results in their study 
of the German premier football league using data from 1996-98 and an attendance 
demand model including even more explanatory variables.  Buraimo and Simmons 
(2008) also find a U-shaped relationship using data from the English Premier League 
from 2000-2006, where attendance is minimized when the home team has a probability of 
winning of 0.35.  This suggests that attendance is maximized when the home team has an 
overwhelming probability of winning, quite in contrast to the UOH.  Furthermore, this 
relationship estimates a higher attendance when the home team has a very low probability 
of winning than when both teams have an equal chance of winning.  Buraimo and 
Simmons attribute these findings to the fans’ strong desire to see their home team win in 
combination with the enjoyment of cheering for a “David vs. Goliath” type underdog. 
Although these studies using European football data sets seem to show that the 
UOH is completely misguided, Knowles et. al. (1992), find completely opposite results in 
their study of the 1988 MLB season.  With a nearly identical specification, the attendance 
regression shows statistically significant support for an inverse U-shaped relationship 
between uncertainty and attendance, with attendance maximized at the point where the 
48 
 
home team has a 0.6 probability of winning.  This result supports the UOH, in that games 
with a priori closer expected outcomes (with a slight home team bias) lead to greater 
attendance, all other things equal.  However, in a more recent study using numerous 
different attendance demand specifications for the 2007 MLB season, Lemke et. al. 
(2010) find the U-shaped relationship between uncertainty and attendance, such that 
attendance is maximized when the home team has a maximum or minimum chance of 
winning.  In fact, the results show that attendance is minimized when the home team has 
a 0.54 probability of winning and that an increase of this probability to 0.75 would be 
expected to increase attendance by 1,910. 
Peel and Thomas (1997) continue their previous investigations of the pre-game 
betting odds as a measure of game uncertainty although with two new considerations.  
First, they employ “handicap” or “spread” betting odds instead of the fixed odds from 
previous studies.  Second, they investigate rugby league as opposed to football.  Using 
data from the 1994-95 season, the authors initially show that the spread betting odds are 
efficient, and that the spread is an accurate ex-ante predictor of match results and thus a 
good proxy to measure outcome uncertainty.  The authors then use the spread betting 
odds in an attendance demand regression equation to determine the effect of outcome 
uncertainty of demand for rugby league games.  The results show, in support of the UOH, 
that for each additional point on the handicap value (meaning a more lopsided expected 
outcome), attendance is reduced by 52 in the First Division and by 9 in the Second 
Division.  This implies that a game with a zero handicap value (or perfectly balanced) 
would add 523 spectators on average to a First Division match and 149 to a Second 
Division match. 
49 
 
Forrest and Simmons (2002) use match-level data from the 1997-98 season of the 
English Football League to test whether the expected ax-ante closeness of games (as 
measured by the betting odds) impacts attendance.  This study mirrors those of Peel and 
Thomas (1988; 1992; 1997) except that the betting odds are corrected for potential 
bookmaker home-away bias, short odds-long odds bias, and bias in favor strongly 
supported clubs.  This correction yields a probability ratio variable that is the chance of a 
home team victory divided by the chance of an away team victory.  Because home field 
advantage in English soccer is so large, nearly all of the observations have a probability 
ratio greater than 1, with a ratios approaching 1 reflecting greater competitive balance.  
The results from the attendance demand regression show that there is a statistically 
significant negative relationship between the probability ratio and attendance, meaning 
that as matches become less balanced attendance is expected to fall.  The statistically 
significant positive parameter estimate on the square term shows that the decline in 
attendance slowly levels off as the probability ratio increases and thus the greatest 
increase in attendance occurs as games approach complete balance.  These results 
provide additional support for the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis for the level of 
individual matches.   
Forrest, Beaumont, Goddard, and Simmons (2005) find nearly identical results 
using data from the 1997-98 season of the three divisions of the English Football League.  
However, these authors importantly note that completely balanced games (each team has 
an equal chance of winning) cannot occur for two completely balanced teams, because 
that would ignore home field advantage.  Because of this, it is likely that league-wide 
attendance is maximized not when teams are completely balanced, but rather when there 
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is sufficient variation in team ability as to maximize the number of matches between a 
home team that is weaker than its opponent by an amount that is exactly offset by its 
home field advantage.  In fact, Forrest et. al. go on to show that the regression results 
suggest that had the English Football League consisted of perfectly balanced teams, it 
would have shown a reduction in attendance of over 2 million people for the season in 
question.  These findings provide an enlightening observation in favor of the uncertainty 
of outcome hypothesis at the match-level, but against the presumed notion that 
uncertainty (and thus attendance) is maximized when teams are completely balanced. 
 Forrest, Simmons, and Buraimo (2005) bring the analysis of the uncertainty of 
outcome hypothesis to television viewing audiences for the first time.  The authors argue 
that television audiences are of increasing financial importance to professional teams and 
thus warrant academic study concerning the effect of uncertainty of outcome.  In 
addition, the use of television audiences overcomes three drawbacks from the use of gate 
attendance data.  First, the majority of tickets sold to individual matches are from season 
tickets, and season ticket holders are expected to attend games regardless of the degree of 
outcome uncertainty.  Second, many attendance data sets suffer from a large number of 
sell-outs, which complicates the determination of the true demand.  Third, most 
individual match attendees are supporters of the home team, who may be more interested 
in the home team winning than in outcome uncertainty.  These reasons might explain 
why the results from previous match-level uncertainty of outcome studies are so mixed, 
and help provide justification for the use of television audiences instead.  Using English 
Premier League data from 1993-2002, Forrest, Simmons, and Buraimo find that greater 
uncertainty (measured as the absolute value of the sum of the average home field 
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advantage and the average points per game of the home team, minus the average points 
per game of the away team) is a statistically significant driver of larger television 
audiences.  Although this provides strong support for the uncertainty of outcome 
hypothesis for television audiences, the authors caution that the effect size is relatively 
small.  For example, taking all variables at their means gives an estimated television 
audience of 888,457 per game.  Increasing outcome uncertainty by one standard deviation 
(to the point of nearly perfect parity) adds only 74,152 to the television audience, an 
increase of just 6%. 
 Paul and Weinbach (2007) also test the UOH in regards to television audiences 
using Nielsen ratings for the NFL’s Monday Night Football telecasts from 1991-2002.  
Two different regression models are used: one for the Nielsen ratings at the start of the 
game, and one for the difference in Nielsen ratings at half-time compared with the start of 
the game.  At the start of the game, the uncertainty variable is the difference between 
winning percent of the home and away teams and at half-time the uncertainty variables is 
the score differential.  The results show that at the start of the game, each difference of 
10-percentage points in win percent between the teams (e.g. one 0.600 team and one 
0.500 team) is expected to decrease the viewing audience by 168,762.  Similarly, at half-
time each extra point of difference in the score is expected to decrease the viewing 
audience by about 75,000.  In both cases, the results give strong support to the UOH at 
the match level for television viewing audiences. 
 Meehan et. al. (2007) test the UOH in MLB using individual game attendances 
from 2000-2002 and the difference in win percent between the home and away teams as 
the measure of match-level uncertainty.  Three specifications of an attendance demand 
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model are utilized in order to determine the exact nature of the effect of match-level 
uncertainty on attendance.  The first specification uses only the absolute value of the 
difference in win percent between the home and away team, with the results showing a 
statistically significant negative effect on attendance when competitive balance is 
reduced.  For each 10-percentage point increase in the difference between the winning 
percentages of the home and away team, attendance is expected to be reduced by 941 
fans.  The second specification separates the uncertainty variable into two components: 
one for when the home team has a better winning percentage and the other for when the 
away team has a better winning percentage.  The results from this specification show that 
the attendance response to competitive balance is asymmetric, as the effect of 
competitive balance is magnified when the home team has a better record (each 10-
percentage point increase is expected to reduce attendance by 1,998 fans) but statistically 
insignificant if the away team has the better record.  The third specification interacts 
these two variables with the number of games left in the season and the number of games 
the home team is behind the division leader.  The results from this specification show that 
the attendance response to competitive balance is also sensitive to the current point in the 
season as well as how competitive the home team is in regards to challenging for the 
division crown.  In general, if the home team has the better record, increases in the level 
of competitive balance lead to attendance increases of a larger magnitude earlier in the 
season compared to later, and when the home team is further down in the standings 
compared to competing for the division lead.  When the away team has the better record, 
the level of competitive balance has no effect on attendance until the later stages of the 
season, when increasing competitive balance actually decreases attendance, which the 
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authors attribute to the idea that late in the season fans would rather watch a great away 
team than a more competitively balanced game.  All in all, these results suggest that the 
relationship between match-level competitive balance and attendance is complicated, but 
that overall greater levels of match uncertainty lead to greater fan interest in terms of 
attendance. 
Coates and Humphreys (2012) further the study of asymmetric responses to 
match-level competitive balance by estimating an individual game attendance demand 
model in the NHL using data from 2005-2010.  Guided by prospect theory, the authors 
hypothesize that fan interest in competitive balance may vary depending on whether the 
home team is expected to win or expected to lose, as expected gains have been shown to 
be treated differently than expected losses.  To test this, the data is segmented into nine 
ranges based on the home team probability of winning (calculated from pre-game betting 
odds).  The results show a strong asymmetric effect in that the probability of a home team 
win is only a statistically significant driver of attendance in the ranges where the home 
team is favored, with the magnitude of the effect increasing as the probability of a home 
team win increases.  For the ranges where the away team is favored, there is no 
statistically significant effect of the home team probability of a win on attendance.  These 
results provide evidence against the UOH at the game-level in the NHL. 
Benz et. al. (2009) test the UOH at the match-level using data from 1999-2005 for 
the first division of professional German football.  This study advances previous work in 
this area in two important ways.  First, the number of season ticket holders (who are 
expected to attend every game regardless of the particulars of the match) are accounted 
for and subtracted from the observed attendance to get the dependent variable of interest.  
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Second, the model allows for heterogeneity of fan demand by using a quantile regression 
with results for five different demand quantiles: 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, and 0.90.  For 
robustness, five different measures of match-level competitive balance are included in 
separate models.  The results show that none of the uncertainty of outcome variables is 
statistically significant except for the high demand (0.90) quantile, where three of the five 
variables are significant in the hypothesized direction at the 10% level.  Of particular 
interest is that the estimates on the home team probability of winning (and its square 
term) suggest that attendance is maximized for high demand games when the home team 
has a 53% chance of winning.  However, due to the fact that only high demand games 
show sensitivity to the level of competitive balance, and that even those estimates are 
significant at only the 10% level, the authors conclude that the level of uncertainty has a 
minor influence on demand and that league revenue re-distribution efforts to increase the 
level of competitive balance are misguided. 
Buraimo and Simmons (2009) test the UOH at the match level using data from 
2003-2007 from Spain’s Primera football division.  This article adds to the literature by 
separately estimating an attendance demand model and a television viewership demand 
model.  The authors hypothesize that fans at the stadium will care more about a home 
team victory whereas the television audience will be more interested in a competitively 
balanced match.  To reflect these hypothesized differences, two different measures of 
competitive balance are used.  For gate attendance, it is the probability of a home team 
win (and its square term), while for television viewership, it is the absolute value of the 
difference between the probability of a home team win and the probability of an away 
team win.  In both cases, the probabilities are calculated from the pre-game betting odds.  
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The results from these two models show that uncertainty of outcome has a negative effect 
on gate attendance but a positive effect on television audience.  As in previous studies of 
European football, (e.g. Buraimo and Simmons 2008), attendance is maximized when 
either the home team has a very large or very small probability of winning.  However, the 
opposite is true for television viewership, where greater competitive balance yields a 
larger audience.  Using the parameter estimates from these two models as well as the 
average revenue generated per fan attending a game or watching on television, it is 
shown that a theoretical increase in the level of league-wide competitive balance would 
create sufficient incremental revenue from enhanced television viewership to more than 
offset the loss from lower attendance, a combined result in support of the UOH. 
In a novel attempt to more directly measure fan response to match-level 
competitive balance, Paul et. al. (2011) use fan ratings submitted on nfl.com for each 
game during the 2009-2010 season to test the UOH.  With the final margin of victory as 
the match-level uncertainty of outcome variable, the authors find that the victory margin 
has a statistically significant negative effect on fan ratings, a result in support of the 
UOH.  Specifically, each extra point in the final margin of victory was expected to lower 
the fan rating by 0.28 points on a scale from zero to 100.  Although this study advances 
the literature on competitive balance by providing a nearly direct measure of fan 
preferences, there are some potential issues with selection bias. 
 
2.3.2 Tests Using Seasonal Competitive Balance 
Jennett (1984), in what is considered the first empirical test of the UOH, creates a 
measure of individual season uncertainty for each game that ranges from zero to one, 
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deemed the significance value.  Taking into account both a team’s level of contention for 
the championship as well as the number of games remaining in the season, the 
significance value would be, for example, zero if the team is mathematically eliminated, 
0.1 if the team requires ten victories to win the league, and 1.0 if the team requires a 
single win to claim the championship.  Using this significance variable for both the home 
and away team in Scottish league football shows that uncertainty of outcome is a 
significant driver of attendance for individual teams, with a home game deciding the 
Premier Division championship attracting on average over 12,000 extra spectators.  
However, although there is significant support for the importance of the uncertainty of 
outcome for individual teams late in the season, the same is not true for the league as a 
whole.  A reasonable increase in competitive balance that saw the average home team 
significance value increase from 0.0269 to 0.0369 would lead to only 205 extra spectators 
per game, or 37,000 fans across the entire 180 game season, a relatively minor change 
compared with the 500,000 decline in Premier Division attendance from 1979-80 to 
1980-81. 
Brandes and Franck (2007) test whether the within-season UOH is valid for 
European football using data from 1963-2006 for six different leagues: German 1 
Bundesliga, English Premier League, English Championship Division, Italian Serie A, 
Italian Serie B, and French Ligue 1.  The motivation for this study is the observation of 
increasing attendance for most of these leagues despite the fact that they are considered to 
have a low level of competitive balance.  Three different measures of within-season 
competitive balance are separately utilized: the ratio of actual to idealized standard 
deviation of win percentages, the concentration of season points accrued by the top five 
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teams in each respective league, and the HHI of points.  The results show big differences 
across the leagues and for each competitive balance measure, although the most common 
conclusions is that attendance is not a statistically significant function of the level of 
seasonal competitive balance.  For the few league-measure combinations that showed 
attendance as a statistically significant function of competitive balance, only one had 
increasing competitive balance leading to increased attendance as suggested by the UOH.  
Brandes and Franck conclude that the relationship between attendance and competitive 
balance varies by country and by competition tiers within each country, but that the 
evidence suggests that European football attendance is not particularly responsive to the 
level of within-season competitive balance.  This finding could be explained by the 
unique nature of European football as compared to the U.S. professional sport leagues, 
where the promotion/relegation system and the European wide competitions (such as the 
Champions league and UEFA Cup) create additional excitement at all levels of 
competitive even if each national league has wide disparities in team talent. 
Lee (2004) tests the UOH in MLB, the Japanese Professional Baseball League 
(JPBL), and the Korean Professional Baseball League (KPBL) using data from 1976-
2000.  Because the KPBL is much younger than the other leagues (founded in 1982 
compared with 1901 and 1936), and has far lower attendance, it is considered a 
developing league as opposed to the developed leagues of MLB and the JPBL.  The 
author hypothesizes that uncertainty of outcome is more important in developing leagues 
because fans of developed leagues are more entrenched in their support due to their long 
history.  To test this, three measures of within-season competitive balance are considered: 
ratio of actual to idealized standard deviation of win percentages, tail likelihood (a slight 
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modification of the excess tail frequency), and the difference in winning percentage 
between the first and second place teams in each league.  The results from the attendance 
demand regression show that the first two competitive balances measures are statistically 
insignificant determinants of attendance for MLB and the JPBL while the third is 
significantly negative for the AL, the Pacific League of the JPBL, and KPBL.  These 
results give some support to the UOH, in that decreasing the level of competitive balance 
in a given league (by increasing the win percentage difference between first and second) 
leads to a reduction in league-wide attendance.  Since the parameter estimate for this 
variable is the largest for the KPBL, and since the KPBL was the only league to show 
significance for either of the other competitive balance measures, the Lee concludes that 
developing leagues have fans that are more sensitive to the level of competitive balance. 
Soebbing (2008) tests the UOH in MLB using individual team attendance data 
from 1920-2006 and two measures of within-season competitive balance: the ratio of 
actual to idealized standard deviation of win percentages, and the number of games 
behind the division leader.  The results from the attendance regression show that both 
competitive balance metrics are statistically significant and that they affect attendance in 
the predicted direction.  An increase in the standard deviation of win percentages or an 
increase in the number of games behind the division leader (lower seasonal competitive 
balance) will both lead to an expected decrease in attendance.  Lee (2009), using a more 
expansive measure of the number of games behind the division leader that accounts for 
the relative standing of every team in MLB, finds similar results for the period of 1901-
2006: greater competitive balance has a statistically significant positive relationship on 
league-wide attendance.  For example, the increase in competitive balance observed in 
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MLB from 1994-2006 (as compared with the period of 1969 to 1993) led to an increase 
in AL attendance of 143,764 per year and in NL attendance by 237,233 per year.  Lenten 
(2009b) uses the ratio of actual to idealized standard deviation of win percentage to 
perform a similar analysis for the Australian Football League from 1945-2005.  The 
results show a statistically significant positive relationship between the level of seasonal 
competitive balance and attendance, with the increase in competitive balance in the AFL 
during 1995-2005 (as compared with the previous period of 1976-1985) leading to a 
league-wide annual attendance increase of 230,000. 
Levin and McDonald (2009) test the within-season UOH using data from five 
non-major professional leagues: the Arena Football League, the Central Hockey League, 
the Major Indoor Soccer League, the National Lacrosse League, and the Northern League 
(baseball).  The authors chose to focus on non-major professional sport leagues in order 
to best be able to isolate the effect of competitive balance on attendance, as these leagues 
are less likely to be influenced by many of the marketing factors common to major league 
sports.  For example, non-major professional leagues usually do not have live broadcasts 
of games and do not have the advantage of a high level of third-party communication 
such as sports shows and newspaper accounts.  Furthermore, these types of leagues rely 
heavily on gate attendance for revenues and cannot rely on the level of fan loyalty 
exhibited at the major league level.  For these reasons, it is expected that this data set will 
provide clear evidence of the effect of competitive balance attendance.  To provide a 
common dependent variable across leagues, the average attendance per game as a 
percentage of average capacity is used for each league-year.  Using data from the 
inception of each league (ranging from 1985 to 1993) until 2003, the regression results 
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show a statistically significant positive relationship between the level of competitive 
balance (measured by the actual to idealized standard deviation of win percentage) and 
attendance.  This provides support for the UOH for non-major professional sports on a 
seasonal basis. 
 
2.3.3 Tests Using Consecutive Season Competitive Balance 
 Eckard (2001) uses an attendance demand model to investigate the effect of 
winning streaks on team attendance, where a winning streak is defined as at least three 
consecutive seasons of first or second place finishes in the league standings, or third or 
fourth place finishes if the team is within ten games of first place or has a win percent 
above 0.575.  The results show that winning streaks are a statistically significant negative 
determinant of attendance.  For every additional year of a winning streak, a team that 
averages an attendance of about three million fans could expect an annual decline of 
about 51,000.  This analysis provides empirical support for the inter-seasonal UOH, 
especially in that it shows that fans of perpetually good teams lose interest in attending 
games over time. 
 Humphreys (2002), in his review of the various measures of competitive balance 
found in previous scholarly work, concludes that none of these metrics adequately 
measure the across-season levels of competitive balance.  Therefore, a new measure is 
proposed, the competitive balance ratio (CBR), which is the ratio of the average variation 
in teams’ win percentages across seasons to the average variation in win percentages in 
each season.  Essentially, this measure reduces Eckard’s (2001) variance decomposition 
into one number that ranges from 0 (no team-specific variation in win percentages) to 1 
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(all of the observed within-season variance is team-specific).  If fans are interested in the 
ability of teams to move up and down within the standings year-to-year (churn), a larger 
CBR should drive greater attendance.  Using MLB data from 1901 -1999, the regression 
gives a statistically significant positive effect of CBR on league-wide attendance.  The 
significant parameter estimate on CBR in this model is in contrast to the insignificant 
results using the same model except with standard deviation of win percentage or HHI of 
championships as the competitive balance metric.  Humphreys concludes that CBR is a 
better metric for capturing the consumer response to inter-seasonal competitive balance 
in the form of attendance. 
 
2.3.4 Tests Using Multiple Forms of Competitive Balance 
In his review of the UOH literature, Fort (2006) suggests that future studies 
should consider all three forms of competitive balance (match, seasonal, consecutive 
season) in the estimation of their attendance demand models.  Since then, a few studies 
have heeded this advice, while several others (including before Fort’s article) have used 
two of the three.  Borland (1987) was the first to use two of the three forms of 
competitive balance in his attendance demand model for the Australian Football League 
from 1950-86.  Five different measures of uncertainty of outcome were used, with each 
measured at four different points throughout the season and then averaged.  The first four 
are seasonal measures (e.g. the difference in games won between the first and last place 
teams) while the fifth is an inter-seasonal measure of the number of different teams in the 
finals in the past three seasons divided by the number of finals berths available.  The 
results of the attendance regression show that only two of the competitive balance 
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measures (both seasonal) were statistically significant predictors of attendance in the 
direction theorized by the UOH.  Of those, the average number of games behind the 
league leader had the most explanatory power. 
Carmichael et. al. (1999) estimate an attendance demand model for the 1994-95 
English Rugby League using one match uncertainty variable and two measuring season 
uncertainty (one for each division).  The match uncertainty variable uses handicap betting 
odds where the larger absolute value of the handicap, the less uncertainty of outcome and 
the lower expected attendance.  The season uncertainty variables are pre-season betting 
odds for the winners for each of the two divisions where the longer the odds of a team 
winning its division, the less chance the team is predicted to have success during that 
season (lower uncertainty) and the lower attendance is expected for its games.  The 
results of the regression confirm the hypotheses concerning the uncertainty variables, in 
that all three variables are statistically significant and with the correct signs. 
Owen and Weatherston (2004) create an attendance demand model for the New 
Zealand based matches of the Super 12 rugby union competition using data from 1999 to 
2001.  There are five variables included to represent the level of seasonal uncertainty 
(e.g. the number of points that the home team is behind the last playoff spot) and two 
variables included to represent the level of match uncertainty (e.g. the probability of a 
home team win as calculated from the pre-game betting odds).  Various different 
specifications of the attendance regression are completed but the only uncertainty 
variable that is ever statistically significant in any of the models is the number of games 
left in the season, which does not reflect fan interest in different underlying levels of 
competitive balance, but rather greater fan interest as the season progresses regardless of 
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the observed competitive balance.  As a result, Owen and Weatherston conclude that 
there is no support for the UOH in this case. 
King et. al. (2012) find completely opposite results using game-level attendance 
data from 2004-2008 in Australia’s National Rugby League (NRL).  Game level 
uncertainty (measured by the probability of a home team win) and seasonal uncertainty 
(measured by the probability of the home team making the playoffs as determined 
through simulation) were both statistically significant drivers of attendance.  These 
results are robust to different specifications of seasonal uncertainty including the number 
of points behind the current leader for the home team or the away team, the average 
number of points behind the current leader for the home and away teams, and the number 
of points required for the home team to make the playoffs.  The results for game-level 
uncertainty suggest an inverse U-shaped relationship between attendance and the 
probability of the home team winning, with attendance maximized when the home team 
has a 0.605 chance of winning.  These results provide support for the UOH in the NRL at 
the game-level and particularly at the season level. 
Pawlowski and Anders (2012) estimate an individual game attendance demand 
model for the 2005-2006 season of the German first football division using match-level 
and seasonal uncertainty of outcome variables to explain attendance.  The match-level 
uncertainty variable is a measure of a team’s chances of winning the game while the 
seasonal uncertainty variable is a measure of a team’s chances at winning the 
championship, both of which are larger as uncertainty increases.  The results show that 
the seasonal balance variable is statistically significant and positive, as expected by the 
UOH, but the match measure is statistically significant and negative.  This suggests that 
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fans prefer more certain outcomes where the home team is either a large favorite or a 
large underdog.  To further analyze this result, a second regression adds a dummy 
variable for if the home team is the favorite, but the parameter estimate is statistically 
insignificant, providing no support to the idea that fans prefer to attend matches where 
the home team is favored.  A third regression using the brand strength of the away team 
gives a statistically significant positive result suggesting that the match uncertainty 
variable was largely picking up fan preference for attending games with popular away 
teams.  These popular teams are also likely to be very good, which creates the result of 
increased attendance for more certain expected outcomes (in this case more certainty that 
the away team will win).  These three different specifications do not change the 
significance or the general positive magnitude of the effect of seasonal uncertainty on 
attendance.  These results provide support for the UOH at the seasonal level while also 
providing an illuminating explanation for previous European football studies that showed 
a U-shaped relationship between attendance and match-level competitive balance. 
Berkowitz et. al. (2011) use both attendance and television broadcast data for the 
NASCAR Sprint Cup Series from 2007-2009 to test the UOH at the race (game) level 
and the individual season level.  For race level uncertainty, the adjusted churn from 
Mizak et. al. (2007) is used in order to account for the amount of observed change 
between the pre-race starting grid and the final results.  Unlike professional team sports 
where there is one winner and one loser in each game, Sprint Cup races have 43 drivers 
and each finishing position is important in the season long standings.  As a result, 
uncertainty measures that strictly looked at the winner or top finishers of a race would be 
insufficient.  For intra-seasonal uncertainty, the HHI of season performance points is 
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used.  The results from the attendance and viewership regressions show that seasonal 
uncertainty is a statistically significant predictor of both attendance and television 
ratings/viewers, with a lower concentration of points leading to greater attendance and 
viewership as predicted by the UOH.  The race level uncertainty variable is statistically 
significant only for the television audience, with a greater churn (more competitive 
balance) leading to higher ratings and viewership.  These results make sense because 
television viewers have low switching costs and can easily change the channel if a race is 
uninteresting for any reason (including a lack of competitive balance).  However the 
choice to attend a race is made well in advance and therefore should not be affected by 
within-race outcomes such as the adjusted churn.  These results provide strong support 
for the UOH for both attendance and television viewership in NASCAR. 
Schmidt and Berri (2001) use Gini coefficients of wins (in one-year, three-year, 
and five-year lags) as explanatory variables in an MLB aggregate attendance model from 
1901-1999.  The results show that within-season and across-season competitive balance 
are both statistically significant drivers of the aggregate attendance of both the AL and 
NL.  For example, the estimate on the one-year lag Gini coefficient (within-season 
balance) suggests that moving from the current level of competitive balance to the 
historical low would lead to an attendance reduction for each AL team of 79,696 and for 
each NL team of 32,151 while moving to the historical high would lead to an attendance 
increase for each AL team of 38,031 and for each NL team of 22,084. 
Krautmann and Hadley (2006) test the UOH in MLB from 1950-2003 using an 
intra-seasonal competitive balance measure (the ratio of actual to idealized standard 
deviation of win percentages) and an inter-seasonal competitive balance measure (the 
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Markov transitional probability of a playoff team from the previous season qualifying for 
the playoffs again in the current season).  The results from the attendance regression 
show that although increased within-season competitive balance increases attendance, the 
effect is not statistically significant.  Increasing inter-seasonal competitive balance, on the 
other hand, has a statistically significant positive effect on attendance, although breaking 
the data up into AL and NL shows that the effect is only present for the AL.  In that case, 
increasing inter-seasonal competitive balance by one standard deviation is expected to 
increase attendance per game by 424.  Lee and Fort (2008) find the opposite results 
concerning the effect on MLB attendance of within-season and across-season competitive 
balance measures.  Using data from 1901 to 2003 it is shown that seasonal uncertainty (as 
measured by the average difference in win percentage between division winners and 
second place finishers) had a statistically significant effect on league-wide attendance in 
support of the UOH.  The consecutive season uncertainty measure (the correlation 
between each team’s winning percentage and its previous three year average) was not 
statistically significant. 
Tainsky and Winfree (2010) estimate a game-level attendance demand model in 
MLB using data from 1996-2009 and eight different measures of uncertainty of outcome: 
one game level, five seasonal, and two inter-seasonal.  Of particular interest are four 
seasonal measures that involve the probability of qualifying for the playoffs, and thus 
extensive Monte Carlo simulations are used to simulate seasons such that playoff 
probabilities can be forecast at the point of each individual game.  The results from the 
attendance model show that six out of eight of the uncertainty variables are statistically 
insignificant.  The two that are significant are the marginal impact of a win on the 
67 
 
probability of making the playoffs (seasonal uncertainty) and the change in home team 
win percentage compared with the end of the previous season (inter-seasonal).  The first 
result has a positive sign as expected, which suggests that later season games for playoff 
contending teams are likely to drive increased attendance.  However, the second result 
has a negative sign which suggests that if the home team is worse than the previous 
season, attendance will rise.  This result, in combination with the fact that the parameter 
estimate on the ticket price control variable was positive and statistically significant, 
suggests that the model may have some problems and the results should be taken with 
caution.   
Krautmann et. al. (2011) use a monthly attendance demand model for MLB in 
order to further understand the effects of all three forms of competitive balance on 
attendance over the course of a season.  The competitive balance measures are Lee’s 
(2004) tail likelihood metric (game level), Lee’s (2009) league seasonal uncertainty 
variable, and Humphreys’ (2002) CBR (inter-seasonal).  Using data from 1957-2006,  the 
results show that seasonal uncertainty is a statistically significant determinant of monthly 
attendance for both leagues but only in September, the last month of the season when the 
playoff chase is in full swing.  The magnitude of this effect is greater for the NL than for 
the AL, where the observed 50% increase in seasonal uncertainty over the sample period 
would be expected to increase the attendance per game in September by 1,582 in the NL 
and 819 in the AL.  The results for game uncertainty were almost always statistically 
insignificant regardless of the month or the league, while the results for CBR were often 
significant, but the sign on the estimate varied across the months and leagues.  These 
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results suggest that for MLB, the UOH may only be significant for late season games in 
regards to seasonal uncertainty. 
Although a few of the UOH studies reviewed in this section also contained ACB 
research, the vast majority of studies focus either on ACB or UOH analysis.  Of those 
that do include both ACB and UOH work, they all begin with the analysis of competitive 
balance before moving on to empirical tests of the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis.  
This approach may stem from the natural progression from theory to empirical tests, 
where ACB (though empirical) represents a closer tie to the theoretical modeling of 
professional sports leagues.  However, thinking of competitive balance research as 
beginning with ACB and moving on to UOH is misguided.  UOH research informs which 
(if any) forms and measures of competitive balance are significant drivers of fan interest 
in the form of attendance and/or television ratings.  Only with this information should 
scholars then move to ACB research to determine whether these forms and measures of 
competitive balance have changed over time and in response to institutional changes.  
This way, any ACB findings will be practically meaningful in terms of their effect on fan 
interest as originally theorized by Rottenberg (1956). 
 
 
2.4 Summary of Literature and Future Directions 
The previous competitive balance literature review has shown that the research in 
this area can be divided into three main branches: theoretical modeling, analysis of 
competitive balance (ACB), and uncertainty of outcome hypothesis (UOH).  The 
majority of theoretical models, especially recently, have focused on the impacts of 
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various forms of revenue sharing on competitive balance, with the conclusions being 
highly dependent on the underlying economic assumptions regarding the league in 
question.  The ACB line of research has largely focused on measuring seasonal levels of 
competitive balance while the UOH line of research has mainly focused on determining 
the attendance response to match-level competitive balance.  Within both streams of 
literature, the results are often mixed due to the different specific competitive balance 
measures used as well as potential differences in the league structure or fan base of 
different leagues.  For example, within the match-level UOH literature stream, the 
conflicting results can perhaps be attributed to the fact that in the United States, fans 
prefer competitively balanced outcomes at the match-level as predicted by the UOH, 
whereas in Europe fans indirectly prefer unbalanced outcomes due to their interest in 
attending games where either the home or away team is one of the perennially popular 
and successful teams (e.g. Manchester United in the English Premier League). 
Other seemingly conflicting results from both ACB and UOH research can be 
explained by more clearly defining what level of competitive balance is being considered: 
match, seasonal, consecutive season.  For example, the conclusions using one measure of 
seasonal competitive balance in terms of how it has changed over time (ACB) or how 
attendance changes in response to its varying levels (UOH) may not be the same for a 
given measure of consecutive season competitive balance.  In consideration of the 
fundamental differences between these three levels of competitive balance, scholars 
should seek to include various balance measures accounting for multiple levels (Fort 
2006), or should focus on under-studied areas such as consecutive season uncertainty for 
both ACB and UOH research streams.  
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Another significantly under-studied area of competitive balance research centers 
on playoff outcomes.  Longley and Lacey (2012) point out that almost all previous 
competitive balance studies look at regular season outcomes only and completely ignore 
the results of playoffs.  However, from a fan perspective, playoff outcomes are likely 
more important than the regular season as the playoffs determine the championship.  To 
that end, fans likely characterize a team with the best regular season record that loses in 
the first round of the playoffs as a failure, but a team with a 0.500 regular season record 
that wins the playoffs as a success.  As a result, Longley and Lacey consider the effect of 
the playoffs on competitive balance, with the finding that a playoff system, in and of 
itself, should increase competitive balance by replacing the outcome of a long, play 
against the field regular season that is prone to reveal true underlying team quality with 
the outcome from a short, head-to-head series of matches with a greater chance of upsets.  
Furthermore, it is shown that decreasing the number of games in each playoff series as 
well as changing the playoff pooling structure from league to conference to divisional 
will increase the frequency of upsets and the corresponding level of competitive balance.   
Using data from the NHL and NBA from 1994-2004, Longley and Lacey show 
that regular season league champions made the final championship series in the playoffs 
just 25% (NHL) and 60% (NBA) of the time, emphasizing the reshuffling nature of the 
playoffs.  In addition, the correlation between playoff games won and team payroll is 
substantially lower in the NHL than the correlation between regular season win 
percentage and payroll during this time period.  Lastly, the HHI of teams finishing in the 
top-8, top-4 and top-2 of the regular season NHL standings are higher than the 
corresponding HHI of teams making the round of 8, round of 4, and Stanley Cup finals, 
71 
 
showing a greater level of turnover of teams across seasons in regards to playoff 
outcomes as opposed to regular season outcomes.  All of these observations support the 
idea that playoff systems dramatically change final outcomes as compared to regular 
season standings and therefore playoff structures and results warrant further consideration 
in studies on competitive balance. 
The only previous study that specifically looks at how changing playoff structures 
affect competitive balance and the corresponding fan response is by Lee (2009).  Using a 
seasonal uncertainty measure that accounts for the relative standing of every team in a 
given league-year, Lee shows that the level of competitive balance has a general positive 
trend in MLB from 1901-2006.  Breaking the sample up into three periods based on the 
number of teams that qualified for the playoffs each year (1901-1968, two teams; 1969-
1993, four teams; 1994-2006, eight teams) shows that there is a statistically significant 
increase in the level of uncertainty for each league as the number of playoff teams is 
increased.  Furthermore, this increase in uncertainty leads to a statistically significant 
increase in league-wide attendance.  As a result, by increasing the number of teams that 
qualify for the playoffs in 1969 and 1994, MLB was able to increase the level of seasonal 
competitive balance which directly led to increased attendance.  The 1969 postseason 
restructuring increased AL attendance by 271,253 and NL attendance by 137,256 per 
year while the 1994 restructuring increased AL attendance by 143,764 and NL attendance 
by 237,233 per year.  This study provides strong empirical evidence of the importance of 
playoff structure on competitive balance.  However, as just a single study in this area, it is 
limited in that it only looks at the seasonal level of balance and only uses data from MLB.  
A significant opportunity therefore exists to investigate the UOH using consecutive 
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season uncertainty measures and to determine how these measures are impacted by a 
league’s choice of playoff structure such as the number of teams that qualify for the 
playoffs each year. 
 
  
73 
 
CHAPTER 3 
CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
In consideration of the previous competitive balance literature review, it is clear 
that uncertainty of outcome remains an important and unsettled research area with two 
significant gaps in the literature: playoff structure/outcomes and consecutive season 
competitive balance measures.  Almost all previous studies ignore the issue of the 
playoffs entirely, which is a serious limitation as playoff structure and outcomes have 
been shown to be important elements that impact the competitive balance of a league 
(Longley and Lacey 2012).  Similarly, the vast majority of UOH studies are focused on 
game and seasonal levels of competitive balance, which may not represent the level of 
competitive balance to which fans are most interested.  This dissertation seeks to add to 
the literature in these two important areas by investigating the effect of playoff structure 
(measured by the number of teams qualifying for the playoffs) and consecutive season 
competitive balance (measured by playoff churn) on league-wide attendance. 
One way to break down the conceptual foundation of competitive balance 
research is put forth by Szymanski (2003) in his essay summarizing the theoretical 
importance of maintaining competitive balance in professional sport leagues: 
Claim One: Inequality of resources leads to unequal competition 
Claim Two: Fan interest declines when outcomes become less uncertain (UOH) 
Claim Three: Specific redistribution mechanisms produce more outcome uncertainty 
The first of these claims is usually taken as a given, with monopoly territorial rights 
serving to foster underlying differences in revenue generating potential between large 
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market and small market teams.  In this situation, large market teams find it more 
financially rewarding to secure additional playing talent as compared to small market 
teams, leading to potential concerns about a lack of competitive balance.  Szymanski 
empirically supports this notion by showing a statistically significant relationship 
between team payrolls and winning percentage for all of the leagues studied: MLB, NFL, 
NBA, NHL, and the top soccer league in each of England, Italy, Germany, and Spain.   
Other studies looking at the relationship between market size and winning 
percentage in MLB include Schmidt and Berri (2002), Gustafson and Hadley (2007), and 
Lewis (2008).  Schmidt and Berri use three different categories of variables to define 
market size (metropolitan statistical area measures, revenue measures, and expenditures), 
and find that most of the revenue and expense variables have a statistically significant 
positive relationship with winning percentage.  The authors caution that although higher 
revenues/payrolls may induce greater winning, it is also possible that high winning 
percentages enable teams to earn greater revenues and spend more on payroll.  Gustafson 
and Hadley use a four-equation simultaneous model of win percent, team payroll, team 
total revenue, and team local revenue to show that market size has a statistically 
significant positive effect on local revenue.  This in turn leads to increased payroll, which 
has a statistically significant positive effect on win percentage.  However, the authors 
caution that the effect of market size on winning percentage is relatively small, with each 
additional one million in market population expected to yield an additional 0.233 to 1.126 
additional wins per season, depending on the exact specification used.  Lewis uses a 
structural dynamic programming model to analyze payroll investment decisions by MLB 
team owners from 1976-2006, finding that market population has a statistically 
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significant impact on the value of a team’s payroll investments.  As a result, the optimal 
payroll for a given team rises with its market size such that, for example, a team’s 
optimal payroll doubles as market size increases from 2.5 to 7.5 million.  Coupled with 
the correlation between team payroll and on-field success, this analysis adds validity to 
the economic foundation of unequal market sizes leading to competitive imbalance. 
Although the previous studies offer some caveats to the findings, overall there 
seems to be a fairly broad consensus in support of the first competitive balance claim put 
forth by Szymanski (2003).  Teams with a larger home market will have greater marginal 
revenue per win at a given winning percentage than their small market peers.  As a result, 
large market teams will spend more on payroll, earn more revenue, and have higher 
winning percentages than small market teams, a competitively unbalanced outcome due 
to the underlying differences in market size that are protected by monopoly territorial 
rights.  Since some level of competitive imbalance is thus shown to be rooted in the 
structure of the leagues themselves, it then becomes important to consider Szymanski’s 
(2003) second and third claims: does this lack of competitive balance lead to lower fan 
interest as predicted by the UOH and therefore necessitate institutional changes to 
improve balance? 
 
3.1 Playoff Structure UOH Hypothesis 
The first question this dissertation seeks to address in regards to the UOH is 
whether playoff structure (in terms of the number of teams that qualify for the playoffs in 
a given year) can affect competitive balance in a way that impacts league-wide 
attendance.  Numerous other studies have investigated whether leagues can enact 
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institutional changes to address competitive imbalance problems in order to restore the 
level of balance to a point at which consumer interest in the league is maximized.  One of 
the most important institutional structures meant to foster competitive balance (at least as 
argued by the owners) was the reserve rule.  The implementation of free agency in MLB 
in 1976 provides a natural test for the efficacy of the reserve rule in terms of promoting 
competitive balance.  However, the results from 20 studies as reviewed by Szymanski 
show seven finding no change in competitive balance post-free agency, nine finding an 
improvement, and four showing a reduction.  Thus, support for the reserve clause as a 
tool to enhance competitive balance is very mixed.  Other institutional rules meant to 
promote competitive balance that have been studied by academic scholars include the 
reverse order draft (e.g. Grier and Tollison 1994), salary caps (e.g. Lee 2010), luxury 
taxes (Dietl et. al. 2010), and various forms of revenue sharing (e.g. Fort and Quirk 1995; 
Kesenne 2000a; Miller 2007).  Overall, the theoretically and empirically observed result 
of most of these rules is either no change or an ambiguous effect on competitive balance 
(Sanderson and Siegfried 2003).  Nevertheless, professional sport leagues, in the name of 
improving competitive balance, have continued to implement new forms of payroll caps, 
luxury taxes, individual salary caps, and revenue sharing that may not have any effect on 
competitive balance at all. 
Sanderson and Siegfried (2003) argue that the one change most likely to induce 
competitive balance in sport leagues is to allow franchises to move from small markets to 
larger markets such as New York City to even the revenue generating potential of teams.  
However, all of the major U.S. professional sport leagues (unlike those in Europe) have 
restrictions on franchise movement to protect the local monopolies of team owners.  
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Sanderson (2002) discusses how small changes to the structure of the competition itself, 
unlike the large changes to the economic structure of a league, can significantly affect 
outcomes and the level of competitive balance.  This is seen in qualifying times that 
reward better competitors with either a head start (car racing) or a preferable/faster lane 
assignment (swimming).  Seeding in tennis and in the playoffs for the four major 
professional leagues also confers the advantages of home-field and of playing against a 
weaker opponent.  In addition, the number of playoff games per series greatly affects the 
chances that the weaker opponent will pull off the upset, with single game playoffs in the 
NFL and college football and basketball promoting greater uncertainty as compared with 
the mostly best of seven series in MLB, the NBA and the NHL.  This result, along with 
the specifics of how teams are pooled for the playoffs (by conference, by division, etc.) is 
empirically shown to significantly affect playoff outcomes by Longley and Lacey (2012).  
Lastly, a simple change that leagues can implement to affect the level of competitive 
balance is to increase the number of teams that qualify for the playoffs (Sanderson 2002; 
Sanderson and Siegfried 2003).  Such a change can significantly reduce the likelihood of 
repeat champions/dynasties.  These and other institutional rule changes over the years in 
all of the major professional sports can have as much or a greater effect on competitive 
balance than the many financial restrictions such as revenue sharing, luxury taxes, and 
salary caps that have been fought for in the name of promoting balance.  In recognition of 
these ideas, attention now turns to how a league’s playoff structure can affect competitive 
balance and attendance.  No empirical study thus far has analyzed the historical 
differences in the percent of playoff qualifying teams within and across leagues in terms 
of competitive balance and the corresponding effect on league-wide attendance.   
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Within and across leagues, the number of teams that qualify for the playoffs each 
year has varied considerably.  In MLB and the NFL, the leagues began with no playoffs 
and slowly added to the number of playoff teams first with a single championship 
game/series (two playoff teams) and now to the point where there are 10 playoff teams in 
baseball and 12 in football.  In both these leagues, the number of teams qualifying for the 
playoffs has increased over time from 0% in their early history to their current points of 
33.3% and 37.5% respectively.  The opposite situation is true for the NHL and NBA, 
where the percentage of teams qualifying for the playoffs started much higher, and has 
slowly decreased over time through league expansion.  In both of these leagues, the 
percentage of teams that currently make the playoffs each year is at a nearly historic low 
of 53.3% compared to previous maximums of 80.0% in basketball and 85.7% in hockey 
(see Appendix A).   
The history of the number and percentage of teams that qualify for the postseason 
is the simplest in MLB.  Starting in 1903, a playoff structure was created where two of 
the 16 MLB teams (12.5%) qualified for the World Series.  This exact format remained in 
place through 1960, at which point MLB started expanding the number of teams in the 
league, first to 18, then to 20, then to 24.  When the league first reached 24 teams, in 
1969, the number of playoff teams was doubled to four (16.7%).  In 1995, with 28 teams 
in the league, the number of playoff teams was again doubled to eight (28.6%).  Finally, 
in 2012, an additional two teams were added to the playoffs so that ten out of the 30 
teams qualify for the playoffs each year (33.3%).  The same general history is observed 
in the NFL, with the first 2-team playoff (NFL championship game) starting in 1933 
when there were ten teams in the league (20.0%).  Over the next 45 years, the NFL 
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experienced small contractions and expansions in the number of teams in the league, but 
the number of playoff teams remained at two.  By 1967, with 16 teams in the league, the 
number of playoff teams was doubled to four (25.0%), and in 1970, following the AFL-
NFL merger that brought the number of NFL teams up to 26, the playoff field was again 
doubled to eight (30.8%).  Since the merger in 1970, the NFL has slowly continued to 
expand the number of teams in the league while also increasing the number of playoff 
teams to 10 in 1978 (35.7%) and to 12 in 1990 (42.9%).  Since 1990, the number of 
teams in the NFL has increased from 28 to 32 while the number of playoff teams has 
remained at 12 (37.5%). 
The history of the number and percentage of playoff qualifying teams in the NHL 
and NBA is slightly more complicated.  In the early history of the NHL (1918-1942), the 
number of playoff teams increased from two to six while the number of teams in the 
league fluctuated between three and ten with various contractions and expansions.  From 
1943-1967 (the era of the Original Six), there were six teams in the league, four of which 
qualified for the playoffs (66.7%).  In 1968, both the number of teams in the league and 
the number of playoff teams doubled (to 12 and 8, respectively), keeping the percentage 
at 66.7%.  By 1975, the number of teams in the NHL had increased to 18, but the number 
of playoff teams was correspondingly increased to 12, such that the playoff percentage 
remained at 66.7%.  In 1980, with 21 teams in the league, the number of playoff teams 
was further increased to 16 (76.2%).  Since that time, the number of playoff teams has 
remained at 16 while the NHL has experienced incremental expansion to the point where 
there are now 30 teams in the league and the percentage of playoff qualifying teams has 
been reduced to 53.3%.  In the early history of the NBA (1947-1974), the number of 
80 
 
playoff qualifying teams alternated between six and eight while the number of teams in 
the league fluctuated between eight and 17.  In 1975, with 18 teams in the league, the 
number of playoff teams was increased to 10 (55.6%) and in 1977, with 22 teams in the 
league, the number of playoff teams was further increased to 12 (54.5%).  The number of 
playoff qualifying teams was increased to 16 in 1984 and has remained there since, 
despite expansion that brought the number of NBA teams from 23 in 1984 (69.6%) to 30 
today (53.3%). 
Looking over these histories, it is clear that all four leagues have generally 
increased (decreased) the number of playoff qualifying teams in line with league 
expansion (contraction).  However, a few observations in each league do not fit that 
general mold.  In MLB, the number of playoff teams was doubled from four to eight in 
1995 despite no change in the number of teams.  This move thus doubled the percentage 
of playoff teams from 14.3% to 28.6%.  Similarly, in the NFL, from 1976-1994 the 
number of teams in the league remained constant at 28 while the number of playoff teams 
was increased from eight to ten in 1978 and then from ten to 12 in 1990.  These moves 
increased the percentage of playoff teams from 28.6% to 35.7% and then to 42.9% (the 
historical high point for the NFL).  In the NBA and NHL, the number of playoff teams 
has remained at 16 in each league since the early 1980s despite significant expansion 
during this time that saw the number of NBA teams increase from 23 to 30 and the 
number of NHL teams increase from 21 to 30.  This lack of playoff expansion has caused 
the percentage of playoff qualifying teams to fall from 69.6% to 53.3% in the NBA and 
from 76.2% to 53.3% in the NHL.  Assuming that leagues choose the number of playoff 
teams in order to maximize league revenues, these observations across the four major 
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professional sport leagues in the U.S. suggest that the optimal percentage of playoff-
qualifying teams in terms of maximizing league attendance falls somewhere in the range 
of 30-50%. 
A league’s choice of the percentage of teams that qualifies for the playoffs is 
influenced by two competing effects.  On the one hand, increasing the number of teams 
that qualify for the playoffs could increase fan interest insomuch as more teams will still 
be in the hunt for playoff spots as the season progresses.  In the early history of MLB and 
the NFL, when there was just a single championship game/series or even no 
championship game at all, it can be expected that teams that quickly fell behind in the 
regular season standings suffered from low attendance for the remainder of the season as 
fans rightfully gave up on the team’s chances for that season.  By increasing the number 
of qualifying teams in these leagues, it can be expected that more teams were competitive 
in terms of securing a playoff spot, increasing overall fan attendance in a given year (e.g. 
Lee 2009; Krautmann et. al. 2011).  On the other hand, increasing the number of playoff 
teams shifts the importance from the regular season to the playoffs, which could 
negatively affect regular season attendance as fans wait until the “real” season begins in 
the playoffs.  This notion can clearly be observed in the extreme case where the 
percentage of teams qualifying for the playoffs approaches 100%, completely 
deteriorating the significance of the regular season and likely leading to a drastic 
reduction in regular season attendance.  The general fan utility function can then be 
written as: 
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Fan utility U = f(competitiveness for playoff qualification, regular season importance, 
game characteristics, team characteristics, league characteristics, market 
characteristics, other factors) 
 
These two competing effects on attendance of increasing the number of teams that 
qualify for the playoffs are apparent in the vastly different playoff structures of NCAA 
Division 1 football and basketball. 
For nearly the entire history of major college football, there was no formal playoff 
system to determine a champion.  When the Bowl Championship Series (BCS) was 
introduced in 1998 to match the top two teams at the end of the regular season in a 
national championship game, it was a major step forward in that it essentially created a 
two-team playoff.  Although financially successful, the BCS became loathed by fans for 
its limitations: only two of the more than 120 top level college football teams qualified 
for the playoff each year, leaving the vast majority of college football teams unable to 
contend for a championship, including some that were undefeated.  Despite these 
persistent fan criticisms, the NCAA only recently decided to expand the playoffs to a 
mere four teams in 2014, citing the need to maintain the importance of the regular season 
(Russo 2012).  In contrast, the playoff system in division 1 basketball began in 1939 with 
eight teams, and has consistently expanded over time to where it now includes 68 (out of 
more than 340) teams each year.  Although this NCAA basketball tournament (deemed 
March Madness) is regularly considered the most exciting collection of collegiate athletic 
games of any sport, the inclusiveness of such a large percentage of teams has potentially 
destroyed fan interest in the regular season (Bishop 2012).  If fans of big name teams 
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know that their team is essentially guaranteed to qualify for the postseason tournament, 
then regular season games could lose their value.  On the other hand, this greater 
inclusiveness of teams could increase uncertainty and attendance for the hundreds of 
teams on the bubble that realistically have hope of qualifying for the tournament as the 
regular season winds down. 
This dissertation seeks to determine which of these two competing effects on 
attendance of increasing the number of teams to qualify for the playoffs is greater.  If the 
effect of greater inclusiveness creating greater uncertainty dominates, then it is expected 
that increasing the number of playoff teams will increase attendance.  Conversely, if the 
effect of shifting importance from the regular season to the postseason dominates, then it 
is expected that increasing the number of playoff teams will decrease attendance.  If these 
two competing effects are equal and opposite, then no effect on attendance will be 
observed. 
 
H1: Increasing the percentage of teams that qualify for the playoffs will affect league-
wide regular season attendance based on which of two competing effects is larger: more 
inclusiveness creating more uncertainty of outcome, or the shift of importance from the 
regular season to the postseason. 
 
3.2 Consecutive Season UOH Hypothesis 
The second question this dissertation seeks to address in regards to the UOH is 
whether consecutive season competitive balance (as measured by the churn in qualifying 
and advancing playoff teams each year) impacts league-wide attendance.  Although there 
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has been a considerable amount of research in this general area as highlighted by the 
UOH literature review in the previous section, the results have been mixed.  Szymanski 
(2003) finds that of the 22 pre-2003 UOH studies, 10 showed strong support for the 
UOH, seven offered weak support, and five contradicted it.  The mixed nature of these 
findings is not surprising considering that each study did not utilize the same general type 
of uncertainty amongst the three accepted levels of competitive balance: match, seasonal, 
and consecutive season.  In addition, even studies using the same level of competitive 
balance often make use of different specific measures of that type of competitive balance 
which complicates the comparison across studies.  Some of these various competitive 
balance metrics have also been shown to suffer from certain measurement issues, 
including Gini coefficients (Utt and Fort 2002; Mizak et. al. 2005), pre-game betting odds 
(Dawson and Downward 2005), league standings (Dawson and Downward 2005), 
standard deviation of win percentages (Mizak et. al. 2005), HHI of wins (Owen et. al. 
2007), ratio of actual to idealized standard deviation of win percentages (Owen 2010), 
and concentration ratios (Manasis et. al. 2011). 
In light of these many differences, conflicting results, and measurement issues, 
the field could benefit greatly from the identification of a single competitive balance 
measure to which consumers show the greatest sensitivity (Zimbalist 2002; 2003).  
Although UOH studies are dominated by game-level analysis and ACB studies have 
largely focused on seasonal measures, neither of these levels of competitive balance 
likely describe what fans are most interested in concerning uncertainty of outcome.  This 
can be seen by the fact that fans considered competitive imbalance to be a significant 
problem in Major League Baseball during the 1990s (Rogers 2001), yet academic studies 
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have consistently found increasing levels of competitive balance in MLB over time, 
including through the 1990s.  This difference is likely accounted for by the fact that 
studies of competitive balance in MLB have largely focused on seasonal measures (e.g. 
Quirk and Fort 1992, Butler 1995, Schmidt and Berri 2001) with one recent study 
investigating league-wide game-level measures (Bowman et. al. 2013).  In all of these 
studies, the finding of increased levels of competitive balance over time is clearly not 
appreciated by MLB fans, who lamented the repeated dominance of the Yankees during 
that decade.  In a study commissioned by MLB in 2000 (deemed the Blue Ribbon Report) 
to investigate various economic issues including competitive balance, it was shown that 
teams in the top 25% of payrolls won all of the World Series games from 1995-1999 and 
that teams in the top 50% of payrolls won all of the playoff games during this time (Levin 
et. al. 2000).  The Blue Ribbon Report concludes that MLB’s competitive balance 
problem is rooted in inter-seasonal concerns and that “proper competitive balance will 
not exist until every well-run club has a regularly recurring reasonable hope of 
reaching postseason play” (Levin et. al. 2000, pg. 5, emphasis in original).  This idea of 
the type of competitive balance to which fans show the most interest contrasts with the 
game-level and seasonal aspects that have largely been the focus of academic inquiry to 
date.  In fact, several studies in response to the Blue Ribbon Report have suggested that 
MLB is incorrect in asserting that it has a competitive balance problem (e.g. Schmidt and 
Berri 2002).  These studies mistakenly ignore the fact that even if seasonal measures of 
competitive balance show greater balance, consumers may be more interested in and 
sensitive to changes in inter-seasonal balance.  As a result, UOH studies should focus on 
these inter-seasonal aspects of competitive balance under the premise that fans are most 
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responsive to that level of balance.  This sentiment is echoed by Humphreys (2003a) in 
his call for a multi-season approach to future competitive balance research. 
The first study to specifically highlight the limitations of within-season measures 
of competitive balance was Eckard (2001).  In particular, it was shown that two seasons 
with the exact same level of seasonal balance could have shown either no change in 
league standings or a complete re-ordering of all teams top to bottom.  These two cases 
represent the extremes of the amount of inter-seasonal balance present in the league, but 
traditional measures of within-season balance would treat these two leagues identically.  
As a result, Eckard proposed a new measure of balance that involved decomposing the 
variance of win percentages into within-season and across-season components.  The 
drawback of this measure is the difficulty of interpreting the relative values of the two 
components of the variance decomposition.  Humphreys (2002) was the next to propose a 
new inter-seasonal competitive balance measure, the CBR.  Although the CBR was later 
shown to be conceptually identical to Eckard’s (2001) variance decomposition (Eckard 
2003), the CBR still has the practical advantage of being a single number (Humphreys 
2003b).  More recently proposed measures of consecutive season competitive balance 
include Markov transitional probabilities (Hadley et. al. 2005), the adjusted churn (Mizak 
et. al. 2007), the normal density function of games back (Lee 2009), and the mobility 
gain function (Lenten 2009a).  All of these inter-seasonal measures offer the advantage of 
providing information that is likely at the root of fan interest in sport leagues.  However, 
with the exception of Markov transitional probabilities, these measures reflect regular 
season outcomes only.   
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Although important, the regular season is just one component of a sports league, 
with the playoffs serving as a “second” season in the determination of league champions 
(Longley and Lacey 2012).  Any inter-seasonal competitive balance measure that doesn’t 
include playoff outcomes ignores the source of greatest potential fan interest in 
professional sport leagues.  Playoff games in the Big Four leagues regularly have 
significantly higher television ratings as well as sold out attendance despite substantially 
higher ticket prices.  As a result, the search for a “best” measure of competitive balance 
in line with Zimbalist’s (2002; 2003) proposition should include some measure of playoff 
success.  Although various competitive balance studies have looked at the playoffs in one 
form or another, the specific use of the qualification for and advancement in the playoffs 
as a measure of consecutive season uncertainty is currently lacking in the competitive 
balance literature.  The closest previous example is the use of Markov transitional 
probabilities as a measure of the qualification for the playoffs, but only one study 
(Krautman and Hadley 2006) utilized this measure in a test of the UOH.  The results from 
this study provide statistically significant support for the UOH using Markov transitional 
probabilities as the measure of inter-seasonal uncertainty, in line with the idea that fans 
care about competitive balance in regards to the playoffs. 
In terms of playoff advancement, several studies have investigated championship 
outcomes (e.g. Cairns 1987; Scully 1989; Quirk and Fort 1992; Fizel 1997; Dittmore and 
Crowe 2010), but none of these studies used this information in a test of the UOH.  The 
combination of just one UOH study measuring playoff qualification and no UOH studies 
measuring playoff advancement and championships highlights an important gap in the 
competitive balance literature.  Namely, fans are most sensitive to inter-seasonal 
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measures of uncertainty of outcome and in particular respond to which teams qualify for 
and advance through the playoffs each year.  If the same small subset of teams regularly 
qualifies for and advances to later rounds of the playoffs (representing a low level of 
churn), fans could have reduced interest in the league due to a perceived lack of inter-
seasonal competitive balance.  On the other hand, fans may have a preference for 
historically strong teams and dynasties.  If that is true, then lower playoff 
qualification/advancement churn should yield greater attendance.  Similarly, fans may 
have a taste for fairness, and desire that the regular season champion is rightfully 
crowned as the champion of the playoffs as well.  In this case, the redistributive effects of 
a playoff tournament on regular season outcomes (Longley and Lacey 2012) would be 
looked upon unfavorably.  The general fan utility function can then be written as: 
 
Fan utility U = f(consecutive season competitive balance, dynasties, perceived fairness of  
playoff outcomes, game characteristics, team characteristics, league 
characteristics, market characteristics, other factors) 
 
Whether fans respond positively or negatively to increased consecutive season 
competitive balance is therefore an open question, including whether fans are more 
sensitive to early playoff rounds (e.g. which teams qualify for the playoffs) or later 
playoff rounds (e.g. which team wins the championship).  The inter-seasonal churn of 
teams in the early playoff rounds may be a more important driver of league-wide fan 
interest because these rounds consist of a greater number of teams and therefore may 
appeal to a broader group of a league’s fan base.  In addition, the playoffs can be an 
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extremely lengthy process (especially in the NBA and NHL), and thus fan interest in 
outcomes may be maximized during the first round and then declining with each 
successive round as the novelty wears off.   On the contrary, fans may be more sensitive 
to the inter-seasonal churn of teams in the later playoff rounds because each round in a 
playoff system becomes closer to and more important in determining the league 
champion.  If fans primarily follow sport leagues in order to find out which team emerges 
as the champion each year, then it is expected that later playoff rounds (and their 
corresponding level of competitive balance year-to-year) will have a great effect on 
league-wide attendance. 
Another factor that potentially will affect the relationship between consecutive 
season competitive balance and league-wide attendance is the time frame with which 
playoff churn is measured.  The specific time frame during which fans might be most 
sensitive to changes in consecutive season competitive balance remains an empirical 
question, with possibilities ranging from using just the previous season, using a simple 
average of some number of previous seasons, or using a weighted average with greater 
weights for more recent seasons.  Research in psychology and behavioral economics has 
consistently found the presence of the “recency effect,” whereby people are cognitively 
biased toward more recent observations and experiences.  In consideration of these 
findings, it is possible that only the most recently finished season is salient to fans in 
terms of their appreciation for the presence (or lack) of inter-seasonal competitive 
balance.  However, the recency bias for fans may not be quite so drastic, with playoff 
results from two or more seasons ago still preserved in fan memory and influencing 
perceptions of the level of competitive balance.  This dissertation seeks to answer these 
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questions concerning the effect of various forms of playoff qualification/advancement 
consecutive season competitive balance measures on fan response in terms of league-
wide attendance. 
 
H2: Higher levels of inter-seasonal competitive balance as measured by the churn of 
playoff qualifying/advancing teams will affect league-wide regular season attendance in 
the direction consistent with fan preference for either competitive balance or 
dynasties/fairness.  The magnitude and direction of this relationship will be impacted by 
both the round of the playoffs under consideration as well as the time-frame used for the 
measurement of playoff churn. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA AND ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
 
 This chapter presents the methodology that is used to test the previously stated 
hypotheses.  The first two sections describe the methodology for hypothesis one, that 
increasing the percentage of teams that qualify for the playoffs will affect league-wide 
regular season attendance based on two competing effects: more inclusiveness creating 
more uncertainty of outcome, and the shift of importance from the regular season to the 
postseason.  The remaining two sections describe the methodology for hypothesis two, 
that higher levels of inter-seasonal competitive balance as measured by the churn of 
playoff qualifying/advancing teams will affect league-wide regular season attendance 
based on fan preference for either competitive balance or dynasties/fairness. 
For hypothesis one, the regression model is described first followed by variable 
definitions and descriptive statistics.  The variables used in the model are broken down 
into the dependent variable, the independent variables of interest, and the control 
variables.  In each case, a justification for the choice of the variable(s) used in the 
analysis is presented, including a priori expectations of the results and a brief discussion 
of the descriptive statistics.  For hypothesis two, the regression model is a simple 
extension of that for hypothesis one, with the same dependent variable and control 
variables.  As a result, only the new independent variables of interest are defined and 
discussed. 
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4.1 H1 Model Specification 
The following regression equation serves as the foundation for the analysis of the 
first hypothesis: 
 
League-wide Attendance = Playoff Percent + Playoff Percent
2
 + Control Variables 
 
To capture the competing effects of increases (decreases) to the playoff percent creating 
more (less) uncertainty of outcome while also decreasing (increasing) the importance of 
the regular season, the playoff percent variable is modeled with both a linear and 
quadratic term.  This allows for the effect on attendance of increasing the playoff percent 
to be positive for some range of playoff percentages while negative for others.  This is 
consistent with the a priori expectation that attendance is maximized for some playoff 
percentage between 30 and 50%.  The choice of control variables as well as the specific 
formulation of the dependent variable came from an iterative process (described in detail 
in section 5.4 Alternate Models) that was used to refine the foundational regression 
model into the final specification used for the analysis.  Of particular importance was the 
need to use the average attendance per game (as opposed to the total league-wide 
attendance) as the dependent variable in order to eliminate multicollinearity problems and 
to use first differencing of all continuous variables in order to remove the non-stationary 
effects from the time-series data.  Additionally, choices were made concerning the 
specific measurement of control variables within the six broad categories of controls used 
in this analysis: stadium capacity, stadium age, ticket prices, seasonal competitive 
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balance, strikes/lockouts, and a trend.   The final baseline first difference regression 
model used to test hypothesis one is shown below for MLB, the NHL, and the NBA: 
 
MLB: AvgAttendPGFD(y) = PlayoffPctFD(x1) + PlayoffPct2FD(x2) + 
AvgCapacityFD(x3) + RealTicketPriFD(x4) + 
NewFranchise(x5) + Relocation(x6) + NewStadium(x7) + 
CenSeasonCBFD(x8) + Strike72(x9) + Strike81(x10) + 
Strike94(x11) + AttendTrendFD(x12) + error 
 
NHL: AvgAttendPGFD(y) = PlayoffPctFD(x1) + PlayoffPct2FD(x2) +  
AvgCapacityFD(x3) + RealTicketPriFD(x4) + 
NewFranchise(x5) + Relocation(x6) + NewStadium(x7) + 
CenSeasonCBFD(x8) + Lockout94(x9) + Lockout04(x10) 
+ Lockout12(x11) + AttendTrendFD(x12) + error 
 
NBA: AvgAttendPGFD(y) = PlayoffPctFD(x1) + PlayoffPct2FD(x2) +  
AvgCapacityFD(x3) + RealTicketPriFD(x4) + 
NewFranchise(x5) + Relocation(x6) + NewStadium(x7) + 
CenSeasonCBFD(x8) + Lockout98(x9) + Lockout11(x10) 
+ AttendTrendFD(x11) + error 
 
Where each of the variables is defined as follow: 
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AvgAttendPGFD is the first difference of the average attendance per game, which is the 
total league-wide attendance divided by the total number of games for a given year. 
PlayoffPctFD is the first difference of the percentage of teams that qualify for the 
playoffs in a given league-year. 
PlayoffPct2FD is the first difference of the square of the percentage of teams that qualify 
for the playoffs in a given league-year. 
AvgCapacityFD is the first difference of the average stadium capacity per game for a 
given league-year. 
RealTicketPriFD is the first difference of the weighted average (by capacity) ticket price 
in real 2013 dollars for all teams in a given league-year. 
NewFranchise is an integer value of the number of new teams added to a league through 
expansion prior to a given year. 
Relocation is an integer value of the number of teams that relocated to a new city prior to 
a given year. 
NewStadium is an integer value of the number of teams that completed construction of a 
new stadium or the extensive renovation of their old stadiums prior to or during a given 
year. 
CenSeasonCBFD is the first difference of the ratio of actual to idealized standard 
deviation of win percentages calculated from the final standings for the middle one third 
of the teams in the league (33
rd
 to 67
th
 percentile). 
Strike72 is a dummy variable for the strike-affected 1972 MLB season. 
Strike81 is a dummy variable for the strike-affected 1981 MLB season. 
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Strike94 is a dummy variable for the strike-affected 1994 MLB season. Since the second 
half of the 1994 season (including the playoffs) was completely canceled as a result of 
this strike, the variable takes a value of 1 for the 1995 MLB season. 
Lockout94 is a dummy variable for the lockout-affected 1994-95 NHL season. 
Lockout04 is a dummy variable for the lockout-affected 2004-05 NHL season.  Since 
this lockout led to the complete cancellation of the 2004-05 NHL season, the variable 
takes a value of 1 for the 2005-06 NHL season. 
Lockout12 is a dummy variable for the lockout-affected 2012-13 NHL season. 
Lockout98 is a dummy variable for the lockout-affected 1998-99 NBA season. 
Lockout11 is a dummy variable for the lockout-affected 2011-12 NBA season. 
AttendTrendFD is the first difference of the average attendance per game of the leagues 
not being considered in the current regression analysis.  For the MLB regressions, 
AttendTrend is the average attendance per game of the NBA and NHL.  For the NHL 
regressions, AttendTrend is the average attendance per game of the NBA and MLB.  For 
the NBA regressions, AttendTrend is the average attendance per game of the MLB and 
NHL. 
 
Descriptive statistics for the preceding variables can be seen below in Table 1 for MLB, 
Table 2 for the NHL and Table 3 for the NBA. 
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Table 1: MLB H1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
AvgAttendFD  257.995 1420.455 -6243.26 4447.231 
PlayoffPctFD  0.00336 0.035505 -0.15385 0.153846 
PlayoffPct2FD  0.00154 0.016071 -0.07101 0.071006 
AvgCapacityFD  19.57592 853.6060 -2545.65 2450.667 
RealTicketPriFD  0.207008 0.780991 -1.19583 3.253435 
NewFranchise  0.218750 0.723061 0 4 
Relocation  0.171875 0.419928 0 2 
NewStadium  0.578125 0.792919 0 3 
CenSeasonCBFD  -0.018560 0.265180 -0.99945 0.638724 
Strike72  0.015625 0.125 0 1 
Strike81  0.015625 0.125 0 1 
Strike94  0.015625 0.125 0 1 
AttendTrendFD  178.4066 406.9994 -1582.26 923.7658 
 
 
Table 2: NHL H1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
AvgAttendFD  96.18279 669.2132 -3157.41 1158.866 
PlayoffPctFD  -0.002720 0.034213 -0.09524 0.166667 
PlayoffPct2FD  -0.003270 0.041823 -0.11791 0.194444 
AvgCapacityFD  71.63129 260.9188 -543.563 1048.628 
RealTicketPriFD  0.638761 3.814039 -11.4418 4.713594 
NewFranchise  0.5 1.164965 0 6 
Relocation  0.18 0.437526 0 2 
NewStadium  0.48 0.973946 0 5 
CenSeasonCBFD  0.004582 0.385923 -0.82870 1.051960 
Lockout94  0.02 0.141421 0 1 
Lockout04  0.02 0.141421 0 1 
Lockout12  0.02 0.141421 0 1 
AttendTrendFD  309.2832 782.9485 -2857.78 2313.191 
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Table 3: NBA H1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
AvgAttendFD  265.0820 477.5770 -960.585 1667.847 
PlayoffPctFD  -0.003740 0.043208 -0.13333 0.173913 
PlayoffPct2FD  -0.004790 0.056 -0.19556 0.211720 
AvgCapacityFD  150.2945 951.9855 -1954.96 3992.182 
RealTicketPriFD  0.614593 3.541757 -8.92191 8.201990 
NewFranchise  0.372881 0.848900 0 4 
Relocation  0.338983 0.544888 0 2 
NewStadium  0.762712 1.149797 0 7 
CenSeasonCBFD  -0.002070 0.558573 -1.48559 1.498537 
Lockout98  0.016949 0.130189 0 1 
Lockout11  0.016949 0.130189 0 1 
AttendTrendFD  222.5182 883.9129 -3071.81 2698.253 
 
 Looking at Tables 1-3, the descriptive statistics match expectations.  Although the 
large magnitude of the standard deviation for each variable relative to its mean may look 
troublesome, this is a first difference model so these variables are measures of the 
changes in the absolute variables each year.  As a result, the mean values are generally 
expected to be around zero, with both positive and negative changes throughout the data 
set leading to the relatively high standard deviations.  In addition, the statistics are 
generally consistent across leagues, with each league showing a small increase in average 
attendance, average stadium capacity and real ticket prices over time.  These trends 
support the observation that professional sport leagues have become more popular over 
time.  One important difference between the leagues is that the percentage of teams 
making the playoffs has shown a slight increase over time for MLB, but a slight decrease 
for the NBA and the NHL.  However, this is consistent with the discussion of the history 
of the percentage of the teams that qualify for the playoffs in each of these leagues (see 
Chapter 3).  
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The NFL is not included in this analysis because of the large number of sellouts 
that exist throughout the data set and which complicates the use of attendance figures as 
an accurate measure of demand.  Although sellouts exist sporadically for each of the 
other three leagues, the frequency and magnitude are small enough that the aggregate 
league-wide attendance measure is expected to accurately model the true total demand.  
In recognition of the fact that the demand for professional sports boomed in the post 
World War II period in the United States (and thus likely exhibits different underlying 
relationships than the period prior), the analysis is limited to this time frame.  Coupled 
with some attendance data limitations for the early years of the NBA and NHL, each data 
set therefore consists of the following years: MLB (1950-2013), NBA (1954-2013), and 
NHL (1964-2013).  See Appendix B for a discussion of the data sources used in this 
study. 
 
4.2 H1 Research Variables 
The following subsections describe the type and definition of variables that are 
included in the final H1 regression model detailed in the previous section.  
 
4.2.1 Independent Variables 
Playoff Percent.  The percentage of teams in a given league that qualify for the 
playoffs in each year, as calculated by dividing the number of available playoff spots by 
the total number of teams in that league for a given year. 
   
99 
 
Playoff Percent Squared.  The square term of the playoff percent variable.  In 
combination, these two independent variables are utilized to determine the effect of 
playoff structure on league-wide attendance as a test of Hypothesis 1.  It is expected that 
the playoff percent will affect attendance in a quadratic nature, with attendance 
maximized for some playoff percent between 30 and 50%. 
 
4.2.2 Dependent Variable 
  
Average Attendance per Game.  The league-wide regular season attendance for 
each league-year divided by the total number of regular season games played that year. 
Total league-wide attendance is the measure of aggregate consumer demand for a given 
professional sports league.  Although this is an imperfect measure due to infrequent 
sellouts and misreporting, it is regularly used and accepted in both the sports economics 
literature as well as the broader economics literature as a good proxy of demand and 
league profitability (e.g. Schmidt and Berri 2004). 
Alternate potential specifications for the dependent variable could look at team-
level attendance and/or complete season attendance (regular season plus postseason).  
Postseason attendance is not considered in this analysis for two primary reasons.  First, 
postseason games are nearly always sold out which means the attendance figures will be 
the home team’s stadium capacity, which varies considerably across teams.  This is 
problematic because the specific set of teams that qualify for the playoffs each year is 
largely random, and therefore the observed postseason attendance will be pre-defined by 
the playoff qualifying teams regardless of the overall fan interest in the league for a given 
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year.  In addition, the playoffs represent only a subset of the total teams in the league, 
which means the inclusion of the postseason attendance would bias the results toward 
specific teams and away from a collective league analysis.  As a result, postseason 
attendance is a poor relative measure of fan interest in a professional sports league. 
Second, even if postseason attendance was a good measure of fan interest in a 
league, it’s likely that including this data would not have a significant effect on the 
analysis due to the limited number of playoff games.  In MLB, even at the current 
historical high of 33% percent of teams making the playoffs, there is a maximum of just 
43 playoff games in one year.  This represents just 1.8% of the 2,430 regular season 
games played each season.  In the NHL and the NBA, the current maximum number of 
playoff games in one year is 105, which is just 8.5% of the 1,230 regular season games 
played each season.  In all three leagues, the effect of including postseason attendance is 
therefore likely to be small. 
Team-level attendance is not considered for this analysis due to the overarching 
research question of investigating the effect of competitive balance on the league as a 
whole.  Numerous previous studies (e.g. Borland 1987) have investigated the effect of 
various competitive balance metrics on individual team attendance.  Not surprisingly, 
significant results have been found showing that the more competitive a given team is for 
a playoff spot, the higher the attendance will be for that team.  However, these studies 
ignore the issue of whether the gain in attendance by these teams is offset by a potential 
drop in attendance of teams that have already clinched a playoff position or are 
hopelessly out of the playoff picture.  From a league perspective, it is insufficient to note 
that a tighter playoff race will increase the attendance for those teams that are involved, 
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without fully understanding the effect on all of the teams collectively.  For this reason, it 
is important to measure league-wide attendance in order to adequately determine the 
overall effect of changes in competitive balance (such as the percentage of teams that 
qualify for the playoffs) on fan demand for the entire league.  The league office would 
not be interested in enacting structural changes that led to an increase in fan interest for a 
given subset of teams if it came at the expense of reducing interest in the league as a 
whole.  Only by investigating attendance responses at the league level can it be 
determined that a given variable collectively imparts a positive or negative effect on the 
entire league. 
 
4.2.3 Control Variables 
Control variables are utilized in the analysis to account for additional factors that 
could impact league-wide attendance for a professional sport league.  The following 
control variables listed below were included in the analysis.  
 
Average Real Ticket Price.  A standard demand model suggests that the quantity 
of tickets demanded (attendance) will be inversely related to the price of the tickets, and 
therefore the average ticket price for each league in each year should be included as an 
important control variable.  Unfortunately, information on average ticket prices in each 
league is limited and therefore most previous longitudinal studies do not include ticket 
prices in their models.  Full data on average ticket prices is only available from 1952 in 
MLB, 1992 in the NBA, and 1995 in the NHL.  Because of these limitations, tests using 
the entire dataset for the NBA and NHL will not be able to use ticket prices as a control 
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variable.  Instead, robustness tests are performed on subsets of the data that contain full 
ticket price information in order to validate the findings from the full model.  Nominal 
average ticket prices for each year are converted into real 2013 dollars using the 
Consumer Price Index. 
 
New Franchises.  Increasing the number of teams in a league through expansion 
is likely to have an effect on average demand for games.  On the one hand, creating more 
teams may open up new markets with strong pent-up demand (as well as national appeal) 
that contributes to an overall increase in the average attendance per game at the league 
level.  On the other hand, if the new teams are in markets of inferior quality to the current 
collection of teams, than expansion may lead to an overall reduction in average demand.  
In consideration of the fact that leagues should choose to expand under situations that 
would most benefit the league, it is expected that new franchises should increase average 
league attendance. 
 
Franchise Relocations.  The decision to relocate a franchise to a new market is 
usually made under the pretext that its existing market is no longer able to adequately 
support a professional sports team.  If this is true, the relocation should result in greater 
fan support in the new, better market.  At the league level, the number of franchise 
relocations in a given year is therefore expected to contribute to greater average 
attendance. 
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New Stadiums.  The construction of a new stadium or the significant renovation 
of an old stadium is expected to lead to an increased demand to attend games, as fans are 
curious and excited about a team’s glitzy new home.  At the league level, the number of 
new or majorly renovated stadiums that open each year is therefore expected to impact 
league-wide attendance, with a larger number of new stadiums contributing to greater 
attendance, all else equal. 
 
 Stadium Capacity.  In addition to the newness of a stadium, its size could also be 
a factor affecting ticket demand.  Even in the absence of sell-outs, a larger stadium with 
more ticket inventory may lead to greater sales.  Some of this potential increase may be 
due to lower average ticket prices for the excess capacity, but this effect (if present) 
would be captured by the ticket price control.  Conversely, following the new trend 
started by the Baltimore Orioles in the early 1990s to build smaller, more fan-friendly 
stadiums/arenas, stadium capacity might be inversely related to demand for tickets.  
Weighing these two potential effects of stadium capacity on attendance, it is expected 
that capacity will positively affect attendance. 
 
Seasonal Competitive Balance.  Although this study is not directly concerned 
with measuring the effect of match or seasonal competitive balance on attendance, the 
UOH suggests that all forms of competitive balance can affect the demand for 
professional sports in a given match or a given season.  As a result, it is important to 
control for other forms of competitive balance to avoid spurious findings on the proposed 
competitive balance measures of interest.  Since this study investigates the demand for 
104 
 
professional sports at the yearly level, only a seasonal competitive balance control is 
needed.  The most commonly used seasonal competitive balance metric in the literature is 
the ratio of actual to idealized standard deviation of win percentages, where a larger ratio 
(corresponding to a lower level of competitive balance) is expected to lead to a decrease 
in attendance.  In this study, this metric is calculated for only the middle third of teams in 
the final standings in order to get a competitive balance measure that is more relevant for 
the teams that are competitive for a playoff position.  As this measure increases, playoff 
contending teams are more widely separated in the standings and the excitement of the 
playoff race may be diminished, leading to lower attendance.  So as not to create 
endogeneity issues with the playoff percent variables of interest but still to retain the 
essence of the importance of the tightness of the standings regarding playoff contending 
teams, a common metric of the middle one third of teams is used regardless of where the 
actual playoff cut line falls in a given season. 
 
 Strikes/Lockouts.  Significant strikes or lockouts in professional sport leagues 
that lead to canceled games are expected to negatively affect fan interest during the 
remaining games of the strike or lockout season.  Therefore, dummy variables are 
included for each league-year that witnessed a strike or lockout that was severe enough to 
cause regular season games to be canceled.  These seasons are 1972 (MLB strike), 1981 
(MLB strike), 1994 (MLB strike), 1994-95 (NHL lockout), 1998-99 (NBA lockout), 
2004-05 (NHL lockout), 2011-12 (NBA lockout) and 2012-13 (NHL lockout).  The 1994 
MLB strike and the 2004-05 NHL lockout were so severe that they led to the cancelation 
of the postseason in addition to regular season games.  As a result, these two league years 
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are not included in the data analysis and the dummy variable for each of these work 
stoppages is attributed to the following year instead.  
 
Attendance Trend.  In addition to all of the previous control variables motivated 
by economic theory, a trend control variable is needed to account for other unexplained 
factors that have contributed to the general rise in popularity of sports over the past 60 
years.  For example, one factor that this trend may account for is the rise in the coverage 
of and interaction with professional sports over time.  Innovations such as 24-hour sports 
networks (e.g. ESPN) as well as fantasy sports have greatly increased the exposure of 
professional sports and the ability of fans to constantly follow and be involved with the 
latest sport news.  However, factors such as these are difficult to directly model.  In order 
to best model this underlying demand for professional sports, the average attendance in 
the other professional sport leagues is used as a control for the league in question.  For 
the MLB regression model, the attendance trend variable is the average attendance per 
game of the NHL and NBA.  Likewise, for the NHL and NBA regressions, the attendance 
trend variable is the average attendance per game of the MLB and NBA, and MLB and 
NHL, respectively.  The choice of this control variable is appropriate considering the 
underlying demand for a given major professional sports league is likely driven by the 
same factors that contribute to the underlying demand for other major professional 
leagues. 
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4.3 H2 Model Specification 
The following regression equation serves as the foundation for the analysis of the 
second hypothesis: 
 
League-wide Attendance = Consecutive Season Competitive Balance + Playoff Percent +  
         Playoff Percent
2
 + Control Variables 
 
This model is a direct extension of the regression equation used in the test of H1 (see 
section 4.1) with one new independent variable testing the effect of consecutive season 
competitive balance.  As such, the dependent variables and all of the control variables are 
the same as previously discussed.  The final baseline first difference regression model 
used to test hypothesis 2 is shown below for MLB, the NHL, and the NBA:  
 
MLB: AvgAttendPGFD(y) = CSCBFD(x1) + PlayoffPctFD(x2) + PlayoffPct2FD(x3) + 
AvgCapacityFD(x4) + RealTicketPriFD(x5) + 
NewFranchise(x6) + Relocation(x7) + NewStadium(x8) + 
CenSeasonCBFD(x9) + Strike72(x10) + Strike81(x11) + 
Strike94(x12) + AttendTrendFD(x13) + error 
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NHL: AvgAttendPGFD(y) = CSCBFD(x1) + PlayoffPctFD(x2) + PlayoffPct2FD(x3) + 
AvgCapacityFD(x4) + NewFranchise(x5) + Relocation(x6) 
+ NewStadium(x7) + CenSeasonCBFD(x8) + 
Lockout94(x9) + Lockout04(x10) + Lockout12(x11) 
AttendTrendFD(x12) + error 
 
NBA: AvgAttendPGFD(y) = CSCBFD(x1) + PlayoffPctFD(x2) + PlayoffPct2FD(x3) + 
AvgCapacityFD(x4) + RealTicketPriFD(x5) + 
NewFranchise(x6) + Relocation(x7) + NewStadium(x8) + 
CenSeasonCBFD(x9) + Lockout98(x10) + Lockout11(x11) 
+ AttendTrendFD(x12) + error 
 
Where all of the variables are the same as in the previous model (see section 4.1) except 
for: 
CSCBFD is the first difference of the consecutive season competitive balance measure of 
interest for a given study.  Specific variables used in this study are: 
1. POChurnFD is the first difference of the percentage of playoff qualifying teams 
in the current league-year that did not qualify for the playoffs the previous season.  
2. POChurnLFD is the lag of POChurnFD. 
3. POChurn3FD is the first difference of the average of the playoff churn for the 
previous three seasons. 
4. POChurnW3FD is the first difference of the weighted average of the playoff 
churn for the previous three seasons, with the previous season given a weight of 
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1.0, the season prior to that given a weight of 0.67, and the season prior to that 
given a weight of 0.33. 
5. CChurnFD is the first difference of a dummy variable equaling 1 if the current 
season saw a new champion and 0 if the current season was a repeat champion 
from the year prior. 
6. CChurnLFD is the lag of CChurnFD. 
7. CGChurnFD is the first difference of the percentage of teams in the 
championship game in the current league-year that did not reach the 
championship game in the previous season. 
8. CGChurnLFD is the lag of CGChurnFD. 
9. SeasChurnFD is the first difference of the adjusted churn of the final season 
standings compared with the mid-season standings. 
10. SeasChurnLFD is the lag of SeasChurnFD. 
11. AvgPOYrsFD is the first difference of the average number of years since each 
team in a given league last reached the playoffs divided by the ideal average 
representing complete turnover in playoff teams every year. 
12. AvgPOYrsLFD is the lag of AvgPOYrsFD. 
13. LFChurnFD is the first difference of the percentage of teams in the league 
(conference) finals in the current league-year that did not reach the league 
(conference) finals game in the previous season. 
14. LFChurnLFD is the lag of LFChurnFD. 
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15. LSFChurnFD is the first difference of the percentage of teams in the league 
(conference) semi-finals in the current league-year that did not reach the league 
(conference) semi-finals in the previous season. 
16. LSFChurnLFD is the lag of LSFChurnFD. 
 
Descriptive statistics for the preceding variables can be seen below in Table 4 for MLB, 
Table 5 for the NHL and Table 6 for the NBA. 
 
Table 4: MLB H2 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
POChurnFD  0 0.387056 -1 1 
POChurnLFD  0.001667 0.406068 -1 1 
POChurn3FD  0.004167 0.138420 -0.33333 0.375 
POChurnW3FD  0.005532 0.167983 -0.33333 0.416667 
CChurnFD  0.016129 0.461357 -1 1 
CChurnLFD  0.016393 0.465181 -1 1 
CGChurnFD  0.011628 0.353358 -0.5 1 
CGChurnLFD  0.011905 0.357636 -0.5 1 
SeasChurnFD  -0.000655 0.091497 -0.23438 0.208333 
SeasChurnLFD  0.001342 0.090849 -0.23438 0.208333 
AvgPOYrsFD  0.025359 0.698104 -3.39860 3.370629 
AvgPOYrsLFD  0.032212 0.701659 -3.39860 3.370629 
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Table 5: NHL H2 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
POChurnFD  0.006510 0.143578 -0.375 0.375 
POChurnLFD  0.005319 0.144890 -0.375 0.375 
POChurn3FD  0.006019 0.057372 -0.09722 0.208333 
POChurnW3FD  0.005556 0.069667 -0.13194 0.270833 
CChurnFD  0.020833 0.635462 -1 1 
CChurnLFD  0.021277 0.642325 -1 1 
CGChurnFD  0.020833 0.412031 -1 1 
CGChurnLFD  0.021277 0.416474 -1 1 
SeasChurnFD  0.001296 0.218985 -0.89349 0.928994 
SeasChurnLFD  0.001324 0.221352 -0.89349 0.928994 
AvgPOYrsFD  -0.002720 1.086963 -5 1.333333 
AvgPOYrsLFD  0.003571 1.097563 -5 1.333333 
LFChurnFD  0.005814 0.280775 -0.5 0.75 
LFChurnLFD  0.011905 0.281288 -0.5 0.75 
LSFChurnFD  0.013889 0.181211 -0.375 0.375 
LSFChurnLFD  0.010714 0.182838 -0.375 0.375 
 
Table 6: NBA H2 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
POChurnFD  -0.001462 0.137083 -0.33333 0.375 
POChurnLFD  -0.003720 0.137250 -0.33333 0.375 
POChurn3FD  0.001157 0.047912 -0.125 0.133333 
POChurnW3FD  0.001286 0.057582 -0.11111 0.1375 
CChurnFD  -0.017544 0.582213 -1 1 
CChurnLFD  0 0.572078 -1 1 
CGChurnFD  0 0.534523 -1 1 
CGChurnLFD  0 0.539360 -1 1 
SeasChurnFD  -0.002047 0.131467 -0.5 0.375 
SeasChurnLFD  -0.000337 0.132016 -0.5 0.375 
AvgPOYrsFD  -0.041708 1.122849 -4.5 2.92716 
AvgPOYrsLFD  -0.041103 1.132821 -4.5 2.92716 
LFChurnFD  0 0.258775 -0.5 0.5 
LFChurnLFD  0 0.261117 -0.5 0.5 
LSFChurnFD  0.003378 0.165324 -0.375 0.5 
LSFChurnLFD  0.003472 0.167668 -0.375 0.5 
 
 Looking at Tables 4-6, the descriptive statistics for the consecutive season 
competitive balance measures match expectations.  Similar to the discussion of the 
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descriptive statistics in Tables 1-3, the relatively large magnitude of the standard 
deviation for each variable relative to its mean is due to first differencing.  As a result, the 
mean values are generally expected to be around zero, with both positive and negative 
changes throughout the data set leading to the relatively high standard deviations.  In 
addition, the statistics are generally consistent across leagues, with all variables having a 
mean value very close to zero.  However, the small positive value for most variables in 
both MLB and the NHL suggests that the level of consecutive season competitive balance 
(as measured by these 16 different metrics) has slowly increased over time, while the 
opposite is true for the NBA.  These trends support the conclusion of previous 
competitive balance studies that show that the NBA has the lowest level of competitive 
balance among the major leagues in the United States. 
 
4.4 H2 Research Variables 
 The dependent variable and all of the control variables are the same in the H2 
regression model as previously described for H1 (see section 4.2).  The only difference 
involves the independent variables of interest, which now include a variety of novel 
consecutive season competitive measures described below. 
 
Consecutive Season Competitive Balance.  The proposed consecutive season 
competitive balance measures are the independent variables of interest in the test of H2.  
Most of these new competitive balance measures consist of a calculation of the percent of 
teams in a given round of the playoffs in the current year that is different from the year 
prior.  This calculation is called the churn, and for the NBA and NHL, the churn is 
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calculated on five different levels: playoff qualification, advancing to the league 
(conference) semi-finals, advancing to the league (conference) finals, advancing to the 
championship game, winning the championship.  For example, in the 2011-2012 season 
for the NBA, the following sixteen teams qualified for the playoffs: Boston Celtics, 
Indiana Pacers, Miami Heat, Philadelphia 76ers, Los Angeles Clippers, Los Angeles 
Lakers, Oklahoma City Thunder, San Antonio Spurs, Atlanta Hawks, Orlando Magic, 
New York Knicks, Chicago Bulls, Memphis Grizzlies, Denver Nuggets, Dallas 
Mavericks, and Utah Jazz.  Of those teams, only the Los Angeles Clippers and Utah Jazz 
did not qualify for the playoffs the year before (taking the place of the Portland 
Trailblazers and the New Orleans Hornets that did), and thus the playoff qualification 
competitive balance measure would be 2/16 = 0.125.   
The first eight teams in the previous list advanced to the second round of the 
playoffs in 2011-12, and four of those did not do so the year before: Pacers, 76ers, 
Clippers, Spurs.  Therefore, the second round competitive balance measure would be 4/8 
= 0.5.  Of the four teams that made the league championship games in 2011-12, two were 
different from the previous year (Celtics, Spurs), so the league championship round 
competitive balance measure would be 2/4 = 0.5.  The same 0.5 calculation is true for the 
championship game measure, where one of the two teams (Thunder) was different 
compared to the year before.  Lastly, the championship winning measure would be 1, as 
the Miami Heat won the championship and did not do so the year before. 
Although the previous example calculated these five inter-seasonal competitive 
balance metrics using only the difference with the prior year’s playoff results, two 
additional specifications for the playoff qualification churn average the results (using 
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either a simple or a weighted average) over a three year time period.  The simple average 
assumes that fans are equally sensitive to playoff qualification in each of the past three 
seasons in terms of their taste for consecutive season competitive balance.  The three year 
weighted average assigns weights of 1.0 for the playoff qualification churn computed for 
the prior year, 0.67 for two years prior, and 0.33 for three years prior.  This specification 
assumes fans are most sensitive to more recent results.  In all cases, the level of churn is 
expected to affect attendance with higher churn (greater competitive balance) leading to 
higher attendance. 
 In addition to the playoff churn variables, two other consecutive season 
competitive balance measures were included in this study: the adjusted seasonal churn of 
the standings from mid-season to the end of the season, and the average number of years 
since each team last made the playoffs.  For the adjusted seasonal churn, it is expected 
that greater churn in the standings as the season progresses will lead to higher attendance.  
For the average number of years variable, it is expected that reducing the average will 
lead to higher attendance.  For all of the consecutive season competitive balance 
measures used to test H2, the variables are calculated for the current year and then also 
included as a lag variable from the previous year.  This is done because the result of 
several of these variables would be uncertain or incomplete to fans during the current 
regular season and therefore the lag variables would likely be a better measure of the 
fans’ perception of the level of consecutive season competitive balance. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 The variables and methods defined in Chapter 4 were used to perform the 
empirical analysis to test the stated hypotheses.  The presentation and discussion of the 
results follows in three sections: results concerning the first hypothesis, results 
concerning the second hypothesis, and results concerning the control variables. The last 
two sections of this chapter discuss alternate models that highlight the robustness of the 
results followed by a broad discussion of the totality of the results. 
  
5.1 Playoff Structure UOH Hypothesis 
 The H1 regression models from the previous chapter were estimated in Stata 
using the two step approach, starting with the control variables and adding in the 
independent variables to determine an increase in explanatory power.  Support for the 
hypotheses was gauged through the significance of the respective parameter estimates.  
Table 7 below display the results of the regressions testing H1.  For MLB and the NHL, 
inclusion of the playoff structure independent variables (Model 2) increases the 
significance of the model when compared to the baseline model (Model 1) of only control 
variables.  For MLB, the adjusted R-squared is 0.42 for the baseline model and 0.59 
when the playoff structure variables are included.  For the NHL, the adjusted R-squared 
is 0.36 for the baseline model and 0.42 when the playoff structure variables are included.  
For both leagues, the playoff variables are statistically significant at the 5% level or 
better, giving support to the underlying notion of hypothesis 1 that the percentage of 
teams that qualify for the playoffs is an important driver of fan interest. 
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 For the NBA, the adjusted R-squared drops when the playoff structure variable is 
included, but this model suffers from complete multicollinearity with the independent 
variables and some of the control variables.  Because of this, Model 2 does not contain 
the square term of playoff percent and the resulting parameter estimates are considered 
less reliable.  Further tests looking at a limited subset of variables give results that are 
relatively consistent with those of MLB and NHL, giving confidence that the NBA 
exhibits underlying trends that are consistent with the other leagues.  However, due to the 
desire to maintain a common baseline regression model across all of the studied leagues, 
the NBA data unfortunately does not allow a complete analysis of the effect of the 
desired independent variables.  For this reason, the following discussion of the playoff 
percent variables will focus on MLB and the NHL.  Discussion of the results for the 
controls variables as well as the independent variables of interest for hypothesis 2 
includes all three leagues. 
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Table 7: H1 Final Regression Models: Dependent Variable First Difference of Average 
Attendance per Game 
 
Independent 
Variable 
MLB 
Model 1       Model 2 
NHL 
Model 1       Model 2 
NBA 
Model 1       Model 2 
PlayoffPctFD  -154082 
(0.001)* 
 -60447.9 
(0.019)* 
 -32554.6 
(0.855) 
PlayoffPct2FD  298958.1 
(0.002)* 
 49518.87 
(0.019)* 
  
       
AvgCapacityFD 0.199706 
(0.454) 
-0.30569 
(0.245) 
0.308347 
(0.440) 
0.374380 
(0.328) 
0.107210 
(0.303) 
0.103778 
(0.348) 
RealTicketPriFD -228.984 
(0.358) 
-14.1976 
(0.948) 
-16.4925 
(0.346) 
-19.0298 
(0.226) 
23.15256 
(0.362) 
21.62952 
(0.438) 
       
NewFranchise 567.6262 
(0.036)* 
1133.058 
(0.000)* 
-316.605 
(0.000)* 
-332.230 
(0.000)* 
188.8466 
(0.160) 
-454.583 
(0.897) 
Relocation -691.968 
(0.443) 
569.8633 
(0.491) 
-158.428 
(0.443) 
-138.758 
(0.482) 
-28.4393 
(0.855) 
-34.9552 
(0.834) 
NewStadium 267.8742 
(0.333) 
0.622449 
(0.998) 
152.1006 
(0.137) 
128.8015 
(0.188) 
38.34482 
(0.390) 
38.86651 
(0.407) 
       
CenSeasonCBFD -1596.55 
(0.149) 
-1876.32 
(0.059) 
-12.3368 
(0.954) 
-23.8569 
(0.907) 
-578.015 
(0.008)* 
-587.152 
(0.012)* 
       
Strike72 218.8468 
(0.891) 
-1105.49 
(0.430) 
    
Strike81 -2068.32 
(0.112) 
1493.813 
(0.332) 
    
Strike94 -6776.54 
(0.000)* 
-3229.08 
(0.029)* 
    
Lockout94   -73.7150 
(0.894) 
-72.6770 
(0.890) 
  
Lockout04   -164.276 
(0.775) 
-172.056 
(0.754) 
  
Lockout12   8.095109 
(0.988) 
-0.64434 
(0.999) 
  
Lockout98     -1482.43 
(0.005)* 
-1490.74 
(0.008)* 
Lockout11     -216.945 
(0.378) 
-223.605 
(0.392) 
       
AttendTrendFD 0.041715 
(0.929) 
0.522442 
(0.221) 
0.248586 
(0.035)* 
0.245086 
(0.030)* 
0.086633 
(0.148) 
0.096560 
(0.248) 
       
Adj. R-Squared 0.4206 0.5910 0.3631 0.4207 0.4498 0.3970 
P-values in parentheses 
*significant at the 5% level or better 
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For both MLB and the NHL, the statistically significant parameter estimates on 
the playoff percent variables allow for the effect of changes to their respective playoff 
structures to be interpreted.  Because of the playoff percent squared term, this 
interpretation of the results requires a base level percent of teams that qualify for the 
playoffs.  For MLB, the current percentage of playoff qualifying teams (10/30 = 33%) 
can be used as this base level in order to evaluate the effect of potential future changes to 
the playoff structure.  The first important conclusion from this analysis is that the current 
percentage of playoff qualifying teams in MLB falls on the upward sloping region of the 
quadratic, suggesting that further increasing the number of teams that qualify for the 
playoffs will yield a positive attendance response.  In fact, if two more teams were added 
to the MLB playoffs (12/30 = 40%), it is calculated that average per game attendance 
would be expected to rise by over 4,000 (see Table 8).  This is a very sizable increase 
(over 10% of the current per game attendance average for MLB), but care must be taken 
because this calculation represents an extrapolation outside of the bounds of the MLB 
data set where the playoff percent variable ranges from 10%-33%.  Nevertheless, these 
results provide evidence that further increasing the number of teams that qualify for the 
MLB playoffs should have a positive effect on regular season attendance. 
 
Table 8: MLB Playoff Structure Results for Select Years 
Year Change in Playoff 
Teams 
Change in Playoff Percent Change in Average 
Attendance per Game 
1969 2 (from 2 to 4) 6.7% (from 10% to 16.7%) -4,957 
1995 4 (from 4 to 8) 14.3% (from 14.3% to 28.6%) -3,708 
2012 2 (from 8 to 10) 6.7% (from 26.7% to 33.3%) 1,686 
Current 2 (from 10 to 12) 6.7% (from 33.3% to 40.0%) 4,343 (projected) 
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From a historical perspective, the analysis is less clear cut due to the quadratic 
nature of the attendance response.  In 1950, the first year of the data set, only two out of 
the 16 teams qualified for the playoffs.  These two teams were their respective league 
champions (pennant winners) and played each other in the World Series.  This system of 
regular season league champions meeting directly in the World Series existed in MLB 
from 1903 to 1968.  During this time, there were no inter-league games between the 
National and American Leagues, so the World Series was a distinctly separate and unique 
event from the regular season.  In this way, the regular season was of utmost importance 
and was not diluted at all by a playoff system.  In each of the two leagues the teams 
played against each other throughout the season in order to win the pennant and every 
game mattered in the final standings.  This reliance on the regular season as the only 
season is historically important in MLB and likely is the underlying reason why 
increasing the number of teams that qualified for the playoffs in 1969 and 1995 led to a 
reduction in average attendance.  
Looking at Table 8, it can be seen that moving from the playoff structure that 
existed in 1968 to that in 1969 (when four teams first made the playoffs) was met with a 
decrease in average attendance per game of almost 5,000.  This was followed by another 
reduction of almost 4,000 when the number of playoff teams was doubled to eight in 
1995.  Although the expectation is that increasing the percentage of teams that qualify for 
the playoffs will increase fan excitement due to the greater number of teams that are 
competitive for a playoff spot, this consideration was not enough to overcome the erosion 
of the importance of the regular season.  Baseball traditionalists to this day still speak 
negatively of the expansion of the playoffs, especially the 1995 expansion that introduced 
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the wild-card spots.  Because of this strong value that MLB fans place on the historical 
significance of the regular season and the pennant race, the early era of just two teams 
qualifying for the World Series is the playoff structure that is expected to lead to the 
greatest regular season fan response within the 1950-2013 data set.   
Although the dilution of the importance of the regular season drove a negative fan 
response through playoff expansion up to eight teams, the positive quadratic nature of 
this response suggests that further expansion would lead to higher attendance.  This is 
likely due to the fact that at higher levels of playoff qualifying teams, the gains from the 
increase in the number of teams that are competitive for a playoff spot start to outweigh 
the losses from the reduction in the importance of the regular season.  This change can be 
attributed to two underlying factors.  First, a change from two to four playoff teams, for 
example, will likely incorporate fewer new competitive teams than a change from eight to 
ten or ten to twelve.  This is due to the fact that the distribution of the finals standings 
most often resembles a bell curve with the largest concentration of teams near the middle.  
Therefore, the closer the playoff cut line gets to the middle, the larger the number of new 
teams that will now be competitive for a playoff spot.  Second, the expansion of the MLB 
playoffs thus far has already initiated the process of reducing the importance of the 
regular season and has therefore taken most of the bite out of further expansion.  Due to 
these reasons, the expansion of the playoffs in 2012 (going from eight teams to 10) was 
estimated to increase the per-game average attendance by around 1,700.  This is an 
increase of about 5% of the current average attendance and thus represents a meaningful 
increase in fan interest and corresponding league-wide profits.  Based on this analysis, it 
appears wise that MLB increased the number of playoff qualifying teams in 2012. 
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In consideration of these complete findings, however, it can be questioned 
whether MLB should ever have expanded at all, or whether it should in fact go back to 
the pre-1969 days of only the two pennant winners making the World Series.  Looking 
again at Table 8, the net effect of the large-scale changes to the playoff structure that 
MLB has implemented over time has been negative.  One can thus hypothesize that MLB 
may have been better off never changing its playoff structure.  However, two 
considerations suggest that playoff expansion in MLB as a whole could be advantageous 
overall.  First, this study does not consider the attendance or profitability of the playoffs 
due to the reasons discussed in Chapter 4.  However, it is expected that increasing the 
number of playoff games (due to adding more teams and more rounds into the playoffs), 
would lead to an increase in postseason attendance and revenue.  As a result, even though 
playoff expansion may have negatively affected regular season attendance in 1969 and 
1995, it’s possible (though unlikely) that additional playoff revenue would have been 
enough to overcome those losses. 
The second consideration relates directly to the results of this analysis, which 
suggest that even further playoff expansion would occur along the upward sloping region 
of the quadratic response, leading to important regular season attendance gains.  
Although the attendance response to playoff structure is based solely on the bounds 
within the data set (playoff percentages from 10-33%), it is reasonable to expect the trend 
to continue for regions near the bounds.  If this is true, further expansion of the MLB 
playoffs to 12 teams (12/30 = 40%), would lead to a gain in regular season attendance 
that would largely offset the overall losses due to expansion from 1950 to 2013.  In 
addition, such an increase in average attendance would be more impactful than the 
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decreases in attendance observed in 1969 and 1995 because there are currently more 
teams in MLB (30 currently compared to 28 in 1995 and 24 in 1969).  With more teams, 
a given change in average attendance imparts a larger change in total aggregate 
attendance. 
For the NHL, the analysis of the results follows a similar, but somewhat opposite 
argument.  In this case, the current percentage of playoff qualifying teams (16/30 = 53%) 
falls on the downward sloping region of the quadratic, suggesting that decreasing the 
number of teams that qualify for the playoffs will yield a positive attendance response 
(see Table 9 below).  In fact, if two teams were removed from the NHL playoffs (14/30 = 
47%), it is calculated that average per game attendance should rise by over 700.  This is a 
sizable increase (about 4% of the current per game attendance average for the NHL), but 
again care must be taken because this calculation represents an extrapolation outside of 
the bounds of the NHL data set where the playoff percent variable ranges from 50%-
76%.  Nevertheless, these results suggest that decreasing the number of teams that qualify 
for the NHL playoffs should have a positive effect on regular season attendance. 
 
Table 9: NHL Playoff Structure Results for Select Years 
Year Change in Playoff 
Teams 
Change in Playoff Percent Change in Average 
Attendance per Game 
1974 4 (from 8 to 12) 16.7% (from 50% to 66.7%) -446 
1979 4 (from 12 to 16) 5.6% (from 70.6% to 76.2%) 685 
2000 0 (from 16 to 16) -22.9% (from 76.2% to 53.3%)* -844* 
Current -2 (from 16 to 14) -6.7% (from 53.3% to 46.7%) 729 (projected) 
*cumulative effect from 1991 to 2000 due to franchise expansion from 21 to 30 teams 
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Conversely, if the NHL were to increase the number of teams that make the 
playoffs there would be an expected negative effect on attendance.  If two teams were 
added to the NHL playoffs (increasing the playoff percentage to 60%), it is calculated 
that the per-game average attendance would drop by almost 300.  This is a decrease of 
about 1.5% of the current average attendance which is a small, but important reduction in 
fan interest and corresponding league-wide profits.  However, this does not tell the whole 
story due to the quadratic nature of the attendance response to playoff structure. 
Although small increases to the current playoff percent are expected to decrease 
attendance, the historical high attendance point for the league (in regards to the playoff 
structure), occurred in 1979 following the increase in the number of playoff qualifying 
teams to 16 (76% of the 21 teams).  As a result, the slow dilution of the percentage of 
playoff qualifying teams from 76% in 1979 to 53% today through franchise expansion 
actually led to a cumulative decrease in average attendance of about 800.  This is just one 
small piece of the complicated history of playoff structural changes in the NHL and the 
corresponding attendance response. 
In the era of the Original Six, which lasted through 1966, there were six teams in 
the NHL and four of them made the playoffs each year (66.7%).  Through franchise 
expansion in the late 1960s and early 1970s (even after increasing the number of playoff 
teams from four to eight in 1967), the playoff percentage declined to the historic low in 
the NHL of 50% in 1973.  However, in the following year the number of playoff teams 
was increased from eight to 12 which brought the playoff percentage back to the Original 
Six levels and was expected to reduce per game attendance by over 400.  In 1979, the 
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bump in playoff teams from 12 to 16 brought the playoff percent to its historic high of 
76% and with it an increase in attendance per game of around 700. 
Although this history of changes in the NHL is more difficult to follow than the 
simpler linear history of the MLB, the same general pattern emerges during the years 
within the data set.  However, unlike MLB, the historical NHL standard of 66.7% of 
teams qualifying for the playoffs is essentially the least preferred outcome, with changes 
in either direction being met with a positive response.  So while tradition is the bellwether 
of fan interest in MLB, novelty seems to rule the day in the NHL.  This fundamental 
difference between the fans of MLB and the NHL makes sense when one considers the 
immense differences in the history of the two leagues.  Major League Baseball is the 
oldest professional league in the United States and had already been well established for 
decades with 16 consistent teams before the NHL was even founded.  By the time of the 
first MLB playoff expansion in 1969, 20 of the current 30 MLB teams were already in 
existence.  Therefore, a majority of the current MLB teams (and their fans) knew and 
appreciated the game under its original World Series only regime.  In the NHL, on the 
other hand, only six teams existed before the first playoff expansion in 1967.  Although 
these six teams are rooted in history and are arguably the six most fan supported teams, 
they now represent only one fifth of the current league members.  The vast majority of 
NHL teams in the United States (and their fans) therefore don’t have a tradition rich 
history and are likely more prone to be fair weather fans that lose interest in attending 
games if their favorite teams are playing badly.  These preferences likely dominate the 
league level analysis. 
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In consideration of this observation, the results suggest that large increases or 
decreases in the percentage of playoff qualifying teams would be met with a positive 
attendance response.  However, this result should not be extrapolated too far outside of 
the bounds of the data set, as increasing the playoff percent to 100%, for example, would 
certainly lead to a significant negative effect on the regular season as it would be 
essentially meaningless.  Therefore, any proposed changes to the playoff structure in the 
NHL or MLB should err on the side of taking advantage of the path of least resistance.  
In the NHL, this means a reduction in the percentage of teams qualifying for the playoffs 
while for MLB, it is means the opposite. 
Although the fan responses to playoff structure in MLB and the NHL were shown 
to be fundamentally different due to the historical underpinnings of the leagues, the 
results do raise an important question of whether there is a percent of playoff qualifying 
teams that would maximize attendance in one or both leagues.  Although there is no data 
in either league for playoff percentages between 33% and 50%, it is conceivable to think 
that regular season attendance (and fan interest) may be maximized for some percentage 
of playoff qualifying teams that falls within this range.  Such an idea is consistent with 
the thought that at lower levels of playoff qualification (less than 33%), adding playoff 
teams furthers the excitement of the playoff race and increases the number of teams that 
are competitive for a playoff spot while still preserving the importance of the regular 
season.  However, at high levels of playoff qualification (greater than 50%), this positive 
effect of adding playoff teams is not sufficient to overcome the negative effects of 
shifting the importance of a season from the regular season to the playoffs.  Although the 
results do not lend direct support to this theory, they do provide evidence in favor of 
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increasing the number of teams that make the playoffs in MLB and decreasing the 
number in the NHL.  Furthermore, as a whole, the regression results provide significant 
support of hypothesis 1 that playoff structure is an important driver of fan interest. 
 
5.2 Consecutive Season UOH Hypothesis 
The H2 regression models from the previous chapter were estimated in Stata for 
each of the 16 consecutive season competitive balance measures in this study. Support for 
the hypotheses was gauged through the significance of the respective parameter 
estimates. 
 The regression results in Table 10 (MLB), Table 11 (NHL), and Table 12 (NBA) 
show the analysis for the second hypothesis concerning the effect of consecutive season 
competitive balance on attendance.  Models 1 through 16 each add one consecutive 
season competitive balance measure to the regression to observe if there is an increase in 
the explanatory power of the model compared with the H1 regression model.  The first 
four new measures (Models 1-4) explore the effect of the churn of playoff qualifying 
teams, including looking at the current season, the previous season, and an average of the 
last three seasons.  Models 5-8 (and 13-16 for the NHL and the NBA) investigate the 
effect of the churn of playoff advancing teams.  Models 9 and 10 look at the churn in the 
standings from mid-season to the end of the season while Models 11 and 12 look at the 
average number of years since each team in the league last qualified for the playoffs.  For 
MLB and the NBA, none of the proposed inter-season competitive balance measures 
increase the adjusted R-squared and none of them are statistically significant.  For the 
NHL, only one of the variables increases the adjusted R-squared (from 0.42 to 0.48) and 
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is statistically significant at the 5% level.  In consideration of the fact that 44 different 
tests were completed across the three different leagues (12 for MLB, 16 each for the NHL 
and the NBA), and only one instance of a consecutive season competitive balance 
measure was found to be statistically significant, it is very likely that this is due to 
chance.  With significance testing at the 5% level, there is a one in 20 chance of making a 
type I error so across 44 tests this is a strong possibility.  In light of these results, there is 
no or very minimal support that the level of consecutive season balance (at least as 
conceptualized by this expansive set of independent variables) has any significant effect 
on attendance. 
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Table 10: MLB H2 Final Regression Models: Dependent Variable First Difference of 
Average Attendance per Game 
 
Independent 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
PlayoffPctFD -161692 
(0.001)* 
-151416 
(0.001)* 
-162173 
(0.001)* 
-156479 
(0.001)* 
-152847 
(0.001)* 
-148617 
(0.001)* 
-103467 
(0.117) 
-90959.7 
(0.173) 
PlayoffPct2FD 314688.5 
(0.001)* 
292831.5 
(0.002)* 
312853.4 
(0.002)* 
303809 
(0.002)* 
296262.2 
(0.002)* 
287623.8 
(0.003)* 
193301.5 
(0.153) 
164772.7 
(0.228) 
POChurnFD 542.6759 
(0.346) 
       
POChurnLFD  253.2317 
(0.609) 
      
POChurn3FD   -1115.70 
(0.525) 
     
POChurnW3FD    -472.780 
(0.733) 
    
CChurnFD     -128.999 
(0.713) 
   
CChurnLFD      -277.509 
(0.440) 
  
CGChurnFD       402.5349 
(0.434) 
 
CGChurnLFD        -781.468 
(0.129) 
         
AvgCapacityFD -0.30915 
(0.241) 
-0.27542 
(0.311) 
-0.35128 
(0.203) 
-0.32280 
(0.235) 
-0.29016 
(0.282) 
-0.28836 
(0.277) 
-0.63355 
(0.058) 
-0.75725 
(0.053) 
RealTicketPriFD 37.65616 
(0.868) 
-21.1086 
(0.924) 
10.65869 
(0.962) 
-0.67813 
(0.998) 
-21.7673 
(0.922) 
1.463745 
(0.995) 
-167.736 
(0.494) 
-150.732 
(0.528) 
         
NewFranchise 1114.129 
(0.000)* 
1155.426 
(0.000)* 
1101.496 
(0.000)* 
1113.294 
(0.000)* 
1126.205 
(0.000)* 
1066.731 
(0.001)* 
1378.331 
(0.000)* 
1330.792 
(0.001)* 
Relocation 972.9403 
(0.299) 
363.5496 
(0.695) 
953.0447 
(0.357) 
742.2449 
(0.449) 
559.2683 
(0.506) 
591.3492 
(0.478) 
-776.565 
(0.494) 
-763.685 
(0.478) 
NewStadium -27.1419 
(0.914) 
31.56578 
(0.903) 
-46.9765 
(0.857) 
-24.3172 
(0.926) 
10.91262 
(0.966) 
-38.7273 
(0.879) 
-173.667 
(0.550) 
-325.085 
(0.274) 
         
CenSeasonCBFD -1689.82 
(0.095) 
-1886.85 
(0.061) 
-1698.98 
(0.102) 
-1806.77 
(0.079) 
-1792.46 
(0.082) 
-1739.76 
(0.086) 
-1687.46 
(0.111) 
-1450.99 
(0.162) 
         
Strike72 -1516.17 
(0.304) 
-868.983 
(0.559) 
-1572.73 
(0.325) 
-1357.94 
(0.397) 
-1112.71 
(0.433) 
-1189.37 
(0.401) 
  
Strike81 1835.571 
(0.249) 
1476.409 
(0.344) 
2133.095 
(0.252) 
1691.009 
(0.311) 
1477.639 
(0.344) 
1372.377 
(0.378) 
1200.655 
(0.467) 
1425.014 
(0.412) 
Strike94 -3313.49 
(0.026)* 
-3159.49 
(0.035)* 
-3161.59 
(0.034)* 
-3324.82 
(0.029)* 
-3232.47 
(0.031)* 
-3015.94 
(0.045)* 
-4014.43 
(0.033)* 
-3695.71 
(0.043)* 
         
AttendTrendFD 0.510242 
(0.233) 
0.498610 
(0.251) 
0.606125 
(0.180) 
0.560720 
(0.211) 
0.527011 
(0.224) 
0.497963 
(0.248) 
-0.14668 
(0.856) 
-0.08680 
(0.915) 
         
Adj. R-Squared 0.5900 0.5817 0.5836 0.5798 0.5800 0.5861 0.6276 0.6565 
P-values in parentheses 
*significant at the 5% level or better 
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Table 10, continued: MLB H2 Final Regression Models: Dependent Variable First 
Difference of Average Attendance per Game 
 
Independent 
Variable 
Model 9 Model 
10 
Model 
11 
Model 
12 
PlayoffPctFD -151694 
(0.001)* 
-153847 
(0.001)* 
-154955 
(0.002)* 
-160423 
(0.001)* 
PlayoffPct2FD 293417.6 
(0.002)* 
296443.2 
(0.002)* 
299548.6 
(0.002)* 
306397.7 
(0.002)* 
SeasChurnFD 1266.988 
(0.505) 
   
SeasChurnLFD  -2076.95 
(0.253) 
  
AvgPOYrsFD   32.47094 
(0.956) 
 
AvgPOYrsLFD    -166.767 
(0.500) 
     
AvgCapacityFD -0.29707 
(0.263) 
-0.31736 
(0.226) 
-0.30423 
(0.257) 
-0.35151 
(0.201) 
RealTicketPriFD -0.49917 
(0.998) 
-58.0458 
(0.793) 
-14.5990 
(0.948) 
-50.4980 
(0.824) 
     
NewFranchise 1106.029 
(0.000)* 
1133.199 
(0.000)* 
1135.709 
(0.000)* 
1169.759 
(0.00)* 
Relocation 606.9521 
(0.469) 
505.0319 
(0.541) 
569.6125 
(0.498) 
634.4742 
(0.451) 
NewStadium -63.3031 
(0.813) 
-21.6803 
(0.930) 
-1.18315 
(0.996) 
28.83612 
(0.909) 
     
CenSeasonCBFD -1786.42 
(0.077) 
-1609.96 
(0.111) 
-1879.81 
(0.063) 
-1881.06 
(0.061) 
     
Strike72 -1164.19 
(0.411) 
-1173.91 
(0.401) 
-1112.58 
(0.436) 
-1290.75 
(0.371) 
Strike81 1451.775 
(0.351) 
1602.559
(0.298) 
1473.305 
(0.360) 
2085.523 
(0.245) 
Strike94 -3415.58 
(0.025)* 
-3154.12 
(0.032)* 
-3191.68 
(0.052) 
-2798.90 
(0.081) 
     
AttendTrendFD 0.559432 
(0.199) 
0.554644 
(0.194) 
0.524964 
(0.229) 
0.583050 
(0.186) 
     
Adj. R-Squared 0.5841 0.5954 0.5783 0.5843 
P-values in parentheses 
*significant at the 5% level or better 
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Table 11: NHL H2 Final Regression Models: Dependent Variable First Difference of 
Average Attendance per Game 
 
Independent 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
PlayoffPctFD -60632.8 
(0.024)* 
-54702.5 
(0.040)* 
-57722.2 
(0.033)* 
-54752.4 
(0.044)* 
-62653.4 
(0.022)* 
-59859.7 
(0.026)* 
-62663.2 
(0.022)* 
-59331.4 
(0.029)* 
PlayoffPct2FD 49610.36 
(0.024)* 
45026.42 
(0.039)* 
47255.79 
(0.033)* 
45355.93 
(0.041)* 
51183.89 
(0.022)* 
49059.62 
(0.026)* 
51187.46 
(0.022)* 
48596.28 
(0.028)* 
POChurnFD 268.6824 
(0.648) 
       
POChurnLFD  -705.292 
(0.251) 
      
POChurn3FD   -1732.48 
(0.260) 
     
POChurnW3FD    -1701.01 
(0.226) 
    
CChurnFD     -59.2052 
(0.656) 
   
CChurnLFD      38.81881 
(0.780) 
  
CGChurnFD       -100.118 
(0.633) 
 
CGChurnLFD        126.0162 
(0.525) 
         
AvgCapacityFD 0.412300 
(0.308) 
0.456773 
(0.251) 
0.378004 
(0.353) 
0.441406 
(0.283) 
0.370074 
(0.353) 
0.359953 
(0.370) 
0.347448 
(0.389) 
0.380574 
(0.343) 
         
NewFranchise -338.434 
(0.000)* 
-311.518 
(0.000)* 
-313.967 
(0.000)* 
-307.805 
(0.000)* 
-329.910 
(0.000)* 
-334.598 
(0.000)* 
-331.310 
(0.000)* 
-330.486 
(0.000)* 
Relocation -145.753 
(0.480) 
-227.188 
(0.297) 
-187.305 
(0.383) 
-251.748 
(0.278) 
-156.977 
(0.457) 
-154.699 
(0.480) 
-136.095 
(0.506) 
-144.856 
(0.486) 
NewStadium 129.1669 
(0.204) 
159.8464 
(0.122) 
157.6378 
(0.135) 
171.3731 
(0.112) 
134.3204 
(0.189) 
135.6935 
(0.186) 
126.3933 
(0.214) 
123.8516 
(0.233) 
         
CenSeasonCBFD -33.7775 
(0.875) 
-11.5220 
(0.957) 
30.3371 
(0.894) 
46.38737 
(0.839) 
-49.2818 
(0.820) 
-12.5189 
(0.955) 
-64.721 
(0.771) 
-18.6111 
(0.933) 
         
Lockout94 -60.7715 
(0.911) 
-145.329 
(0.788) 
-66.9916 
(0.903) 
-74.1384 
(0.893) 
-78.3619 
(0.886) 
-68.1595 
(0.901) 
-71.4564 
(0.896) 
-57.6217 
(0.917) 
Lockout04 -195.007 
(0.733) 
-259.054 
(0.646) 
-37.1766 
(0.949) 
-141.640 
(0.805) 
-184.855 
(0.746) 
-172.723 
(0.761) 
-181.496 
(0.750) 
-150.534 
(0.794) 
Lockout12 -15.3239 
(0.978) 
65.54659 
(0.904) 
4.436535 
(0.994) 
6.297602 
(0.991) 
-4.19851 
(0.994) 
7.335481 
(0.989) 
-9.56949 
(0.986) 
12.31998 
(0.982) 
         
AttendTrendFD 0.249723 
(0.033)* 
0.256316 
(0.027)* 
0.230277 
(0.054)* 
0.241124 
(0.042)* 
0.251334 
(0.033)* 
0.252747 
(0.032)* 
0.244492 
(0.037)* 
0.238280 
(0.047)* 
         
Adj. R-Squared 0.3899 0.4219 0.4045 0.4081 0.3898 0.4008 0.3903 0.3892 
P-values in parentheses 
*significant at the 5% level or better 
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Table 11, continued: NHL H2 Final Regression Models: Dependent Variable First 
Difference of Average Attendance per Game 
 
Independent 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
PlayoffPctFD -61600.8 
(0.023)* 
-59083 
(0.024)* 
-58935.5 
(0.016)* 
-57799.1 
(0.027)* 
-45656 
(0.058) 
-44288.1 
(0.057) 
-55590.1 
(0.295) 
-35528.7 
(0.454) 
PlayoffPct2FD 50511.28 
(0.023)* 
48567.64 
(0.023)* 
47585.33 
(0.018)* 
47234.31 
(0.028)* 
37777.15 
(0.055) 
36537.01 
(0.055) 
43577.51 
(0.257) 
29361.5 
(0.392) 
SeasChurnFD -122.372 
(0.811) 
       
SeasChurnLFD  537.3673 
(0.169) 
      
AvgPOYrsFD   195.0162 
(0.026)* 
     
AvgPOYrsLFD    -103.449 
(0.171) 
    
LFChurnFD     -150.385 
(0.618) 
   
LFChurnLFD      258.6376 
(0.334) 
  
LSFChurnFD       307.6289 
(0.408) 
 
LSFChurnLFD        -398.540 
(0.267) 
         
AvgCapacityFD 0.366256 
(0.354) 
0.370683 
(0.339) 
0.171732 
(0.644) 
0.268164 
(0.497) 
0.230099 
(0.525) 
0.197550 
(0.575) 
0.312037 
(0.389) 
0.351288 
(0.298) 
         
NewFranchise -333.476 
(0.000)* 
-323.030 
(0.000)* 
-248.045 
(0.002)* 
-359.425 
(0.000)* 
-87.9718 
(0.367) 
-97.6891 
(0.289) 
-63.6792 
(0.587) 
-31.5751 
(0.771) 
Relocation -140.752 
(0.488) 
-172.839 
(0.393) 
-182.078 
(0.334) 
-87.2958 
(0.666) 
-81.1602 
(0.663) 
-33.0363 
(0.855) 
-29.3158 
(0.842) 
287.1039 
(0.140) 
NewStadium 126.4634 
(0.211) 
167.0717 
(0.107) 
140.9212 
(0.131) 
118.3059 
(0.234) 
105.8268 
(0.241) 
108.1385 
(0.218) 
59.14256 
(0.455) 
-38.2545 
(0.651) 
         
CenSeasonCBFD -26.2798 
(0.901) 
-8.05260 
(0.970) 
111.5014 
(0.582) 
-69.5233 
(0.742) 
117.2381 
(0.616) 
92.40101 
(0.683) 
-181.790 
(0.398) 
-195.719 
(0.325) 
         
Lockout94 42.31354 
(0.953) 
-92.9728 
(0.861) 
2.338458 
(0.996) 
-49.6032 
(0.926) 
120.2318 
(0.802) 
212.497 
(0.654) 
183.3881 
(0.638) 
222.5797 
(0.524) 
Lockout04 -191.174 
(0.737) 
-239.071 
(0.668) 
-139.969 
(0.787) 
-187.771 
(0.735) 
112.583 
(0.825) 
136.0773 
(0.783) 
56.91663 
(0.886) 
-46.9472 
(0.898) 
Lockout12   107.9263 
(0.831) 
-29.5586 
(0.956) 
124.398 
(0.799) 
119.28 
(0.800) 
67.51905 
(0.858) 
178.4943 
(0.613) 
         
AttendTrendFD 0.255777 
(0.040)* 
0.308666 
(0.0130* 
0.291841 
(0.008)* 
0.255149 
(0.026)* 
0.160399 
(0.138) 
0.159183 
(0.125) 
0.142410 
(0.118) 
0.161662 
(0.056) 
         
Adj. R-Squared 0.4014 0.4305 0.4808 0.4186 0.0306 0.0608 0.0885 0.2161 
P-values in parentheses 
*significant at the 5% level or better 
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Table 12: NBA H2 Final Regression Models: Dependent Variable First Difference of 
Average Attendance per Game 
 
Independent 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
PlayoffPctFD -57529.9 
(0.767) 
-32382.8 
(0.894) 
-119015 
(0.600) 
-90108.7 
(0.690) 
-1401.79 
(0.995) 
-19471.8 
(0.917) 
-16272.5 
(0.943) 
-4624.26 
(0.981) 
POChurnFD -368.869 
(0.649) 
       
POChurnLFD  -1.03933 
(0.999) 
      
POChurn3FD   2083.246 
(0.514) 
     
POChurnW3FD    982.4218 
(0.653) 
    
CChurnFD     43.87661 
(0.711) 
   
CChurnLFD      -55.9679 
(0.614) 
  
CGChurnFD       24.3892 
(0.900) 
 
CGChurnLFD        -103.311 
(0.602) 
         
AvgCapacityFD 0.105178 
(0.363) 
0.103825 
(0.404) 
0.107494 
(0.348) 
0.092341 
(0.433) 
0.105064 
(0.366) 
0.071527 
(0.583) 
0.109867 
(0.386) 
0.069779 
(0.594) 
RealTicketPriFD 18.41723 
(0.537) 
21.62446 
(0.468) 
12.67488 
(0.688) 
19.96131 
(0.496) 
29.41019 
(0.418) 
22.97123 
(0.432) 
22.97097 
(0.464) 
20.10376 
(0.490) 
         
NewFranchise -953.710 
(0.804) 
-451.147 
(0.926) 
-2195.35 
(0.626) 
-1611.33 
(0.720) 
133.8181 
(0.973) 
-201.026 
(0.957) 
-135.720 
(0.976) 
114.7863 
(0.976) 
Relocation -76.1458 
(0.699) 
-34.8935 
(0.851) 
-48.0510 
(0.782) 
-59.6900 
(0.745) 
-32.8694 
(0.851) 
-47.9473 
(0.786) 
-29.6565 
(0.870) 
-58.5653 
(0.745) 
NewStadium 34.48079 
(0.488) 
38.90329 
(0.515) 
34.34264 
(0.481) 
28.30399 
(0.600) 
29.25952 
(0.596) 
37.70618 
(0.441) 
38.53562 
(0.437) 
47.84314 
(0.359) 
         
CenSeasonCBFD -609.28 
(0.016)* 
-587.093 
(0.021)* 
-581.542 
(0.017)* 
-600.714 
(0.016)* 
-588.685 
(0.017)* 
-551.035 
(0.028)* 
-582.266 
(0.020)* 
-553.476 
(0.027)* 
         
Lockout98 -1500.47 
(0.011)* 
-1490.51 
(0.017)* 
-1470.60 
(0.011)* 
-1547.34 
(0.011)* 
-1608.29 
(0.019)* 
-1456.71 
(0.013)* 
-1516.00 
(0.016)* 
-1480.03 
(0.011)* 
Lockout11 -322.436 
(0.360) 
-223.444 
(0.474) 
-288.324 
(0.320) 
-296.878 
(0.355) 
-232.811 
(0.398) 
-164.938 
(0.574) 
-207.909 
(0.492) 
-160.091 
(0.588) 
         
AttendTrendFD 0.108546 
(0.238) 
0.096532 
(0.294) 
0.098024 
(0.257) 
0.102613 
(0.248) 
0.082886 
(0.380) 
0.096960 
(0.266) 
0.092493 
(0.324) 
0.104409 
(0.240) 
         
Adj. R-Squared 0.3461 0.3300 0.3627 0.3457 0.3406 0.3496 0.3312 0.3510 
P-values in parentheses 
*significant at the 5% level or better 
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Table 12, continued: NBA H2 Final Regression Models: Dependent Variable First 
Difference of Average Attendance per Game 
 
Independent 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
PlayoffPctFD -24067.1 
(0.889) 
-94847.1 
(0.626) 
-34778.5 
(0.853) 
-23069.3 
(0.915) 
-4193.90 
(0.982) 
3603.756 
(0.983) 
-33318.3 
(0.859) 
115339.6 
(0.563) 
SeasChurnFD -1163.11 
(0.216) 
       
SeasChurnLFD  1317.863 
(0.146) 
      
AvgPOYrsFD   36.40834 
(0.806) 
     
AvgPOYrsLFD    10.63017 
(0.928) 
    
LFChurnFD     147.6272 
(0.553) 
   
LFChurnLFD      -258.830 
(0.204) 
  
LSFChurnFD       -62.9269 
(0.871) 
 
LSFChurnLFD        -802.800 
(0.175) 
         
AvgCapacityFD 0.104359 
(0.331) 
0.009687 
(0.947) 
0.096731 
(0.419) 
0.105110 
(0.373) 
0.107490 
(0.350) 
0.097306 
(0.361) 
0.101619 
(0.387) 
0.171288 
(0.153) 
RealTicketPriFD 27.8653 
(0.316) 
23.36738 
(0.436) 
21.45655 
(0.465) 
23.02894 
(0.490) 
27.20171 
(0.374) 
28.41198 
(0.305) 
21.09246 
(0.476) 
67.15869 
(0.127) 
         
NewFranchise -275.202 
(0.935) 
-1710.07 
(0.656) 
-468.002 
(0.899) 
-268.735 
(0.950) 
101.9048 
(0.978) 
261.8351 
(0.939) 
-464.194 
(0.900) 
2494.395 
(0.529) 
Relocation -7.37132 
(0.964) 
-73.9039 
(0.670) 
-39.3935 
(0.824) 
-24.7434 
(0.906) 
23.11059 
(0.907) 
60.18175 
(0.733) 
-49.7535 
(0.802) 
258.607 
(0.332) 
NewStadium 47.16701 
(0.309) 
93.25714 
(0.322) 
35.00431 
(0.498) 
38.86115 
(0.433) 
50.2936 
(0.340) 
47.39875 
(0.305) 
35.77991 
(0.499) 
37.16122 
(0.405) 
         
CenSeasonCBFD -659.460 
(0.008)* 
-580.531 
(0.018)* 
-587.542 
(0.017)* 
-582.619 
(0.021)* 
-573.953 
(0.018)* 
-556.589 
(0.015)* 
-572.618 
(0.029)* 
-904.152 
(0.011)* 
         
Lockout98 -1481.53 
(0.012)* 
-1406.26 
(0.013)* 
-1473.20 
(0.013)* 
-1496.48 
(0.012)* 
-1518.58 
(0.010)* 
-1460.58 
(0.008)* 
-1475.29 
(0.013)* 
-2106.89 
(0.006) 
Lockout11 -100.826 
(0.705) 
-231.362 
(0.396) 
-246.079 
(0.398) 
-216.644 
(0.449) 
-109.154 
(0.739) 
-41.834 
(0.882) 
-237.068 
(0.411) 
45.06373 
(0.883) 
         
AttendTrendFD 0.119579 
(0.159) 
0.124781 
(0.182) 
0.100958 
(0.263) 
0.093534 
(0.321) 
0.092060 
(0.288) 
0.093647 
(0.246) 
0.098716 
(0.269) 
0.111958 
(0.171) 
         
Adj. R-Squared 0.3771 0.4686 0.3347 0.3306 0.3571 0.4457 0.3320 0.4600 
P-values in parentheses 
*significant at the 5% level or better 
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 The one inter-season competitive balance metric that is statistically significant in 
the NHL is the average number of years since each team in the league last qualified for 
the playoffs.  The parameter estimate suggests that if the average number of years goes 
up by 1, average per-game attendance would increase by around 200 (about 1% of the 
current per-game attendance).  Such a result provides some evidence that NHL fans may 
prefer to see the same teams qualify for the playoffs each year and thus prefer dynasties 
over competitive balance.  If this result is valid, such a finding could perhaps be 
explained by the fact that certain teams (such as the Original Six) have far greater 
drawing power in the NHL and league-wide there is interest in seeing these teams have 
success at the expense of newer, less popular teams.  However, since none of the other 
consecutive season competitive balance metrics were statistically significant this result 
may represent a Type I error.  Taken altogether, these results do not provide much 
support for Hypothesis 2 that consecutive season competitive balance is an important 
driver of fan interest, a result that is discussed further in section 5.5.  
 
5.3 Control Variables 
In addition to the regression results concerning the independent variables of 
interest, there are also some important results in regards to the control variables (see 
Table 7 above for the results of all three leagues).  First and foremost, despite economic 
theory guiding the selection of appropriate control variables, there are very few variables 
in each model that are statistically significant.  This highlights the difficulty in explaining 
year-to-year aggregate attendance changes in professional sports.  Although this may beg 
the question of why league-wide attendance was used as the dependent variable, it is 
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important to remember that one of the primary contributions of this study is the 
investigation of the effects of competitive balance at the league level (see the Chapter 4 
discussion on the dependent variable).  To show that increasing the competitiveness of 
the playoff race benefits the teams that are directly competing for those spots is 
somewhat obvious and has been shown before.  However, when taken as a whole, do 
those gains outweigh any potential losses in interest for other teams that have already 
secured playoff spots?  Only an investigation at the league-level can show whether these 
considerations matter for all 30 teams as a collective.  In addition, despite the difficulties 
in explaining league-wide attendance, the final models are still able to explain 40-60% of 
the variance in the change of average attendance per year.   
Of the six categories of control variables, two (stadium capacity and real ticket 
prices) did not show statistically significant results for any of the leagues.  This suggests 
that in the aggregate at the league-level, ticket prices and stadium capacity do not have 
large effects on attendance.  Although certainly these variables would impact individual 
team attendance, these effects are small and get washed out when observed at the league-
level.  The same is true for franchise relocations and new stadiums as neither of these two 
variables were statistically significant for any of the leagues.  The dummy variable for 
new franchises, however, was significant at the 5% level for both MLB and the NHL.  
For MLB, each new franchise led to an increase in average attendance per game of 
around 1,100 which shows that there is pent up demand for MLB franchises and that 
expansion can lead to greater fan interest.  For the NHL, the reverse is true, as each new 
franchise is expected to decrease average attendance per game by about 300.  This 
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suggests that the NHL has over-expanded and in doing so has cost the league in terms of 
fan interest.   
Other variables that show statistically significant results at the 5% level for one or 
more leagues include the seasonal competitive balance metric (NBA), strike/lockout 
dummies (MLB, NBA), and the attendance trend variable (NHL).  Early specifications 
using the actual to idealized ratio of standard deviation of win percentages for the 
seasonal competitive balance metric (for either the final or mid-season standings), did not 
show significant results.  However, that same metric applied to the middle third of teams 
in the final standings does give support to the idea that seasonal competitive balance is 
important in professional sports.  For the NBA, each one unit increase in this metric, 
which represents a greater standard deviation of win percentages for the middle third of 
teams and thus less competitive balance, is expected to reduce average attendance per 
game by about 600.  For MLB, this effect is even greater, although the parameter 
estimate is only significant at the 10% level.  Each one unit increase in the competitive 
balance metric in MLB yields a reduction in average attendance per game of about 1,800.  
These results provide support at the league-level that the tightness of the playoff race is 
important for fan interest. 
Most of the results for years affected by a strike or a lockout are not statistically 
significant, with two notable exceptions.  First, the 1994 MLB players’ strike had a 
significant negative impact on per-game attendance in the following season (since the 
strike canceled the second half of the 1994 season, the dummy variable was applied to 
1995).  This strike was responsible for a large per-game attendance reduction in the 1995 
season of around 3,200.  Similarly, the 1998 NBA lockout led to a reduction in average 
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attendance per game of about 1,500 during the 1998-99 season.  Although the effects of 
the 1994 MLB players strike and the 1998 NBA lockout had significant negative effects 
on fan interest, it is notable that the other six lockouts/strikes (1972 MLB strike, 1981 
MLB strike, 2011 NBA lockout, 1994 NHL lockout, 2004 NHL lockout, and 2012 NHL 
lockout) did not have a significant effect on attendance.  This is particularly noteworthy 
for the 2004 NHL lockout which led to the cancellation of the entire 2004-05 season.  
These results concerning the effects of strikes and lockouts are mostly 
inconsistent with the findings of Schmidt and Berri (2004) which found that each strike 
and lockout in MLB, the NHL, and the NFL had a statistically significant negative effect 
on attendance for the year in question.  However, the dependent variable used in their 
analysis is the average attendance per team, as opposed to the average attendance per 
game used in this study.  Using average attendance per team as the dependent variable is 
essentially guaranteed to show significant negative results from strikes and lockouts due 
to the fact that these labor stoppages cause a lower number of games to be played in the 
strike/lockout affected season.  This lower number of games will substantially reduce the 
average attendance per team for that season, but may have no actual effect on the average 
attendance per game.   
Replicating the Schmidt and Berri (2004) time series analysis but using average 
attendance per game as the dependent variable finds that there are no statistically 
significant effects on attendance for any strike/lockout except for the 1994 MLB players’ 
strike.  Perhaps more noteworthy, replicating their analysis exactly but extending it to 
include the 2004-05 NHL lockout shows no statistically significant drop in attendance 
during the season following the lockout.  This is due to the fact that the NHL played a 
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full complement of games that season following the loss of the entire 2004-05 season 
which makes the average attendance per team dependent variable just a scaled measure of 
average attendance per game. 
 
5.4 Alternate Models 
 The final regression models used for this study were determined through an 
iterative process that utilized various different specifications for the dependent variable as 
well as the set of control variables.  In each case, the independent variables of interest for 
this process were the percentage of teams that qualify for the playoffs and its square term.  
For each model combination of one dependent variable specification and a given set of 
control variables, these same independent variables were used in order to maintain 
consistency as the models were expanded and enhanced.  This allowed for one model 
specification to be chosen as the most effective at answering the research questions in 
addition to showcasing the robustness of the model to various specifications. 
The first set of regression models used total league-wide attendance for a given 
league as the dependent variable.  Early models using this specification suffered from 
significant multicollinearity problems due to several independent and control variables 
that exhibited monotonically increasing trends over the length of the data set that 
mirrored the general increasing trend of total league-wide attendance for each league.  In 
particular, the number of teams in the league, the number of games per team, ticket 
prices, the U.S. population, and the U.S. per capita income are all highly correlated and 
thus affected the statistical reliability of the model.  To address this issue, as well as to 
increase the number of degrees of freedom, the dependent variable was adjusted to absorb 
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two of the control variables: the number of teams in the league and the number of games 
per team.  Dividing total league-wide attendance by these two variables creates a second 
dependent variable that is the average attendance per game for a given league-year.  This 
change significantly reduces the multicollinearity problems without jeopardizing the 
model.  Although the number of teams in the league and the number of games per team 
are important controls that must be included in the model in some form, it is not 
necessary to get parameter estimates for these variables as the effect of increasing the 
number of teams or the number of games in a league should have a very predictable 
scalable positive effect on total attendance. 
 Two other dependent variable specifications were created by further absorbing 
control variables into the dependent variable.  First, the control variable for stadium 
capacity was used to create the average attendance per game as a percentage of capacity.  
Second, the ticket price control was used to create the average attendance per game 
weighted by average ticket prices for each team.  This ticket price weighted average 
attendance dependent variable was done solely for MLB because neither the NBA nor 
NHL has sufficient ticket price information to create a dependent variable in this manner 
with enough data points.  This process of creating additional dependent variable 
specifications, similar to that done for total teams and games per team to create average 
attendance per game, frees up an additional degree of freedom while also allowing for 
additional specifications for robustness checks. 
All of these dependent variable specifications were further considered as part of 
first difference models.  The absolute average attendance models exhibit non-stationary 
effects that jeopardize the reliability of the statistical results from these models.  As a 
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result, additional models were created that used the first difference of all variables except 
the dummy variables.  Dickey-fuller tests on the times series of the first difference of 
each of the average attendance dependent variable specifications show that the first 
difference data is stationary with a p-value of 0.000 for all leagues considered. 
Moving to the control variables, different specifications were tested for stadium 
age, seasonal competitive balance, and the trend.  For stadium age, the average age of all 
current stadiums is used as an introductory control variable for the stadium experience.  
However, this variable, as an average, may not accurately account for the important 
elements that drive interest in new stadiums.  As a result, two additional specifications 
meant to capture stadium/franchise effects are utilized.  The first specification breaks this 
variable into three dummy variables to account for three important stadium related 
components: new franchises (which often enter the league with new stadiums), franchise 
relocations to new cities (which often involve moving into new stadiums), and newly 
constructed/extensively renovated stadiums involving pre-existing teams in their current 
city.  This new specification allows not only for direct measurement of a new stadium’s 
effect on attendance but also the corresponding effects of new franchises and franchise 
relocations. 
 A further set of stadium variables builds on the previous dummy variable 
specification by accounting for the fact that the effect of new franchises, relocations, and 
new stadiums might last for a period of time longer than one year.  In this case, the effect 
is modeled as lasting for three years.  However, in consideration of the fact that the 
novelty effect of any of these three changes will likely diminish over time, this new 
specification assigns a value of one for the year immediately following one of these 
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changes, a value of 0.67 for the second year, and a value of 0.33 for the third year.  This 
alternate specification may more closely approximate the actual fan response to new 
franchises, relocations, and new stadiums, and also provides for an additional robustness 
check on the modeling of this control variable. 
 For seasonal competitive balance, the ratio of actual to idealized standard 
deviation of win percentages is used for each league-year as the introductory control 
variable.  This metric was chosen due to its popularity in the literature for studies 
investigating the effect of seasonal competitive balance on fan interest/attendance.  
However, this variable may not adequately measure the level of competitive balance that 
exists throughout the season, or specifically in regards to the playoff race.  As a result, 
two additional seasonal competitive balance metrics were considered. 
First, a mid-seasonal ratio was calculated in an identical format except the mid-
season standings (as opposed to the final standings) were used.  This alternative measure 
looks at the level of dispersion in the standings mid-way through season, which could be 
a better measure of the effect of seasonal competitive balance on fan interest and 
attendance as the season is progressing.  Mid-season standings were recorded for each 
league from shrpsports.com using July 1
st
 as the mid-season point for MLB and January 
15
th
 as the mid-season point for both the NBA and the NHL.  Those dates were chosen 
based on looking at the true mid-season (half of the season’s games had been played) for 
each season of each league and then choosing a representative average that could serve as 
the approximate mid-point for every year of the league in question. 
The second alternative seasonal competitive balance measure is a calculation of 
the final season ratio of actual to idealized standard deviation of win percentages for the 
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middle third of the teams of each league.  Although total dispersion of win percentages 
may be important, a better measure may be the dispersion of teams that are competitive 
for a playoff position down the stretch. 
For the trend control variable, a proxy is needed to account for other unexplained 
factors that have contributed to the general rise in popularity of sports over the past 60 
years.  First, U.S. population and real per capita income were jointly used to model this 
observed increase in the demand for sports.  Second, a new attendance trend variable was 
created that utilizes the average attendance in the other professional sport leagues as a 
control for the league in question. 
 Utilizing the different dependent variables and control variables described in this 
section allowed for several different model specifications to be run for each of the three 
leagues in order to determine the best performing base-line model that is also generally 
robust to different specifications.  For each dependent variable (average attendance per 
game, average attendance as a percentage of capacity, average attendance per game 
weighted by ticket price, first difference of average attendance per game, first difference 
of average attendance as a percentage of capacity, first difference of average attendance 
per game weight by ticket price), eight specifications were run for each league that 
gradually built up the model from initial control variables to more detailed and refined 
control variables.   
 Overall, the results from these 112 model specifications (48 for MLB, 32 for the 
NBA and 32 for the NHL) are generally consistent, providing strong support for the 
robustness of the final base-line model used in this study.  See Appendix B for the results 
of these various specifications.  Although the models using the absolute measures of the 
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dependent variable show extremely high adjusted R-squared values (up to 0.97 for MLB, 
0.93 for the NHL, and 0.88 for the NBA), some of this fit is spurious and due to the non-
stationary nature of the attendance time-series data.  As mentioned previously, first 
differencing the data solves this problem (Dickey-Fuller tests reject the null hypothesis of 
a unit root in the first differenced attendance data series for each league with a p-value of 
0.000), and so the final reported analysis utilized the first differenced models.  Although 
these models show significantly lower adjusted R-squared values than the absolute 
models, they are still quite high, with values up to 0.59 for MLB, 0.43 for the NHL, and 
0.39 for the NBA.  These relatively high adjusted R-squared values for first differencing 
provide confidence in the explanatory power of the model. 
For the three first differenced dependent variables (average attendance per game, 
average attendance per game as a percent of capacity, average attendance per game 
weighted by ticket price), the models generally show the greatest fit for the average 
attendance per game.  This dependent variable is also the least complicated and easiest to 
understand, and also allows for parameter estimates to be obtained for the stadium 
capacity and real ticket price control variables.  For these reasons, the dependent variable 
of first difference of average attendance per game was chosen for the final model.  
However, the magnitude, direction, and significance of the important results are largely 
unaffected by this choice. 
For the control variables, the attendance trend was used over the U.S. population 
and per capita income variables due to multicollinearity concerns as well as the fact that 
the attendance trend represents a better proxy for the underlying demand for professional 
sports in the United States.  The standard set of stadium dummy variables for new 
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franchises, relocations, and new stadiums was chosen over the weighted average stadium 
dummies due to the fact that the standard dummies better resemble the expected fan 
response in a first difference model.  The weighted average stadium dummies are a better 
approximation of the fan response in the absolute measures, but in first differencing they 
would suggest that a new stadium, for example, would generate a rise in attendance in 
year one, a further rise in year two, and an even further rise in year three.  This is unlikely 
to be the case and it is therefore no surprise that the standard dummies generate higher fit 
in the first differencing models.  In addition, both sets of dummies outperform the 
variable for average stadium age that was first considered. 
The seasonal competitive balance measure for the middle third of teams is chosen 
over the standard seasonal measure as well as the mid-seasonal measure due to its better 
predictive ability in the models.  In addition, this variable seems to better approximate 
what fans most respond to during a season, in that the closeness of teams that are vying 
for playoff spots is of the most importance for competitive balance concerns.   
These are the factors that informed the choice of the final model that was used in 
this study to test the effect of playoff structure and consecutive season competitive 
balance on attendance.  However, in all cases, the specific choice of control variables did 
not have large impacts on the results concerning the independent variables of interest.  In 
addition, performing the same analyses on a subset of the data for each league (1969-
2013 for MLB, 1979-2013 for the NHL, and 1982-2013 for the NBA) likewise did not 
significantly change the results.  In consideration of all of these different specifications, 
there is confidence in the robustness of the model and in the significance of the findings. 
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5.5 Concluding Discussion 
 Taken together, the results from this study offer some important findings 
concerning competitive balance and its affect on fan interest.  Although the newly 
proposed consecutive season competitive balance metrics largely did not show 
statistically significant effects on attendance at the league-level, this is perhaps not 
surprising.  Trying to explain the factors that contribute to league-wide attendance 
changes proved to be a difficult task, as noted by the lack of significant results for many 
of the control variables that economic theory suggests would be important (such as ticket 
prices).  Overall, the attendance series for each of the three studied leagues seemed to 
follow a general upward trend due to fundamental underlying factors driving interest in 
professional sports as a whole during the time frame examined.  This is perhaps best 
appreciated by the fact that most of the lockouts and strikes included in the analysis had 
no affect on attendance, not even for the year in which they occurred.  This suggests 
remarkable staying power for these leagues and the ability to rise above what otherwise 
should be large setbacks. Even the 1994 MLB players’ strike, which had a well 
documented and severe effect on fan interest including an estimated loss of 3,200 fans 
per game based on this analysis, was overcome with no long-term attendance effects. 
These observations highlight the unmistakable growing popularity of professional 
sports in recent decades and thus the difficulty in explaining attendance changes outside 
of this growing trend.  Under the circumstances, the fact that 40-60% of the variance of 
average attendance in the first difference models was able to be explained by the control 
variables and the independent variables of interest is quite good.  In addition, one of the 
primary variables of interest (playoff structure) was found to be a significant and 
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importance driver of fan interest in MLB and NHL.  This result, coupled with some 
significant results involving the seasonal competitive balance control variable for MLB 
and the NBA emphasizes the importance of a critical element of competitive balance that 
is most often overlooked in other studies: the playoffs.  And in consideration of the 
difficulty of finding variables that have a statistically significant effect on league-wide 
attendance, this result is particularly impactful. 
One of the primary theoretical contributions of this dissertation involves the idea 
that previous competitive balance studies have largely ignored the playoffs, despite the 
obvious importance of the playoffs to the fan experience.  The results of this study 
overwhelming support the notion that the playoffs are important and are a crucial element 
of competitive balance studies.  First and foremost, the results support hypothesis 1 in 
that the structure of the playoffs as determined by the percentage of teams that qualify for 
the postseason is an important consideration in terms of league-wide attendance.  If it is 
assumed that major professional sport leagues are viewed and appreciated by fans in a 
somewhat similar fashion, at least at the margins, the results from the MLB and NHL 
analysis can be combined to suggest that there may be an optimal level for the percentage 
of teams that qualify for the playoffs (somewhere between 33% and 50%) that maximizes 
league-wide regular season attendance.  Regardless of the exact figure (if there even is 
one), it is likely that MLB would be better off in terms of attendance by further 
increasing the number of teams that qualify for the playoffs whereas the NHL could drive 
higher attendance by doing the opposite.  Specifically, the results show that if MLB were 
to increase the number of playoff teams to 12 it could expect a per game attendance 
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increase of over 4,000 where if the NHL were to decrease the number of playoff teams to 
14 it could expect a per game attendance increase of over 700, all else equal. 
This result, untested and unproven in prior literature, supports the notion that 
increasing the number of playoff spots can increase the excitement as well as the number 
of teams involved in the playoff race, but only to a point.  For low levels of playoff 
qualification, the positive effect of making more teams competitive for the postseason 
may outweigh the negative shift of importance from the regular season to the playoffs.  
However, for high levels of playoff qualification the opposite may be true, with fans of 
the best teams losing interest in the regular season due to having all but guaranteed a 
playoff spot early in the season.  The idea that a simple structural change such as the 
number of teams that qualify for the playoffs could have such an important and positive 
effect on fan interest through competitive balance concerns is extremely noteworthy. 
Much of the recent labor strife in professional sports can be traced at some level 
to the idea that competitive balance is important and that labor restrictions (salary 
caps/floors, luxury taxes, franchise tags, etc.) should be implemented to help foster 
competitive balance.  Unfortunately, numerous previous studies have shown that these 
types of labor restrictions actually have no effect on competitive balance and thus create 
acrimonious owner/labor relationships with no notable increase in the appeal of the 
league for fans.  Adjusting the playoff structure, however, gives a simple and efficient 
way to positively affect competitive balance and thus the fan experience, leading to 
increased league-wide attendance and profitability. 
In the United States, MLB is most often the scapegoat when it comes to a 
perceived lack of competitive balance.  Although previous studies have shown that in 
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fact, by most measures MLB has relatively good levels of competitive balance compared 
with other leagues, this is not the fan perception.  Perhaps the problem has been as simple 
as MLB has too few teams qualifying for the playoffs.  Looking again at The Blue 
Ribbon Report that dissected MLB’s competitive balance concerns shows that “proper 
competitive balance will not exist until every well-run club has a regularly recurring 
reasonable hope of reaching postseason play” (Levin et. al. 2000, pg. 5, emphasis in 
original).  Although completely evening the level of playing talent among all 30 MLB 
teams surely would accomplish this goal, an easier and more realistic task would be to 
just increase the number of teams that qualify for the playoffs.  More playoff spots would 
directly increase the number of teams that reasonably had hope of reaching postseason 
play each year. 
This idea that the playoff race is intertwined with fans’ perceptions of competitive 
balance is further supported by the results from the seasonal competitive balance control 
variable.  Using a standard seasonal competitive balance metric for the complete final 
standings and the complete mid-season standings did not show any statistically 
significant effects on attendance.  However, when that variable measured only the middle 
third of teams at the end of the season (those most likely competing to make the 
playoffs), significant results were observed in line with the hypothesis that increased 
levels of competitive balance increase fan interest.  When these results are taken together 
with those from the playoff structure and consecutive season competitive balance 
variables, a fuller picture of the importance of competitive balance emerges.  Consistent 
with all of these results is the idea that it doesn’t actually matter who wins and who loses 
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a given match, a given season’s championship, or a string of consecutive championships.  
All that matters is that your team is competitive. 
In truth, this observation should be somewhat obvious in that it forms the core of 
the concept itself: competitive balance.  But it seems to go against the very nature of sport 
itself, which celebrates winners and forgets losers.  Yet, in consideration of the MLB’s 
Blue Ribbon Report, competitiveness, win or lose, gives hope.  And maybe hope is all 
that your average fan needs to stick by his/her team, attend games, and purchase 
merchandise.  It doesn’t matter if the Yankees win the World Series every year.  It 
doesn’t even matter if your team never makes the playoffs.  All that matters is that your 
team is competitive down the stretch for one of those final playoff spots.  Because if your 
team is competitive for a playoff spot, then there is reasonable hope of making the 
playoffs.  And if your team makes the playoffs, then there is reasonable hope of winning 
the championship. 
Thinking about the idea of competitive balance in this way (as opposed to the 
standard idea of wins and losses) fits with all of the results from this study.  The only 
seasonal competitive balance control variable that affected attendance was the one that 
most closely measured the competitiveness of the playoff race.  All of the consecutive 
season competitive balance measures were insignificant predictors of attendance, but they 
all focused on outcomes and not the level of competitiveness to reach the playoffs.  And 
of course, the statistically significant effects of modifying the playoff structure directly 
impact the competitiveness of the playoff race due to the number of opportunities that 
exist to make the playoffs.   
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This interpretation of the meaning of competitive balance as viewed by the fan is 
at this point just a new theory, albeit one that is consistent with the results of this study.  
However, an alternate explanation may simply be that the effects of the consecutive 
season competitive balance measures got washed out in the aggregation of the data at the 
yearly level, a similar result that was seen for many of the control variables.  For 
instance, the dummy variable for new stadiums was not significant for any of the models 
despite the fact that it is commonly accepted and shown that new stadiums often lead to a 
large bump in attendance the first year for specific teams (for example, the Baltimore 
Orioles saw an increase in attendance of over 12,000 per game in 1992 in their new 
stadium).  However, the effect is not consistent across teams, with some teams/stadiums 
showing small increases or even decreases and when these effects are aggregated across 
all teams each year for a given league, the overall effect is small and difficult to assess 
properly.  The result is an insignificant parameter estimate in the model at the league-
level despite some importance for individual teams in certain situations. 
Other control variables that did not show a statistically significant effect at the 
league level include stadium capacity, real ticket prices, franchise relocations, and most 
of the strikes/lockouts.  Of course, for given teams and given years these variables would 
have important effects on attendance and that is why they were included as control 
variables.  However, when aggregated at the league-level, there are no significant 
attendance responses based on changes in stadium capacity, average ticket prices or the 
location of franchises.  Likewise, the effect of lockouts/strikes on attendance was largely 
insignificant at the league level which is a very important and interesting finding. 
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Of the eight strikes and lockouts investigated across the three leagues in this 
study, only two were shown to have a statistically significant negative effect on 
attendance.  The first is the 1994 MLB strike which was notorious for causing the first 
cancellation of a postseason due to a work stoppage.  The second is the 1998 NBA 
lockout which, in consideration of the lack of statistically significant findings for the 
other strikes and lockouts, could arguably be the result of Michael Jordan’s second (and 
seemingly final) retirement from the Chicago Bulls and the NBA.  If the observed drop in 
attendance during the 1998-99 season is thus largely or entirely attributed to the 
retirement of the Michael Jordan, then outside of the 1994 MLB strike, work stoppages 
do not have a significant effect on league attendance.  This finding is especially 
noteworthy because it includes the 2004 NHL lockout which wiped out an entire season 
and seemingly did not adversely impact attendance in the NHL.  These findings might 
inform the recent wave of league imposed lockouts in the NHL, NBA, and NFL during 
the previous three seasons, as there does not appear to be negative consequences for such 
actions. 
A final interesting observation from the control variables concerns the addition of 
new franchises through expansion.  The positive results for MLB follow the notion that 
professional sport leagues in the U.S. have monopoly power and use that to control entry 
in order to preserve excess demand and maintain pricing power.  As a result, MLB 
currently has fewer teams than for which there is demand and therefore could benefit 
from further expansion.  However, maintaining this excess demand may be more valuable 
to the league (e.g. through extracting sizable stadium subsidies) than the increased fan 
interest generated by expansion.  Conversely, the negative results for the NHL suggest 
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that the NHL has over-expanded and deteriorated interest in the league as a result.  In 
particular, it is likely that expansion in the 1990’s and early 2000s that put new franchises 
into cities in the Sun Belt (such as Atlanta, Miami and Nashville) that could not support 
their teams to the same extent as the established northern cities ended up pulling down 
league-wide attendance as a whole.  The fact that the Atlanta team has already relocated 
to a smaller Canadian city (Winnipeg) furthers the notion that the Sun Belt expansion was 
not well founded and that the NHL could be a stronger and more popular league with 
fewer teams.  The fact that these new franchise results for MLB and the NHL remained 
significant through the aggregation of the data at the league level showcases how strong 
these effects are on league attendance.  Likewise, the fact that the primary results 
concerning the playoff percent variables are strongly significant highlights just how 
important the playoff structure must be for this effect to be observed in the league level 
model.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
This dissertation sought to answer questions about how playoff structure and the 
level of consecutive season competitive balance impact fan interest in major professional 
sport leagues in the United States.  The results suggest that playoff structure (namely the 
percentage of teams that qualify for the playoffs) is an important driver of fan interest as 
defined by the average attendance per game.  Conversely, the level of consecutive season 
competitive balance as determined through various new metrics was not shown to be of 
significant importance to fans.  The remainder of this chapter is divided into three parts.  
First, there are concluding remarks concerning the major findings of this research.  
Second, the implications for research and practice are discussed.  Last, the limitations of 
this research are presented along with promising areas for future research. 
 
6.1 Conclusion 
This dissertation explored how playoff structure and various forms of consecutive 
season competitive balance influence league-wide attendance for MLB, the NHL, and the 
NBA.  In contrast to previous literature in this field, this study suggests that playoffs are 
an important consideration that cannot be overlooked in competitive balance studies due 
to the inherent fan focus on postseason play.  The results show that the percentage of 
teams that qualify for the playoffs is a significant driver of fan interest in MLB and the 
NHL as measured by attendance.  Specifically it was shown that while early increases in 
the percentage of playoff qualifying teams in MLB led to decreased attendance, moving 
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forward an increase of the playoffs to include 12 teams would be expected to increase per 
game attendance by over 4,000.  Similarly, while playoff structural changes have a mixed 
history in the NHL, in the current situation a reduction in the number of playoff teams to 
14 would be expected to increase the per game attendance by over 700.  In addition, the 
combination of the results from these two leagues may support the idea that fan interest is 
maximized when the number of teams that make the playoffs falls within 33-50%.  At 
such a potential optimal point, the competing concerns of increasing the number of teams 
that are competitive for a playoff spot and maintaining the importance of the regular 
season are balanced.  Although the consecutive season competitive balance metrics did 
not significantly impact attendance, this result is consistent with the idea that fans care 
less about the actual outcome and more about the level of competitiveness, whether that 
is at the game, season, or consecutive season level.  This idea is also consistent with the 
finding that the level of dispersion of the middle third of teams in a given year (those 
most likely to be actively competitive for a playoff spot) is a better predictor of 
attendance than similar seasonal competitive balance measures using all of the teams. 
 
6.2 Implications 
 The results from this study concerning competitive balance have several 
implications for sport economics research.  Most of the existing UOH literature focuses 
on match level or seasonal level outcomes, ignoring the playoffs.  However, this study 
shows the importance of the playoffs as an important driver of fan interest.  In the quest 
to find a competitive balance metric to which consumers show the greatest sensitivity, 
focusing on a playoff-based measure seems to be a good place to start.  And although the 
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newly proposed consecutive season competitive balance measures based on playoff 
outcomes were insignificant predictors of league-wide attendance, the theoretical 
contribution of this study suggests that inter-seasonal competitive balance concerns are at 
least as important as those for seasonal competitive balance.  The difficulty of finding 
significant consecutive season results may simply lie in the aggregation of the data at the 
league level.  Despite the fact that this league-wide approach limited the number of 
significant findings, ultimately the notion of competitive balance is important only at the 
league level and thus should be analyzed at this level. 
 This research also has important implications for professional sport league 
managers.  The results show that simple manipulations of the playoff structure through 
the number of the teams that qualify for the playoffs can have substantial effects on fan 
interest and attendance.  Such manipulations may be sufficient to satisfy underlying fan 
desire for competitive balance insomuch as more teams have a realistic hope of reaching 
postseason play.  Leveling the playing field through labor restrictions may be 
unnecessary (not to mention challenging and acrimonious) as fans may care less about 
the actual outcomes and more about the perceived competitiveness of their favorite 
teams, win or lose.   
Observing the differences in NCAA Division 1 men’s basketball and FBS football 
may prove instructive in this manner.  In both cases, the same small subset of teams wins 
the championship every year (e.g. UCLA, Kentucky, Indiana, North Carolina, Duke, 
UConn, Kansas, Louisville in basketball, and Alabama, Notre Dame, Oklahoma, USC, 
Miami, Nebraska, Ohio State, Texas in football), but the perceived level of balance in 
basketball is much higher.  Every single team in Division 1 basketball has a legitimate 
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chance at making the postseason tournament, as the winner of every conference is 
guaranteed a place.  It doesn’t seem to matter that most of those teams do not have a 
realistic chance of winning it all.  Just making the tournament is a victory for many 
teams, whereas a sweet sixteen berth or a final four appearance may be as fulfilling for 
some teams as a championship is for others (e.g. George Mason making the final four in 
2006 or Florida Gulf Coast making the sweet sixteen in 2013).  This creates somewhat of 
tiered system of competitive balance where every team is competitive for a given 
noteworthy place. 
 The system in college football is the complete opposite, where 80% of the teams 
are shut out from national championship consideration before the season even starts 
(undefeated, non-championship seasons by teams such as Boise State and Utah 
emphasize this point).  Although the bowl system seeks to replicate the idea that every 
team is competitive for something, the minor bowls are a sideshow to the national 
championship picture and there is no hope that any of those teams will ever have a 
George Mason style Cinderella run.  Although the nature of the sport of football 
precludes a large March Madness style tournament, the results of this study suggest that 
FBS football would benefit from a larger playoff field in order to increase the number of 
teams that were competitive for the playoffs.  Although FBS football is set to have four 
playoff teams for the first time in 2014, there is likely a long way to go until fan interest 
in maximized. 
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6.3 Limitations and Areas of Future Research 
 The major limitation of this study involves using attendance figures as a proxy for 
fan interest and league profitability.  Since the rise in television viewing of professional 
sports, it can be questioned whether attendance figures truly give an adequate measure of 
demand (not to mention that there is an incentive for teams to upwardly misreport their 
attendance).  However, attendance is regularly used in the sports economics literature as a 
trusted and accepted measure of fan demand.  This seems reasonable because attendance 
has continued to increase in all of the major professional sport leagues despite the threat 
of television as well as a general increase in average ticket prices each year.  This 
suggests that fan are still willing to pay for, and still value more highly, attending a game 
rather than watching it on TV. As a result, despite its drawbacks attendance is expected to 
be a good measure to test the effect of the variables of interest. 
 Additional limitations of this study relate to the completeness and quality of the 
data, which limits the overall generalizability of the conclusions.  The initial conception 
of this study was to investigate all four of the major professional sport leagues in the U.S. 
(MLB, NFL, NHL, NBA) in order to build a common model that could explain the 
importance of playoff-based competitive balance measures for sport leagues as a whole.  
Unfortunately, the NFL attendance data suffers from a large proportion of sellouts, and 
the NBA data was too highly correlated with the independent variables of interest to 
provide reliable results concerning the hypotheses.  Therefore, the analysis for MLB and 
the NHL largely formed the basis of the importance of the playoffs in terms of 
competitive balance and league-wide attendance.  It is expected, though not proven, that 
the results from this analysis will generalize to the NBA and the NFL as well as other 
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emerging professional leagues such as Major League Soccer and the Arena Football 
League. 
 Based on the previous limitations, it would be useful to extend this analysis to 
other leagues for confirmation of the results.  In particular, it might be interesting to see 
whether the same general effects are present in other major professional leagues around 
the world.  Just as consumers in other parts of the world have different tastes for food, 
fashion, and music, so too might consumers of sport in different countries have different 
tastes for competitive balance. 
 Future research might also find it fruitful to further test and validate the seasonal 
competitive balance measure used in this study.  Although the ratio of actual to idealized 
standard deviation of win percentages is frequently used as the metric for competitive 
balance, this was shown to have no effect on attendance in this study.  Instead, modifying 
the calculation slightly to include only the middle subset of teams (in this case the middle 
one third) may be a more salient measure of competitive balance actually experienced by 
consumers.  The results of this study suggest that this measure is an important factor 
influencing attendance so future competitive balance studies should investigate this 
variable as a replacement for the current standard.  If shown to be a robust measure of 
competitive balance to which consumers respond, then ACB studies could benefit from 
the inclusion of this variable in their historical analysis of the level of competitive 
balance present in the various professional sport leagues. 
 This dissertation has built on the work of previous literature concerning 
competitive balance in professional sports.  While the goal was to introduce and attempt 
to answer questions related to how playoff structure and consecutive season competitive 
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balance affect fan interest, the results from this work will also hopefully inspire future 
research investigating new elements of competitive balance.  This is especially relevant 
moving forward since competitive balance continues to receive attention from the 
mainstream media as well as academic scholars.   
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APPENDIX A 
HISTORY OF PLAYOFF QUALIFYING TEAMS 
 
Number and Percentage of Playoff Qualifying Teams for each of the Big Four Leagues 
each Year 
  MLB NFL NBA NHL 
Year Teams 
Playoff 
Teams Percent Teams 
Playoff 
Teams Percent Teams 
Playoff 
Teams Percent Teams 
Playoff 
Teams Percent 
1901 16 0 0.0% 
  
  
  
  
  
  
1902 16 0 0.0% 
  
  
  
  
  
  
1903 16 2 12.5% 
  
  
  
  
  
  
1904 16 2 12.5% 
  
  
  
  
  
  
1905 16 2 12.5% 
  
  
  
  
  
  
1906 16 2 12.5% 
  
  
  
  
  
  
1907 16 2 12.5% 
  
  
  
  
  
  
1908 16 2 12.5% 
  
  
  
  
  
  
1909 16 2 12.5% 
  
  
  
  
  
  
1910 16 2 12.5% 
  
  
  
  
  
  
1911 16 2 12.5% 
  
  
  
  
  
  
1912 16 2 12.5% 
  
  
  
  
  
  
1913 16 2 12.5% 
  
  
  
  
  
  
1914 16 2 12.5% 
  
  
  
  
  
  
1915 16 2 12.5% 
  
  
  
  
  
  
1916 16 2 12.5% 
  
  
  
  
  
  
1917 16 2 12.5% 
  
  
  
  4 2 50.0% 
1918 16 2 12.5% 
  
  
  
  3 2 66.7% 
1919 16 2 12.5% 
  
  
  
  4 2 50.0% 
1920 16 2 12.5% 14 0 0.0% 
  
  4 2 50.0% 
1921 16 2 12.5% 21 0 0.0% 
  
  4 2 50.0% 
1922 16 2 12.5% 18 0 0.0% 
  
  4 2 50.0% 
1923 16 2 12.5% 20 0 0.0% 
  
  4 2 50.0% 
1924 16 2 12.5% 19 0 0.0% 
  
  6 3 50.0% 
1925 16 2 12.5% 20 0 0.0% 
  
  7 3 42.9% 
1926 16 2 12.5% 22 0 0.0% 
  
  10 6 60.0% 
1927 16 2 12.5% 12 0 0.0% 
  
  10 6 60.0% 
1928 16 2 12.5% 10 0 0.0% 
  
  10 6 60.0% 
1929 16 2 12.5% 12 0 0.0% 
  
  10 6 60.0% 
1930 16 2 12.5% 11 0 0.0% 
  
  10 6 60.0% 
1931 16 2 12.5% 10 0 0.0% 
  
  8 6 75.0% 
1932 16 2 12.5% 8 0 0.0% 
  
  9 6 66.7% 
1933 16 2 12.5% 10 2 20.0% 
  
  9 6 66.7% 
1934 16 2 12.5% 11 2 18.2% 
  
  9 6 66.7% 
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1935 16 2 12.5% 9 2 22.2% 
  
  8 6 75.0% 
1936 16 2 12.5% 9 2 22.2% 
  
  8 6 75.0% 
1937 16 2 12.5% 10 2 20.0% 
  
  8 6 75.0% 
1938 16 2 12.5% 10 2 20.0% 
  
  7 6 85.7% 
1939 16 2 12.5% 10 2 20.0% 
  
  7 6 85.7% 
1940 16 2 12.5% 10 2 20.0% 
  
  7 6 85.7% 
1941 16 2 12.5% 10 2 20.0% 
  
  7 6 85.7% 
1942 16 2 12.5% 10 2 20.0% 
  
  6 4 66.7% 
1943 16 2 12.5% 9 2 22.2% 
  
  6 4 66.7% 
1944 16 2 12.5% 10 2 20.0% 
  
  6 4 66.7% 
1945 16 2 12.5% 10 2 20.0% 
  
  6 4 66.7% 
1946 16 2 12.5% 10 2 20.0% 11 6 54.5% 6 4 66.7% 
1947 16 2 12.5% 10 2 20.0% 8 6 75.0% 6 4 66.7% 
1948 16 2 12.5% 10 2 20.0% 12 8 66.7% 6 4 66.7% 
1949 16 2 12.5% 10 2 20.0% 17 8 47.1% 6 4 66.7% 
1950 16 2 12.5% 13 2 15.4% 11 8 72.7% 6 4 66.7% 
1951 16 2 12.5% 12 2 16.7% 10 8 80.0% 6 4 66.7% 
1952 16 2 12.5% 12 2 16.7% 10 8 80.0% 6 4 66.7% 
1953 16 2 12.5% 12 2 16.7% 9 6 66.7% 6 4 66.7% 
1954 16 2 12.5% 12 2 16.7% 8 6 75.0% 6 4 66.7% 
1955 16 2 12.5% 12 2 16.7% 8 6 75.0% 6 4 66.7% 
1956 16 2 12.5% 12 2 16.7% 8 6 75.0% 6 4 66.7% 
1957 16 2 12.5% 12 2 16.7% 8 6 75.0% 6 4 66.7% 
1958 16 2 12.5% 12 2 16.7% 8 6 75.0% 6 4 66.7% 
1959 16 2 12.5% 12 2 16.7% 8 6 75.0% 6 4 66.7% 
1960 16 2 12.5% 13 2 15.4% 8 6 75.0% 6 4 66.7% 
1961 18 2 11.1% 14 2 14.3% 9 6 66.7% 6 4 66.7% 
1962 20 2 10.0% 14 2 14.3% 9 6 66.7% 6 4 66.7% 
1963 20 2 10.0% 14 2 14.3% 9 6 66.7% 6 4 66.7% 
1964 20 2 10.0% 14 2 14.3% 9 6 66.7% 6 4 66.7% 
1965 20 2 10.0% 14 2 14.3% 9 6 66.7% 6 4 66.7% 
1966 20 2 10.0% 15 2 13.3% 10 8 80.0% 6 4 66.7% 
1967 20 2 10.0% 16 4 25.0% 12 8 66.7% 12 8 66.7% 
1968 20 2 10.0% 16 4 25.0% 14 8 57.1% 12 8 66.7% 
1969 24 4 16.7% 16 4 25.0% 14 8 57.1% 12 8 66.7% 
1970 24 4 16.7% 26 8 30.8% 17 8 47.1% 14 8 57.1% 
1971 24 4 16.7% 26 8 30.8% 17 8 47.1% 14 8 57.1% 
1972 24 4 16.7% 26 8 30.8% 17 8 47.1% 16 8 50.0% 
1973 24 4 16.7% 26 8 30.8% 17 8 47.1% 16 8 50.0% 
1974 24 4 16.7% 26 8 30.8% 18 10 55.6% 18 12 66.7% 
1975 24 4 16.7% 26 8 30.8% 18 10 55.6% 18 12 66.7% 
1976 24 4 16.7% 28 8 28.6% 22 12 54.5% 18 12 66.7% 
1977 26 4 15.4% 28 8 28.6% 21 12 57.1% 18 12 66.7% 
1978 26 4 15.4% 28 10 35.7% 22 12 54.5% 17 12 70.6% 
1979 26 4 15.4% 28 10 35.7% 22 12 54.5% 21 16 76.2% 
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1980 26 4 15.4% 28 10 35.7% 23 12 52.2% 21 16 76.2% 
1981 26 4 15.4% 28 10 35.7% 23 12 52.2% 21 16 76.2% 
1982 26 4 15.4% 28 10 35.7% 23 12 52.2% 21 16 76.2% 
1983 26 4 15.4% 28 10 35.7% 23 16 69.6% 21 16 76.2% 
1984 26 4 15.4% 28 10 35.7% 23 16 69.6% 21 16 76.2% 
1985 26 4 15.4% 28 10 35.7% 23 16 69.6% 21 16 76.2% 
1986 26 4 15.4% 28 10 35.7% 23 16 69.6% 21 16 76.2% 
1987 26 4 15.4% 28 10 35.7% 23 16 69.6% 21 16 76.2% 
1988 26 4 15.4% 28 10 35.7% 25 16 64.0% 21 16 76.2% 
1989 26 4 15.4% 28 10 35.7% 27 16 59.3% 21 16 76.2% 
1990 26 4 15.4% 28 12 42.9% 27 16 59.3% 21 16 76.2% 
1991 26 4 15.4% 28 12 42.9% 27 16 59.3% 22 16 72.7% 
1992 26 4 15.4% 28 12 42.9% 27 16 59.3% 24 16 66.7% 
1993 28 4 14.3% 28 12 42.9% 27 16 59.3% 26 16 61.5% 
1994 Strike 28 12 42.9% 27 16 59.3% 26 16 61.5%   
1995 28 8 28.6% 30 12 40.0% 29 16 55.2% 26 16 61.5% 
1996 28 8 28.6% 30 12 40.0% 29 16 55.2% 26 16 61.5% 
1997 28 8 28.6% 30 12 40.0% 29 16 55.2% 26 16 61.5% 
1998 30 8 26.7% 30 12 40.0% 29 16 55.2% 27 16 59.3% 
1999 30 8 26.7% 31 12 38.7% 29 16 55.2% 28 16 57.1% 
2000 30 8 26.7% 31 12 38.7% 29 16 55.2% 30 16 53.3% 
2001 30 8 26.7% 31 12 38.7% 29 16 55.2% 30 16 53.3% 
2002 30 8 26.7% 32 12 37.5% 29 16 55.2% 30 16 53.3% 
2003 30 8 26.7% 32 12 37.5% 29 16 55.2% 30 16 53.3% 
2004 30 8 26.7% 32 12 37.5% 30 16 53.3% Lockout 
2005 30 8 26.7% 32 12 37.5% 30 16 53.3% 30             16 53.3%   
2006 30 8 26.7% 32 12 37.5% 30 16 53.3% 30 16 53.3% 
2007 30 8 26.7% 32 12 37.5% 30 16 53.3% 30 16 53.3% 
2008 30 8 26.7% 32 12 37.5% 30 16 53.3% 30 16 53.3% 
2009 30 8 26.7% 32 12 37.5% 30 16 53.3% 30 16 53.3% 
2010 30 8 26.7% 32 12 37.5% 30 16 53.3% 30 16 53.3% 
2011 30 8 26.7% 32 12 37.5% 30 16 53.3% 30 16 53.3% 
2012 30 10 33.3% 32 12 37.5% 30 16 53.3% 30 16 53.3% 
2013 30 10 33.3% 32 12 37.5% 30 16 53.3% 30 16 53.3% 
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APPENDIX B 
REGRESSION RESULTS AND VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
Variable Definitions for Regression Results: 
**Variable names with an “FD” at the end represent the first difference of that variable 
 
Dependent Variables: 
1. Average Attendance per Game is the total league-wide attendance for a given 
league divided by the total number of games played in a season. 
2. Average Attendance per Game as a Percent of Capacity is the average attendance 
per game divided by the average capacity per game. 
3. Average Attendance per Game Weighted by Ticket Price is the average 
attendance per game weighted by the average ticket price for each team 
4. First Difference of the Average Attendance per Game is the first difference of the 
average attendance per game series 
5. First Difference of the Average Attendance per Game as a Percent of Capacity is 
the first difference of the average attendance per game as a percent of capacity 
series. 
6. First Difference of the Average Attendance per Game Weighted by Ticket Price is 
the first difference of the average attendance per game weighted by ticket price 
series. 
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Independent Variables: 
1. PlayoffPct** is the percentage of teams that qualify for the playoffs in a given 
league-year. 
2. PlayoffPct2** is the square of the percentage of teams that qualify for the 
playoffs in a given league-year. 
3. POChurn** is the percentage of playoff qualifying teams in the current league-
year that did not qualify for the playoffs the previous season.  
4. POChurn3** is an average of the playoff churn for the previous three seasons. 
5. POChurnW3** is a weighted average of the playoff churn for the previous three 
seasons, with the previous season given a weight of 1.0, the season prior to that 
given a weight of 0.67, and the season prior to that given a weight of 0.33. 
6. CChurn** is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the current season saw a new 
champion and 0 if the current season was a repeat champion from the year prior. 
7. SeasonChurn** is the adjusted churn of the final season standings compared with 
the mid-season standings.  This value ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 representing 
identical final and mid-season standings and 1 representing complete churn (first 
to last, last to first, etc.) 
8. AvgPOYears** is the average number of years since each team in a given league 
last reached the playoffs divided by the ideal average representing complete 
turnover in playoff teams every year. 
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Control Variables: 
1. AvgCapacity** is the average stadium capacity per game for a given league-year. 
2. RealTicketPrice** is the weighted average (by capacity) ticket price (in real 2013 
dollars) for all teams in a given league-year. 
3. AvgStadiumAge** is the average age (in years) of all current stadiums during a 
given league-year. 
4. NewFranchise is an integer value of the number of new teams added to a league 
through expansion prior to a given year. 
5. Relocation is an integer value of the number of teams that relocated to a new city 
prior to a given year. 
6. NewStadium is an integer value of the number of teams that completed 
construction of a new stadium or the extensive renovation of their old stadiums 
prior to or during a given year. 
7. NewFranchise3 assigns a value of 1 for the year following the addition of a new 
team to a league through expansion, a value of 0.67 for the second year after, and 
a value of 0.33 for the third year after. 
8. Relocation3 assigns a value of 1 for the year following the relocation of a team to 
a new city, a value of 0.67 for the second year after, and a value of 0.33 for the 
third year after. 
9. NewStadium3 assigns a value of 1 for the year following the completion of the 
construction of a team’s new stadium or extensively renovated old stadium, a 
value of 0.67 for the second year after, and a value of 0.33 for the third year after. 
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10. SeasonalCB** is the ratio of actual to idealized standard deviation of win 
percentages in a given league-year.  This is the most commonly used measure of 
the level of seasonal competitive balance in league. 
11. MidSeasonalCB** is the ratio of actual to idealized standard deviation of win 
percentages calculated at the mid-point of the season (July 1
st
 for MLB, January 
15
th
 for the NBA and the NHL). 
12. CenSeasonalCB** is the ratio of actual to idealized standard deviation of win 
percentages calculated from the final standings for just the middle one third of the 
teams in the league (33
rd
 to 67
th
 percentile). 
13. PopulationUS** is the population of the United States each year. 
14. PerCapIncome** is the per capita income (in real 2012 dollars) for the United 
States each year. 
15. AttendanceTrend** is the average attendance per game of the leagues not being 
considered in the current regression analysis.  For the MLB regressions, 
AttendanceTrend is the average attendance per game of the NBA and NHL.  For 
the NHL regressions, AttendanceTrend is the average attendance per game of the 
NBA and MLB.  For the NBA regressions, AttendanceTrend is the average 
attendance per game of the MLB and NHL. 
16. Strike72 is a dummy variable for the strike-affected 1972 MLB season. 
17. Strike81 is a dummy variable for the strike-affected 1981 MLB season. 
18. Strike94 is a dummy variable for the strike-affected 1994 MLB season. Since the 
second half of the 1994 season (including the playoffs) was completely canceled 
as a result of this strike, the variable takes a value of 1 for the 1995 MLB season. 
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19. Lockout94 is a dummy variable for the lockout-affected 1994-95 NHL season. 
20. Lockout04 is a dummy variable for the lockout-affected 2004-05 NHL season.  
Since this lockout led to the complete cancellation of the 2004-05 NHL season, 
the variable takes a value of 1 for the 2005-06 NHL season. 
21. Lockout12 is a dummy variable for the lockout-affected 2012-13 NHL season. 
22. Lockout98 is a dummy variable for the lockout-affected 1998-99 NBA season. 
23. Lockout11 is a dummy variable for the lockout-affected 2011-12 NBA season. 
 
 For each of these three leagues, the data for league-wide regular season 
attendance, number of teams, average ticket prices, number of games for each season, 
and the number of teams that qualify for the playoffs  each year are obtained through the 
sport economist Rodney Fort’s sport business data repository: 
https://sites.google.com/site/rodswebpages/codes.  Rodney Fort is renowned in his field 
and his data repository is frequently used by other sport economists as a recognized 
source of high quality data.  The original sources for Fort’s attendance data include Quirk 
and Fort (1992), www.sports-reference.com, and ESPN.  The original sources for Fort’s 
ticket price data include The Sporting News and Team Marketing Report. 
 Data for playoff qualifying and advancing teams each year is obtained through the 
website www.sports-reference.com for each of the three leagues investigated and then the 
appropriate inter-season competitive balances measures are calculated using Excel.  Data 
for U.S. population and per capita income were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau 
(www.census.gov).  
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Table 13: MLB Regression Models: Dependent Variable Average Attendance per Game 
 
Independent 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
PlayoffPct 93188.64 
(0.020)* 
66367.98 
(0.085)* 
22011.69 
(0.441) 
-64925.2 
(0.028)* 
-71421.6 
(0.016)* 
-19798.2 
(0.013)* 
-61970.7 
(0.028)* 
-57751 
(0.047)* 
PlayoffPct2 -162766 
(0.084)* 
-67476.4 
(0.477) 
-46505.5 
(0.505) 
112157.5 
(0.128) 
121328.4 
(0.096)* 
 91854.14 
(0.165) 
83269.9 
(0.218) 
         
AvgCapacity 1.549076 
(0.000)* 
1.521181 
(0.000)* 
0.337712 
(0.065)* 
0.555122 
(0.023)* 
0.497067 
(0.035)* 
-0.07546 
(0.440) 
0.514995 
(0.031)* 
0.52863 
(0.027)* 
RealTicketPrice 1579.128 
(0.000)* 
1384.002 
(0.000)* 
222.7783 
(0.235) 
496.8302 
(0.010)* 
480.8993 
(0.011)* 
 456.2824 
(0.022)* 
460.682 
(0.019)* 
         
AvgStadiumAge 497.4356 
(0.000)* 
454.1946 
(0.000)* 
408.2858 
(0.000)* 
     
NewFranchise    372.9448 
(0.211) 
    
Relocation    137.5659 
(0.851) 
    
NewStadium    -88.4652 
(0.735) 
    
NewFranchise3     470.534 
(0.106) 
297.8236 
(0.333) 
366.2615 
(0.203) 
314.945 
(0.289) 
Relocation3     -203.519 
(0.773) 
-82.9588 
(0.914) 
137.1578 
(0.844) 
261.133 
(0.729) 
NewStadium3     -159.253 
(0.497) 
42.08467 
(0.863) 
-275.388 
(0.276) 
-273.63 
(0.253) 
         
SeasonalCB  242.4707 
(0.772) 
115.9859 
(0.838) 
-599.080 
(0.534) 
-1066.64 
(0.346) 
-899.396 
(0.464) 
 
 
 
MidSeasonalCB       165.1624 
(0.901) 
 
CenSeasonalCB        648.779 
(0.663) 
         
Strike72  -4770.03 
(0.013)* 
-1659.03 
(0.215) 
-2149.84 
(0.166) 
-1390.69 
(0.373) 
-1102.16 
(0.514) 
-1676.53 
(0.295) 
-1924.8 
(0.259) 
Strike81  -6288.95 
(0.012)* 
-965.153 
(0.588) 
1753.921 
(0.400) 
2124.217 
(0.297) 
3254.115 
(0.104) 
2871.454 
(0.177) 
2782.71 
(0.182) 
Strike94  -3584.19 
(0.083)* 
-1603.49 
(0.255) 
-2666.11 
(0.071)* 
-2704.00 
(0.069)* 
-3214.82 
(0.041)* 
-2040.55 
(0.183) 
-1969.4 
(0.199) 
         
PopulationUS   0.000052 
(0.272) 
     
PerCapIncome   0.584877 
(0.026)* 
     
AttendanceTrend    2.081297 
(0.000)* 
2.164358 
(0.000)* 
2.567487 
(0.000)* 
2.250017 
(0.000)* 
2.23405 
(0.000)* 
         
Adj. R-Squared 0.9198 0.9338 0.9700 0.9632 0.9648 0.9557 0.9608 0.9610 
P-values in parentheses 
*significant at the 10% level or better  
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Table 14: MLB Regression Models: Dependent Variable Average Attendance per Game 
as a Percent of Capacity 
 
Independent 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
PlayoffPct 4.027763 
(0.002)* 
3.291366 
(0.008)* 
0.526971 
(0.376) 
-0.95556 
(0.099)* 
-1.11665 
(0.056)* 
0.015168 
(0.448) 
-0.90857 
(0.124) 
-0.7907 
(0.203) 
PlayoffPct2 -7.22229 
(0.019)* 
-4.92086 
(0.110) 
-1.05754 
(0.462) 
1.401137 
(0.312) 
1.714346 
(0.215) 
 1.125068 
(0.399) 
0.85373 
(0.544) 
         
RealTicketPrice 0.016878 
(0.000)* 
0.013894 
(0.000)* 
0.007711 
(0.000)* 
0.010389 
(0.000)* 
0.011220 
(0.000)* 
 0.010252 
(0.000)* 
0.01015 
(0.000)* 
         
AvgStadiumAge 0.002323 
(0.203) 
0.003171 
(0.073)* 
0.007974 
(0.000)* 
     
NewFranchise    0.004628 
(0.465) 
    
Relocation    -0.00062 
(0.969) 
    
NewStadium    -0.00389 
(0.494) 
    
NewFranchise3     0.007477 
(0.236) 
-0.00674 
(0.449) 
0.004595 
(0.465) 
0.00201 
(0.756) 
Relocation3     -0.00751 
(0.623) 
0.037214 
(0.083)* 
0.001611 
(0.917) 
0.00540 
(0.745) 
NewStadium3     -0.00573 
(0.260) 
0.010676 
(0.123) 
-0.00831 
(0.139) 
-0.0089 
(0.097)* 
         
SeasonalCB  -0.06906 
(0.006) 
-0.00161 
(0.889) 
-0.01977 
(0.349) 
-0.02914 
(0.229) 
0.035391 
(0.302) 
  
MidSeasonalCB       -0.00587 
(0.840) 
 
CenSeasonalCB        0.01927 
(0.553) 
         
Strike72  -0.12265 
(0.048)* 
-0.03835 
(0.156) 
-0.04239 
(0.199) 
-0.02791 
(0.398) 
-0.08650 
(0.078)* 
-0.03486 
(0.311) 
-0.0430 
(0.237) 
Strike81  -0.16440 
(0.042)* 
-0.01669 
(0.641) 
0.050599 
(0.220) 
0.050916 
(0.210) 
-0.02077 
(0.710) 
0.067053 
(0.115) 
0.06294 
(0.131) 
Strike94  -0.07768 
(0.247) 
-0.03944 
(0.176) 
-0.05801 
(0.073)* 
-0.05478 
(0.092)* 
-0.12712 
(0.006)* 
-0.04243 
(0.211) 
-0.0390 
(0.249) 
         
PopulationUS   1.11e-09 
(0.233) 
     
PerCapIncome   0.000011 
(0.044)* 
     
AttendanceTrend    0.000044 
(0.000)* 
0.000044 
(0.000)* 
0.000047 
(0.000)* 
0.000046 
(0.000)* 
0.00005 
(0.000)* 
         
Adj. R-Squared 0.8031 0.8428 0.9711 0.9656 0.9670 0.9196 0.9639 0.9642 
P-values in parentheses 
*significant at the 10% level or better 
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Table 15: MLB Regression Models: Dependent Variable Average Attendance per Game 
Weighted by Ticket Price 
 
Independent 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
PlayoffPct 152522.6 
(0.075)* 
45807.5 
(0.526) 
15169.59 
(0.627) 
-45055.4 
(0.168) 
-51984.7 
(0.111) 
-26673.6 
(0.004)* 
-49091.0 
(0.113) 
-50700.6 
(0.119) 
PlayoffPct2 -152506 
(0.452) 
148631.7 
(0.403) 
-32337.9 
(0.672) 
52323.44 
(0.519) 
65590.18 
(0.414) 
 48712.97 
(0.499) 
51608.35 
(0.492) 
         
AvgCapacity 0.329013 
(0.074)* 
0.594996 
(0.001)* 
0.082630 
(0.289) 
-0.10052 
(0.365) 
-0.12439 
(0.310) 
-0.16904 
(0.124) 
-0.06075 
(0.586) 
-0.06253 
(0.583) 
         
AvgStadiumAge 29.457 
(0.810) 
131.206 
(0.202) 
401.9201 
(0.000)* 
     
NewFranchise    155.2004 
(0.651) 
    
Relocation    175.0886 
(0.841) 
    
NewStadium    238.4603 
(0.432) 
    
NewFranchise3     469.4328 
(0.171) 
431.8108 
(0.201) 
485.0049 
(0.135) 
433.7118 
(0.200) 
Relocation3     -377.236 
(0.653) 
-411.872 
(0.622) 
200.7691 
(0.799) 
202.8171 
(0.813) 
NewStadium3     185.1297 
(0.480) 
202.8035 
(0.436) 
50.17173 
(0.853) 
20.70956 
(0.937) 
         
SeasonalCB  -1838.47 
(0.240) 
15.46564 
(0.980) 
-496.660 
(0.664) 
-1473.17 
(0.273) 
-1470.15 
(0.271) 
 
 
 
MidSeasonalCB       -578.290 
(0.695) 
 
CenSeasonalCB        -58.5037 
(0.972) 
         
Strike72  -5916.17 
(0.100)* 
-1458.15 
(0.301) 
-1398.07 
(0.433) 
-700.478 
(0.700) 
-870.514 
(0.628) 
-1045.15 
(0.554) 
-1096.30 
(0.561) 
Strike81  -20284.8 
(0.000)* 
-1193.36 
(0.541) 
3370.743 
(0.163) 
3577.46 
(0.130) 
4332.582 
(0.048)* 
4846.042 
(0.040)* 
4675.889 
(0.045)* 
Strike94  -10156.5 
(0.009)* 
-1874.41 
(0.226) 
-3667.10 
(0.036)* 
-3976.65 
(0.024)* 
-3618.92 
(0.031)* 
-3131.88 
(0.068)* 
-3089.95 
(0.073)* 
         
PopulationUS   0.000085 
(0.069)* 
     
PerCapIncome   0.585887 
(0.041)* 
     
AttendanceTrend    2.831647 
(0.000)* 
2.849528 
(0.000)* 
2.856268 
(0.000)* 
2.950598 
(0.000)* 
2.960339 
(0.000)* 
         
Adj. R-Squared 0.6714 0.7928 0.9688 0.9555 0.9576 0.9579 0.9572 0.9571 
P-values in parentheses 
*significant at the 10% level or better 
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Table 16: MLB Regression Models: Dependent Variable First Difference of Average 
Attendance per Game 
 
Independent 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
PlayoffPctFD -44218.4 
(0.199) 
-15834.1 
(0.640) 
-15547.6 
(0.650) 
-136511 
(0.001)* 
-140136 
(0.002)* 
-15027.6 
(0.025)* 
-146731 
(0.002)* 
-154082 
(0.001)* 
PlayoffPct2FD 53089.21 
(0.483) 
-14161.4 
(0.846) 
13829.01 
(0.852) 
255488.6 
(0.002)* 
260808.6 
(0.005)* 
 277609 
(0.004)* 
298958.1 
(0.002)* 
         
AvgCapacityFD 0.378257 
(0.062)* 
0.343346 
(0.086)* 
0.400030 
(0.065)* 
-0.01408 
(0.952) 
-0.26039 
(0.353) 
0.199832 
(0.436) 
-0.23223 
(0.393) 
-0.30569 
(0.245) 
RealTicketPriFD 35.18839 
(0.520) 
26.81555 
(0.605) 
23.6979 
(0.653) 
35.97851 
(0.370) 
57.48675 
(0.181) 
30.98582 
(0.501) 
-27.7122 
(0.904) 
-14.1976 
(0.948) 
         
AvgStadAgeFD 73.77754 
(0.517) 
50.39642 
(0.645) 
94.04369 
(0.446) 
     
NewFranchise    1061.758 
(0.001)* 
  889.7354 
(0.003)* 
1133.058 
(0.000)* 
Relocation    29.44014 
(0.962) 
  866.9453 
(0.314) 
569.8633 
(0.491) 
NewStadium    -69.9777 
(0.731) 
  -2.31529 
(0.993) 
0.622449 
(0.998) 
NewFranchise3     652.9566 
(0.005)* 
317.3333 
(0.131) 
 
 
 
Relocation3     261.7057 
(0.619) 
-434.343 
(0.407) 
 
 
 
NewStadium3     -252.176 
(0.137) 
-122.951 
(0.493) 
  
         
SeasonalCBFD  53.59384 
(0.918) 
154.537 
(0.772) 
-942.700 
(0.169) 
-29.6292 
(0.961) 
-374.669 
(0.574) 
  
MidSeasonCBFD       501.5733 
(0.542) 
 
CenSeasonCBFD        -1876.32 
(0.059)* 
         
Strike72  -885.537 
(0.461) 
-995.094 
(0.415) 
-898.797 
(0.422) 
-1097.81 
(0.346) 
-365.579 
(0.771) 
-1844.63 
(0.196) 
-1105.49 
(0.430) 
Strike81  -1020.55 
(0.532) 
-1125.27 
(0.501) 
801.1162 
(0.560) 
1321.85 
(0.402) 
-244.774 
(0.881) 
1335.777 
(0.411) 
1493.813 
(0.332) 
Strike94  -4955.9 
(0.002)* 
-4905.12 
(0.003)* 
-2512.68 
(0.061)* 
-2834.49 
(0.049)* 
-4484.9 
(0.003)* 
-2949.43 
(0.055)* 
-3229.08 
(0.029)* 
         
PopulationUSFD   0.000153 
(0.416) 
     
PerCapIncFD   0.229515 
(0.497) 
     
AttendTrendFD    0.813860 
(0.033)* 
0.904306 
(0.024)* 
0.841107 
(0.055)* 
0.391234 
(0.375) 
0.522442 
(0.221) 
         
Adj. R-Squared 0.2640 0.3541 0.3451 0.5680 0.5298 0.4455 0.5489 0.5910 
P-values in parentheses 
*significant at the 10% level or better 
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Table 17: MLB Regression Models: Dependent Variable First Difference of Average 
Attendance per Game as a Percent of Capacity 
 
Independent 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model8 
PlayoffPctFD -0.88908 
(0.205) 
-0.29611 
(0.675) 
-0.32282 
(0.650) 
-2.22390 
(0.003)* 
-1.64771 
(0.034)* 
-0.25896 
(0.045)* 
-1.95993 
(0.033)* 
-2.01749 
(0.025)* 
PlayoffPct2FD 1.112199 
(0.471) 
0.284368 
(0.853) 
0.337064 
(0.826) 
4.160938 
(0.008)* 
2.976016 
(0.068)* 
 3.701831 
(0.055)* 
3.900459 
(0.040)* 
         
RealTicketPriFD 0.000698 
(0.538) 
0.000579 
(0.596) 
0.000484 
(0.661) 
0.000662 
(0.435) 
0.000836 
(0.357) 
0.000633 
(0.496) 
-0.00176 
(0.732) 
-0.00154 
(0.760) 
         
AvgStadAgeFD 0.000780 
(0.736) 
0.000496 
(0.825) 
0.001329 
(0.584) 
     
NewFranchise    0.018855 
(0.002)* 
  0.015499 
(0.018)* 
0.018144 
(0.005)* 
Relocation    -0.00825 
(0.483) 
  -0.00552 
(0.728) 
-0.01130 
(0.490) 
NewStadium    0.001168 
(0.785) 
  0.005992 
(0.294) 
0.006154 
(0.270) 
NewFranchise3     0.008561 
(0.053)* 
0.005542 
(0.184) 
  
Relocation3     -0.00616 
(0.539) 
-0.01073 
(0.289) 
  
NewStadium3     -0.00186 
(0.598) 
-0.00087 
(0.810) 
  
         
SeasonalCBFD  -0.00078 
(0.943) 
0.001089 
(0.921) 
-0.01893 
(0.191) 
-0.00176 
(0.895) 
-0.00795 
(0.552) 
  
MidSeasonCBFD       0.003113 
(0.865) 
 
CenSeasonCBFD        -0.02542 
(0.252) 
         
Strike72  -0.01828 
(0.470) 
-0.02111 
(0.409) 
-0.00820 
(0.717) 
-0.00942 
(0.698) 
-0.00579 
(0.817) 
-0.01097 
(0.705) 
0.001337 
(0.965) 
Strike81  -0.02412 
(0.469) 
-0.02362 
(0.481) 
-0.00517 
(0.845) 
-0.01050 
(0.723) 
-0.01492 
(0.625) 
-0.00605 
(0.853) 
-0.00759 
(0.810) 
Strike94  -0.09622 
(0.004)* 
-0.09503 
(0.005)* 
-0.05541 
(0.048)* 
-0.07355 
(0.015)* 
-0.08946 
(0.003)* 
-0.07287 
(0.032)* 
-0.07719 
(0.021)* 
         
PopulationUSFD   3.46e-09 
(0.345) 
     
PerCapIncFD   5.59e-06 
(0.429) 
     
AttendTrendFD    0.000017 
(0.033)* 
0.000019 
(0.033)* 
0.000017 
(0.052)* 
4.45e-06 
(0.646) 
5.94e-06 
(0.536) 
         
Adj. R-Squared 0.1959 0.2691 0.2681 0.4531 0.3753 0.3666 0.4322 0.4536 
P-values in parentheses 
*significant at the 10% level or better 
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Table 18: MLB Regression Models: Dependent Variable First Difference of Average 
Attendance per Game Weighted by Ticket Price 
 
Independent 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
PlayoffPctFD -46581.3 
(0.187) 
-19331.0 
(0.587) 
-18444.2 
(0.610) 
-128672 
(0.003)* 
-135822 
(0.005)* 
-15419.5 
(0.028)* 
-142491 
(0.004)* 
-150640 
(0.002)* 
PlayoffPct2FD -57179.9 
(0.460) 
19461.06 
(0.800) 
17860.18 
(0.819) 
238098.7 
(0.007)* 
251235.9 
(0.010)* 
 267508.7 
(0.009)* 
290303.4 
(0.004)* 
         
AvgCapacityFD 0.364848 
(0.078)* 
0.332815 
(0.111) 
0.394985 
(0.083)* 
0.025066 
(0.924) 
-0.22534 
(0.445) 
0.211557 
(0.431) 
-0.23285 
(0.439) 
-0.31275 
(0.285) 
         
AvgStadAgeFD 23.47908 
(0.834) 
11.63258 
(0.915) 
59.44349 
(0.633) 
     
NewFranchise    954.3031 
(0.004)* 
  812.4451 
(0.014)* 
1051.694 
(0.001)* 
Relocation    -97.0381 
(0.890) 
  883.401 
(0.324) 
555.261 
(0.523) 
NewStadium    -8.79568 
(0.969) 
  53.98414 
(0.830) 
61.18127 
(0.798) 
NewFranchise3     689.2177 
(0.007)* 
355.6822 
(0.126) 
  
Relocation3     15.04142 
(0.978) 
-612.343 
(0.268) 
  
NewStadium3     -268.406 
(0.133) 
-159.546 
(0.394) 
  
         
SeasonalCBFD  -68.8779 
(0.899) 
23.56854 
(0.966) 
-955.916 
(0.219) 
-358.676 
(0.591) 
-688.002 
(0.338) 
  
MidSeasonCBFD       379.1606 
(0.677) 
 
CenSeasonCBFD        -1973.14 
(0.074)* 
         
Strike72  -930.393 
(0.461) 
-1009.32 
(0.432) 
-849.336 
(0.500) 
-919.557 
(0.458) 
-244.826 
(0.852) 
-1833.47 
(0.236) 
-1032.29 
(0.501) 
Strike81  -1091.02 
(0.525) 
-1240.07 
(0.481) 
500.4444 
(0.747) 
875.5235 
(0.600) 
-606.077 
(0.724) 
1179.394 
(0.511) 
1302.034 
(0.445) 
Strike94  -4535.03 
(0.007)* 
-4486.23 
(0.008)* 
-2350.94 
(0.114) 
-2579.91 
(0.088)* 
-4133.75 
(0.009)* 
-2631.82 
(0.113) 
-2923.82 
(0.067)* 
         
PopulationUSFD   0.000161 
(0.416) 
     
PerCapIncFD   0.156767 
(0.656) 
     
AttendTrendFD    0.775845 
(0.068)* 
0.804125 
(0.057)* 
0.740683 
(0.105) 
0.258432 
(0.582) 
0.386837 
(0.395) 
         
Adj. R-Squared 0.2696 0.3278 0.3188 0.4900 0.4718 0.3888 0.4725 0.5180 
P-values in parentheses 
*significant at the 10% level or better 
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Table 19: NHL Regression Models: Dependent Variable Average Attendance per Game  
 
Independent 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
PlayoffPct -136382 
(0.505) 
-30575.2 
(0.850) 
-289620 
(0.070)* 
-140120 
(0.431) 
-26347.0 
(0.810) 
-4336.87 
(0.000)* 
-19176.5 
(0.885) 
-26525 
(0.809) 
PlayoffPct2 116761 
(0.514) 
20980.36 
(0.882) 
260722.7 
(0.068)* 
117122.6 
(0.452) 
10654.47 
(0.913) 
 2052.223 
(0.986) 
10403.9 
(0.915) 
         
AvgCapacity 1.486745 
(0.025)* 
0.401108 
(0.495) 
-1.70937 
(0.052)* 
-0.40249 
(0.394) 
-0.61694 
(0.187) 
-0.08813 
(0.689) 
-0.66428 
(0.187) 
-0.5933 
(0.227) 
RealTicketPrice 23.84968 
(0.204) 
17.22342 
(0.297) 
20.32685 
(0.203) 
14.08638 
(0.428) 
17.11049 
(0.307) 
 15.25823 
(0.358) 
19.3576 
(0.213) 
         
AvgStadiumAge 99.11264 
(0.008)* 
62.86595 
(0.051)* 
-125.732 
(0.074)* 
     
NewFranchise    -127.577 
(0.418) 
    
Relocation    258.6233 
(0.212) 
    
NewStadium    -37.8434 
(0.628) 
    
NewFranchise3     -246.097 
(0.081)* 
-284.722 
(0.000)* 
-283.088 
(0.023)* 
-274.48 
(0.018)* 
Relocation3     346.5524 
(0.040)* 
-349.462 
(0.043)* 
302.1305 
(0.081)* 
346.110 
(0.041)* 
NewStadium3     27.81334 
(0.761) 
122.1127 
(0.057)* 
79.11876 
(0.466) 
28.6824 
(0.756) 
         
SeasonalCB  -888.327 
(0.015) 
-103.948 
(0.747) 
-624.660 
(0.126) 
-208.290 
(0.556) 
-665.104 
(0.003)* 
  
MidSeasonalCB       1.748512 
(0.996) 
 
CenSeasonalCB        -211.64 
(0.574) 
         
Lockout94  -775.76 
(0.059)* 
192.0465 
(0.631) 
-1130.45 
(0.030)* 
-493.184 
(0.276) 
-482.809 
(0.369) 
-418.16 
(0.167) 
-357.95 
(0.304) 
Lockout04  298.2585 
(0.306) 
265.2278 
(0.221) 
107.3378 
(0.703) 
16.39477 
(0.931) 
-87.7621 
(0.865) 
-51.6256 
(0.815) 
-73.063 
(0.713) 
Lockout12  411.2097 
(0.159) 
199.4063 
(0.564) 
517.1658 
(0.034)* 
252.6435 
(0.225) 
722.2608 
(0.175) 
 200.935 
(0.340) 
         
PopulationUS   0.000028 
(0.094)* 
     
PerCapIncome   0.278326 
(0.035)* 
     
AttendanceTrend    0.255549 
(0.034)* 
0.256939 
(0.006)* 
0.214007 
(0.000)* 
0.272557 
(0.004)* 
0.25263 
(0.010)* 
         
Adj. R-Squared 0.6930 0.8174 0.9120 0.8380 0.9299 0.9157 0.9001 0.9295 
P-values in parentheses 
*significant at the 10% level or better 
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Table 20: NHL Regression Models: Dependent Variable First Difference of Average 
Attendance per Game as a Percent of Capacity 
 
Independent 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
PlayoffPct -7.39701 
(0.506) 
-2.62434 
(0.763) 
-4.52770 
(0.681) 
-15.0210 
(0.280) 
-6.70089 
(0.496) 
-0.07119 
(0.275) 
-12.2847 
(0.295) 
-6.2009 
(0.507) 
PlayoffPct2 6.143192 
(0.527) 
2.124376 
(0.780) 
3.931069 
(0.688) 
13.25097 
(0.275) 
6.201042 
(0.475) 
 11.1302 
(0.289) 
5.64122 
(0.494) 
         
RealTicketPrice 0.001333 
(0.192) 
0.000953 
(0.286) 
0.000959 
(0.465) 
0.000045 
(0.973) 
-0.00063 
(0.620) 
 0.000193 
(0.895) 
-0.0001 
(0.919) 
         
AvgStadiumAge 0.004246 
(0.005)* 
0.004308 
(0.004)* 
0.003551 
(0.175) 
     
NewFranchise    -0.00291 
(0.809) 
    
Relocation    0.023917 
(0.133) 
    
NewStadium    -0.00402 
(0.514) 
    
NewFranchise3     0.001499 
(0.863) 
-0.01103 
(0.010)* 
-0.00422 
(0.533) 
-0.0045 
(0.447) 
Relocation3     0.030348 
(0.029)* 
-0.02723 
(0.038) 
0.024905 
(0.095)* 
0.02914 
(0.028)* 
NewStadium3     -0.01117 
(0.082)* 
0.004776 
(0.310) 
-0.00940 
(0.222) 
-0.0108 
(0.070)* 
         
SeasonalCB  -0.04214 
(0.016)* 
-0.03451 
(0.181) 
-0.03256 
(0.287) 
-0.04404 
(0.145) 
-0.04000 
(0.017)* 
  
MidSeasonalCB       -0.03157 
(0.270) 
 
CenSeasonalCB        -0.0493 
(0.095)* 
         
Lockout94  -0.03278 
(0.079)* 
-0.02273 
(0.464) 
-0.01999 
(0.453) 
-0.04609 
(0.250) 
0.016618 
(0.670) 
-0.00757 
(0.736) 
-0.0190 
(0.516) 
Lockout04  0.013397 
(0.380) 
0.011814 
(0.507) 
-0.00272 
(0.901) 
0.001004 
(0.954) 
-0.01279 
(0.745) 
0.001782 
(0.931) 
-0.0181 
(0.268) 
Lockout12  0.022652 
(0.151) 
0.035661 
(0.118) 
0.039776 
(0.029)* 
0.023583 
(0.191) 
0.045412 
(0.264) 
 0.01454 
(0.425) 
         
PopulationUS   1.91e-10 
(0.864) 
     
PerCapIncome   1.52e-06 
(0.835) 
     
AttendanceTrend    0.000013 
(0.137) 
9.56e-06 
(0.119) 
1.47e-06 
(0.300) 
0.000013 
(0.040)* 
8.3e-06 
(0.163) 
         
Adj. R-Squared 0.4415 0.6696 0.5969 0.3613 0.6375 0.4625 0.4828 0.6727 
P-values in parentheses 
*significant at the 10% level or better 
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Table 21: NHL Regression Models: Dependent Variable First Difference of Average 
Attendance per Game 
 
Independent 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
PlayoffPctFD -148296 
(0.377) 
-60159.4 
(0.028)* 
-56569.1 
(0.046)* 
-68101.7 
(0.012)* 
-67279.3 
(0.031)* 
93.28751 
(0.972) 
-56089.2 
(0.037)* 
-60447.9 
(0.019)* 
PlayoffPct2FD 132620.2 
(0.371) 
49586.63 
(0.027)* 
46986.93 
(0.042)* 
55863.12 
(0.011)* 
55296.86 
(0.030)* 
 46029.55 
(0.036)* 
49518.87 
(0.019)* 
         
AvgCapacityFD -1.15030 
(0.146) 
1.21585 
(0.000)* 
1.209425 
(0.000)* 
0.366321 
(0.317) 
1.027953 
(0.010)* 
0.899247 
(0.027)* 
0.381375 
(0.311) 
0.374380 
(0.328) 
RealTicketPriFD 5.621903 
(0.784) 
       
         
AvgStadAgeFD -96.4362 
(0.080)* 
116.1586 
(0.000)* 
115.4329 
(0.000)* 
     
NewFranchise    -324.328 
(0.000)* 
  -337.212 
(0.000)* 
-332.230 
(0.000)* 
Relocation    -112.852 
(0.565) 
  -152.754 
(0.445) 
-138.758 
(0.482) 
NewStadium    142.5199 
(0.134) 
  121.4005 
(0.213) 
128.8015 
(0.188) 
NewFranchise3     -161.298 
(0.013)* 
-155.182 
(0.022)* 
  
Relocation3     -47.6254 
(0.808) 
-7.53462 
(0.971) 
  
NewStadium3     18.24956 
(0.785) 
23.77416 
(0.735) 
  
         
SeasonalCBFD  -2.98998 
(0.990) 
-6.00014 
(0.980) 
239.956 
(0.327) 
364.2401 
(0.190) 
176.4728 
(0.522) 
  
MidSeasonCBFD       -167.489 
(0.538) 
 
CenSeasonCBFD        -23.8569 
(0.907) 
         
Lockout94  560.7413 
(0.305) 
552.5871 
(0.322) 
9.177541 
(0.986) 
404.8636 
(0.508) 
332.543 
(0.604) 
241.7914 
(0.709) 
-72.6770 
(0.890) 
Lockout04  133.7103 
(0.803) 
96.50584 
(0.871) 
-233.490 
(0.668) 
-120.701 
(0.850) 
-57.7987 
(0.931) 
-97.6470 
(0.863) 
-172.056 
(0.754) 
Lockout12  152.0619 
(0.778) 
1941.875 
(0.241) 
-16.4185 
(0.975) 
57.15372 
(0.926) 
65.83017 
(0.919) 
 -0.64434 
(0.999) 
         
PopulationUSFD   -4.0e-06 
(0.956) 
     
PerCapIncFD   0.111366 
(0.497) 
     
AttendTrendFD    0.283612 
(0.014)* 
0.194056 
(0.129) 
0.174975 
(0.190) 
0.230257 
(0.044)* 
0.245086 
(0.030)* 
         
Adj. R-Squared -0.0528 0.3904 0.3668 0.4351 0.2326 0.1525 0.4329 0.4207 
P-values in parentheses 
*significant at the 10% level or better 
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Table 22: NHL Regression Models: Dependent Variable First Difference of Average 
Attendance per Game as a Percent of Capacity 
 
Independent 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
PlayoffPctFD -1.33052 
(0.903) 
-3.58417 
(0.037)* 
-3.35631 
(0.059)* 
-4.52866 
(0.008)* 
-4.17161 
(0.032)* 
0.005724 
(0.972) 
-3.68031 
(0.033)* 
-3.93461 
(0.017)* 
PlayoffPct2FD 1.085207 
(0.910) 
2.951888 
(0.036)* 
2.787474 
(0.054)* 
3.714835 
(0.008)* 
3.429443 
(0.031)* 
 3.018755 
(0.032)* 
3.222335 
(0.017)* 
         
RealTicketPriFD 0.000036 
(0.980) 
       
         
AvgStadAgeFD 0.000940 
(0.649) 
0.007605 
(0.000)* 
0.007559 
(0.000)* 
     
NewFranchise    -0.01916 
(0.000)* 
  -0.02012 
(0.000)* 
-0.01988 
(0.000)* 
Relocation    -0.01050 
(0.391) 
  -0.01324 
(0.291) 
-0.01208 
(0.330) 
NewStadium    0.005824 
(0.294) 
  0.00447 
(0.433) 
0.004627 
(0.411) 
NewFranchise3     -0.01081 
(0.009)* 
-0.01036 
(0.015)* 
  
Relocation3     -0.00133 
(0.911) 
-0.00033 
(0.998) 
  
NewStadium3     -0.00154 
(0.709) 
0.001592 
(0.713) 
  
         
SeasonalCBFD  0.000234 
(0.988) 
0.000083 
(0.996) 
0.018605 
(0.234) 
0.026390 
(0.133) 
0.014696 
(0.398) 
  
MidSeasonCBFD       -0.00960 
(0.581) 
 
CenSeasonCBFD        -0.00497 
(0.695) 
         
Lockout94  0.037840 
(0.276) 
0.037297 
(0.292) 
-0.00104 
(0.975) 
0.026179 
(0.498) 
0.021499 
(0.595) 
0.015990 
(0.695) 
-0.00778 
(0.817) 
Lockout04  0.003306 
(0.922) 
0.000808 
(0.983) 
-0.01374 
(0.690) 
-0.01293 
(0.747) 
-0.00807 
(0.848) 
-0.00477 
(0.894) 
-0.00972 
(0.780) 
Lockout12  0.004844 
(0.888) 
0.070626 
(0.482) 
-0.00098 
(0.977) 
-0.00116 
(0.976) 
0.000633 
(0.988) 
 -0.00059 
(0.986) 
         
PopulationUSFD   -2.3e-10 
(0.960) 
     
PerCapIncFD   7.23e-06 
(0.487) 
     
AttendTrendFD    0.000015 
(0.031)* 
0.000013 
(0.097)* 
0.000011 
(0.169) 
0.000011 
(0.099)* 
0.000012 
(0.075)* 
         
Adj. R-Squared -0.3009 0.2848 0.2582 0.3331 0.1106 0.0214 0.3224 0.3110 
P-values in parentheses 
*significant at the 10% level or better 
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Table 23: NBA Regression Models: Dependent Variable Average Attendance per Game 
 
Independent 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
PlayoffPct -344781 
(0.331) 
-252024 
(0.537) 
-353190 
(0.438) 
345476.8 
(0.496) 
573193.4 
(0.332) 
-3970.46 
(0.066)* 
691648.6 
(0.191) 
841870 
(0.076)* 
PlayoffPct2 289087.3 
(0.363) 
206755.2 
(0.572) 
299035.8 
(0.459) 
-319864 
(0.480) 
-526878 
(0.319) 
 -633007 
(0.181) 
-763891 
(0.072)* 
         
AvgCapacity 0.051135 
(0.678) 
0.127400 
(0.463) 
0.116612 
(0.511) 
0.186319 
(0.258) 
0.079672 
(0.634) 
0.191958 
(0.014)* 
0.038046 
(0.810) 
0.18976 
(0.239) 
RealTicketPrice -12.0462 
(0.460) 
-8.36737 
(0.652) 
-6.29583 
(0.776) 
-31.1821 
(0.144) 
-41.4605 
(0.216) 
 -44.9195 
(0.136) 
-46.418 
(0.063)* 
         
AvgStadiumAge -45.0198 
(0.447) 
-11.2408 
(0.880) 
-53.1904 
(0.587) 
     
NewFranchise    338.6087 
(0.062)* 
    
Relocation    -137.585 
(0.383) 
    
NewStadium    43.31886 
(0.350) 
    
NewFranchise3     147.6985 
(0.482) 
329.1997 
(0.033)* 
62.82959 
(0.723) 
50.3909 
(0.741) 
Relocation3     -197.441 
(0.274) 
-45.2075 
(0.855) 
-132.763 
(0.451) 
-201.13 
(0.205) 
NewStadium3     42.16419 
(0.659) 
291.1153 
(0.007)* 
57.83292 
(0.544) 
12.1605 
(0.876) 
         
SeasonalCB  -42.3775 
(0.879) 
-171.635 
(0.617) 
-310.163 
(0.220) 
-431.921 
(0.133) 
-268.012 
(0.445) 
 
 
 
MidSeasonalCB       -480.579 
(0.225) 
 
CenSeasonalCB        -530.11 
(0.039)* 
         
Lockout98  -388.793 
(0.479) 
-365.218 
(0.568) 
-616.254 
(0.155) 
-599.305 
(0.227) 
-289.765 
(0.759) 
-1279.38 
(0.038)* 
-886.34 
(0.079)* 
Lockout11  -202.268 
(0.559) 
-370.459 
(0.331) 
-327.598 
(0.267) 
-509.258 
(0.155) 
-362.621 
(0.703) 
-622.116 
(0.143) 
-480.83 
(0.107) 
         
PopulationUS   0.000025 
(0.278) 
     
PerCapIncome   -0.15412 
(0.219) 
     
AttendanceTrend    0.258752 
(0.038)* 
0.283770 
(0.034)* 
0.945824 
(0.000)* 
0.305349 
(0.027)* 
0.32721 
(0.007)* 
         
Adj. R-Squared 0.7352 0.6954 0.6893 0.8009 0.7901 0.9583 0.7844 0.8331 
P-values in parentheses 
*significant at the 10% level or better 
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Table 24: NBA Regression Models: Dependent Variable Average Attendance per Game 
as a Percent of Capacity 
 
Independent 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
PlayoffPct -75.2753 
(0.016)* 
-27.0753 
(0.388) 
-35.9179 
(0.323) 
-31.6429 
(0.411) 
-40.3276 
(0.381) 
-0.21635 
(0.158) 
-18.4054 
(0.677) 
23.7224 
(0.512) 
PlayoffPct2 66.98022 
(0.017)* 
23.86202 
(0.395) 
31.54592 
(0.327) 
28.19854 
(0.409) 
36.08307 
(0.379) 
 16.54753 
(0.674) 
-21.048 
(0.513) 
         
RealTicketPrice -0.00229 
(0.131) 
-0.00108 
(0.450) 
-0.00067 
(0.705) 
-0.00129 
(0.450) 
0.000236 
(0.932) 
 -0.00097 
(0.716) 
-0.0022 
(0.262) 
         
AvgStadiumAge -0.00761 
(0.167) 
0.001512 
(0.792) 
0.009801 
(0.899) 
     
NewFranchise    0.031736 
(0.029)* 
    
Relocation    -0.00369 
(0.776) 
    
NewStadium    0.001827 
(0.634) 
    
NewFranchise3     0.028548 
(0.119) 
0.022953 
(0.039)* 
0.016100 
(0.330) 
0.00930 
(0.462) 
Relocation3     -0.00877 
(0.584) 
-0.00157 
(0.929) 
-0.00270 
(0.870) 
-0.0109 
(0.400) 
NewStadium3     -0.00393 
(0.640) 
0.012350 
(0.102) 
-0.00151 
(0.864) 
-0.0032 
(0.613) 
         
SeasonalCB  -0.02312 
(0.263) 
-0.03320 
(0.214) 
-0.02839 
(0.173) 
-0.03035 
(0.229) 
0.015577 
(0.507) 
  
MidSeasonalCB       -0.03796 
(0.304) 
 
CenSeasonalCB        -0.0518 
(0.009)* 
         
Lockout98  -0.09150 
(0.012)* 
-0.09863 
(0.029)* 
-0.08464 
(0.008)* 
-0.09558 
(0.018)* 
-0.05563 
(0.418) 
-0.10532 
(0.011)* 
-0.1135 
(0.002)* 
Lockout11  -0.02036 
(0.445) 
-0.02748 
(0.366) 
-0.01937 
(0.428) 
-0.01681 
(0.585) 
-0.00707 
(0.918) 
-0.02733 
(0.479) 
-0.0248 
(0.299) 
         
PopulationUS   8.17e-10 
(0.645) 
     
PerCapIncome   -7.50e-06 
(0.447) 
     
AttendanceTrend    8.99e-06 
(0.334) 
6.64e-06 
(0.521) 
0.000043 
(0.000)* 
9.91e-06 
(0.389) 
0.00002 
(0.066)* 
         
Adj. R-Squared 0.3768 0.5271 0.4770 0.6365 0.5529 0.8806 0.5520 0.6954 
P-values in parentheses 
*significant at the 10% level or better 
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Table 25: NBA Regression Models: Dependent Variable First Difference of Average 
Attendance per Game 
 
Independent 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
PlayoffPctFD -426922 
(0.218) 
-443741 
(0.204) 
-3187098 
(0.183) 
83992.64 
(0.695) 
-278190 
(0.470) 
857.4575 
(0.643) 
119062.5 
(0.621) 
-32554.6 
(0.855) 
PlayoffPct2FD 369301.1 
(0.228) 
380225.5 
(0.217) 
2777411 
(0.184) 
 
 
226711.6 
(0.507) 
   
         
AvgCapacityFD 0.108636 
(0.369) 
0.021719 
(0.862) 
0.041173 
(0.752) 
-0.00208 
(0.988) 
-0.05837 
(0.667) 
0.006694 
(0.926) 
0.046942 
(0.749) 
0.103778 
(0.348) 
RealTicketPriFD -10.8639 
(0.571) 
22.05495 
(0.391) 
17.64636 
(0.504) 
10.59618 
(0.758) 
-5.77110 
(0.854) 
 4.988469 
(0.892) 
21.62952 
(0.438) 
         
AvgStadAgeFD -86.2186 
(0.136) 
-34.8841 
(0.582) 
-37.1285 
(0.568) 
     
NewFranchise    292.4146 
(0.203) 
  2583.924 
(0.586) 
-454.583 
(0.897) 
Relocation    -77.1184 
(0.720) 
  -100.018 
(0.662) 
-34.9552 
(0.834) 
NewStadium    41.24658 
(0.483) 
  27.99275 
(0.662) 
38.86651 
(0.407) 
NewFranchise3     -205.656 
(0.334) 
51.4742 
(0.479) 
  
Relocation3     -317.12 
(0.127) 
-59.8978 
(0.620) 
  
NewStadium3     -29.0179 
(0.527) 
-3.19254 
(0.952) 
  
         
SeasonalCBFD  -358.319 
(0.168) 
-369.269 
(0.166) 
-415.905 
(0.155) 
-371.715 
(0.149) 
-139.611 
(0.459) 
  
MidSeasonCBFD       178.4109 
(0.633) 
 
CenSeasonCBFD        -587.152 
(0.012)* 
         
Lockout98  -1051.97 
(0.066)* 
-1107.43 
(0.080)* 
-1062.86 
(0.077)* 
-1123.69 
(0.041)* 
-799.248 
(0.157) 
-1028.54 
(0.094)* 
-1490.74 
(0.008)* 
Lockout11  -231.812 
(0.454) 
-380.257 
(0.268) 
-277.357 
(0.410) 
-546.843 
(0.114) 
-363.973 
(0.478) 
27.31281 
(0.826) 
-223.605 
(0.392) 
         
PopulationUSFD   -0.00039 
(0.232) 
     
PerCapIncFD   0.046485 
(0.741) 
     
AttendTrendFD    0.047134 
(0.590) 
0.027239 
(0.727) 
-0.02860 
(0.732) 
-0.02643 
(0.826) 
0.096560 
(0.248) 
         
Adj. R-Squared 0.3396 0.1789 0.1835 0.0725 0.2515 -0.1108 0.1140 0.3970 
P-values in parentheses 
*significant at the 10% level or better 
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Table 26: NBA Regression Models: Dependent Variable First Difference of Average 
Attendance per Game as a Percent of Capacity 
 
Independent 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
PlayoffPctFD -38.4409 
(0.233) 
-36.4626 
(0.322) 
-335.734 
(0.185) 
20.79703 
(0.372) 
-34.4425 
(0.448) 
0.011643 
(0.947) 
21.5959 
(0.360) 
9.564638 
(0.646) 
PlayoffPct2FD 34.29648 
(0.228) 
32.57564 
(0.316) 
294.0624 
(0.184) 
 
 
29.08353 
(0.471) 
   
         
RealTicketPriFD -0.00086 
(0.634) 
-0.00098 
(0.712) 
-0.00155 
(0.572) 
0.001441 
(0.703) 
0.002309 
(0.533) 
 0.001592 
(0.662) 
0.002702 
(0.406) 
         
AvgStadAgeFD -0.01089 
(0.036)* 
-0.01082 
(0.093)* 
-0.01117 
(0.094) 
     
NewFranchise    -0.01021 
(0.656) 
  0.426232 
(0.360) 
0.185888 
(0.652) 
Relocation    0.014893 
(0.516) 
  0.013480 
(0.535) 
0.016319 
(0.393) 
NewStadium    0.007631 
(0.225) 
  0.007426 
(0.224) 
0.007722 
(0.146) 
NewFranchise3     -0.03808 
(0.105) 
0.002342 
(0.733) 
  
Relocation3     0.011696 
(0.583) 
0.000260 
(0.982) 
  
NewStadium3     0.004195 
(0.415) 
-0.00154 
(0.759) 
  
         
SeasonalCBFD  0.007534 
(0.767) 
0.007434 
(0.775) 
-0.00323 
(0.914) 
0.005905 
(0.832) 
0.005689 
(0.745) 
  
MidSeasonCBFD       0.007673 
(0.835) 
 
CenSeasonCBFD        -0.04282 
(0.083)* 
         
Lockout98  0.008292 
(0.877) 
0.016321 
(0.780) 
-0.02046 
(0.733) 
-0.03191 
(0.585) 
-0.02209 
(0.676) 
-0.01426 
(0.817) 
-0.08957 
(0.119) 
Lockout11  0.010287 
(0.749) 
-0.00931 
(0.797) 
0.009808 
(0.782) 
0.003736 
(0.920) 
-0.00928 
(0.848) 
0.017542 
(0.711) 
0.002286 
(0.939) 
         
PopulationUSFD   -4.1e-08 
(0.231) 
     
PerCapIncFD   -7.2e-06 
(0.632) 
     
AttendTrendFD    -3.9e-06 
(0.677) 
1.35e-06 
(0.886) 
4.03e-06 
(0.607) 
-7.1e-06 
(0.546) 
1.51e-06 
(0.873) 
         
Adj. R-Squared 0.0822 -0.1157 -0.1454 -0.3175 -0.2529 -0.1654 -0.3256 0.0093 
P-values in parentheses 
*significant at the 10% level or better 
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Table 27: H1 Final Regression Models, Subset: Dependent Variable First Difference of 
Average Attendance per Game 
 
Independent 
Variable 
MLB 
Model 1       Model 2 
NHL (1979-2012) 
Model 1       Model 2 
NBA 
Model 1       Model 2 
PlayoffPctFD  -156950 
(0.001)* 
 -41074.5 
(0.390) 
 1124.393 
(0.586) 
PlayoffPct2FD  302537.8 
(0.002)* 
 33804.46 
(0.328) 
  
       
AvgCapacityFD 0.022403 
(0.946) 
-0.55468 
(0.085) 
0.310811 
(0.332) 
0.337372 
(0.319) 
-0.16447 
(0.105) 
-0.16139 
(0.119) 
RealTicketPriFD -345.632 
(0.207) 
-117.676 
(0.622) 
-16.4925 
(0.346) 
-19.0298 
(0.226) 
23.15256 
(0.362) 
21.62952 
(0.438) 
       
NewFranchise 566.7245 
(0.044)* 
1159.522 
(0.000)* 
-4.09273 
(0.961) 
-42.2438 
(0.697) 
336.0822 
(0.005)* 
367.9293 
(0.007)* 
Relocation 524.8115 
(0.783) 
2294.691 
(0.179) 
232.1095 
(0.248) 
268.2343 
(0.168) 
-81.0359 
(0.618) 
-63.9270 
(0.704) 
NewStadium 79.00202 
(0.799) 
-249.144 
(0.377) 
9.116865 
(0.910) 
-12.0888 
(0.878) 
-15.2248 
(0.767) 
-9.52549 
(0.858) 
       
CenSeasonCBFD -1477.45 
(0.206) 
-1848.99 
(0.077) 
-212.101 
(0.320) 
-231.057 
(0.263) 
-493.771 
(0.008)* 
-496.289 
(0.009)* 
       
Strike72 -948.902 
(0.676) 
-2730.64 
(0.174) 
    
Strike81 -2438.88 
(0.076) 
1436.668 
(0.368) 
    
Strike94 -6660.24 
(0.000)* 
-2883.28 
(0.054) 
    
Lockout94   176.8094 
(0.627) 
162.4826 
(0.641) 
  
Lockout04   60.81277 
(0.875) 
21.40535 
(0.954) 
  
Lockout12   122.7725 
(0.735) 
91.04904 
(0.794) 
  
Lockout98     -1373.30 
(0.004)* 
-1358.85 
(0.005)* 
Lockout11     -390.607 
(0.274) 
-372.482 
(0.307) 
       
AttendTrendFD -0.81909 
(0.336) 
-0.35844 
(0.643) 
0.151235 
(0.091) 
0.155415 
(0.073) 
0.145614 
(0.051) 
0.147084 
(0.054) 
       
Adj. R-Squared 0.4377 0.6196 0.1862 0.2596 0.4383 0.4191 
P-values in parentheses 
*significant at the 5% level or better 
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